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Evidence of actual confusion can present one of the most formidable challenges to 
an attorney representing a trademark defendant.  In a case where all other circumstances 
point to a finding of non-infringement, significant evidence of actual confusion 
dramatically alters the equation.  Such evidence can shift the focus away from other 
factors impacting the infringement analysis and drive litigation into discovery and 
evidentiary hearings, in contrast to the increasingly frequent tendency to determine 
infringement before discovery has commenced— from a paper record on a preliminary 
injunction. 
Yet, plaintiffs’ attorneys often draw a false sense of security from such evidence, 
which is often not what it appears, at first glance, to be.  Indeed, such evidence is 
typically characterized by vagueness, ambiguity, untrustworthy sources, and a host of 
unknown circumstances when sources are not identified or do not testify.  Furthermore, 
such evidence is frequently characterized by circumstances that do not reflect the 
commercial realities of how marks are used and how consumers react to them, as well as 
by widely varying quantities of incidents that are difficult to assess when viewed in light 
of various factors that may lead one to expect more or less of such evidence to have 
surfaced. 
From the perspective of courts, such evidence has a powerful allure.  In particular, 
in trademark litigation, judges (and sometimes juries) are given the difficult task of 
determining whether one mark is so like another that its use should be enjoined—based 
on predictions of whether the coexistence of those two marks is likely to confuse the 
consuming public rather than on subjective impressions about the mere similarity of the 
marks and whether the senior user should be afforded protection for the sheer creativity 
of the mark.  This task requires suspending one’s instinctive feelings about similarity of 
the marks and fairness to the creator and substituting a judgment about a likely 
commercial impact that, in reality, is frequently unclear and requires drawing inferences 
that inevitably involve highly subjective judgments.1  Evidence of actual confusion holds 
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1  See Harvey S. Perlman, The Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition:  A 
Work in Progress, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 461, 467, 471-72 (1990); Keith M. Stolte, 
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the allure of solving that problem by giving courts a window into what would appear to 
be actual commercial effects of the competing marks.2  Accordingly, courts frequently 
issue pronouncements that give preferred or favored status to evidence of actual 
confusion as a method of proving likelihood of confusion.3 
¶4 
¶5 
                                                                                                                                                
Nevertheless, commentators have recognized that evidence of actual confusion 
comes in many different varieties with widely varying degrees of probative value.  
Furthermore, judicial treatment of many types of such evidence has been inconsistent.4  
Thus, however powerful the allure of an objective measure for determining infringement, 
evidence of actual confusion is often not such a clear indicator of anything, and the 
interpretation of such evidence often requires highly subjective judgments.  Indeed, 
judicial pronouncements on actual confusion are often sweeping and, yet, diametrically 
opposed to each other, while failing to articulate sufficient rationale to provide 
meaningful guidance for future courts.  Accordingly, one commentator has concluded 
that many types of evidence accepted by courts as proof of actual confusion are not 
objective indicators of actual injury to the trademark owner.5 
It is the thesis of this article that greater consistency, coherence, and predictability 
and, ultimately, greater objectivity can be attained in cases involving actual confusion by 
articulating a set of factors that distill the many ways in which different types of evidence 
have produced different results under varying circumstances.  This approach is consistent 
with trademark law’s overall factor-based approach to determining the effect of different 
marks under varying commercial circumstances.6  Distilling such factors requires 
reviewing a vast body of caselaw, and this article undertakes such a review.  Section I 
introduces the place of actual confusion in the context of various courts’ standards for 
determining infringement.  Section II discusses the need for evidence of actual confusion, 
including the extent of any such need and the quantity of evidence necessary to establish 
actual confusion.  Section III reviews a host of circumstances that may impact the value 
of evidence of actual confusion.  Section IV appraises various tests that courts have 
articulated for assessing evidence of actual confusion.  Finally, in an effort to steer a 
course between the extreme, vague, and conflicting rhetoric that courts use to describe 
 
Remedying Judicial Limitations on Trademark Remedies:  Monetary Relief Should Not 
Require Proof of Actual Confusion, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 229, 244 (1997); Robert G. 
Sugarman & Doreen G. Small, Proving Likelihood of Confusion in Trademark Cases, 
TRIAL, March 1990, at 51. 
2  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23 cmt. b (1995); Edwin S. 
Clark, Finding Likelihood of Confusion With Actual Confusion:  A Critical Analysis of 
the Federal Courts’ Approach, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 393, 394-95, 397 (1992); 
Perlman, supra note 1, at 472; Stolte, supra note 1, at 245. 
3  See Clark, supra note 2, at 396; see also infra passim. 
4  See Michael J. Allen, The Role of Actual Confusion Evidence in Federal Trademark 
Infringement Litigation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 19, 20, 30-43 (1994); Stolte, supra note 1, 
at 246-47. 
5  See Stolte, supra note 1, at 245. 
6  See David J. McKinley, Trademark Litigation:  Infringement:  Proving Likelihood 
of Confusion:  Lanham Act vs. Restatement, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 239, 243 
(2001). 
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how such evidence should be assessed, Section V proposes a multi-factor test to provide 
clearer guidance. 














                                                
Trademark infringement is determined by the “likelihood of confusion” test.7  This 
test examines whether consumers are likely to be confused between products identified 
with the respective parties’ marks.  This likelihood of confusion is determined based 
upon the commercial realities of how the products are sold.  To determine whether 
consumers are likely to be confused by the respective parties’ marks on their products 
under the proper commercial circumstances, courts weigh a variety of non-exclusive 
factors. 
Although the factors typically enunciated in the test for infringement vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, they tend to include: 
The similarity of the respective parties’ marks; 
The similarity of the parties’ marketing methods; 
The similarity of the parties’ channels of distribution for their goods or 
services; 
The level of sophistication of the prospective purchasers for the respective 
parties’ goods or services, and the degree of care used in purchasing such 
goods or services; 
The source-designating strength of the mark sought to be protected; 
Where the second-comer’s goods or services differ from the first-comer’s, the 
likelihood that prospective purchasers of the second-comer’s goods or 
services would expect the first-comer to have expanded its marketing or 
sponsorship into the second-comer’s field; 
The extent of overlap in the parties’ geographic markets and whether the 
prior user is known by its mark in geographic markets in which it does not 
actually sell its goods or services; 
Whether the second-comer intended to copy the first-comer’s mark in order 
to cause confusion or deceive; and 
The degree of actual confusion that has surfaced as a result of the two parties’ 
respective marks.8 
Among other things, these factors are designed to ensure that the determination of 
whether one mark infringes another is not merely a subjective decision about whether the 
second-comer’s mark so closely resembles the first-comer’s mark that it would be unfair 
to allow the later entrant to continue.  Trademark law does not confer a “right in gross” to 
a mark but, rather, confers rights limited to what is necessary to prevent consumer 
 
7  See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 23:1 (Rel. 27 2003). 
8  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21-23. 
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confusion and protect the good will of the trademark owner.9  Thus, trademark 
infringement typically is not determined based solely upon a side-by-side comparison of 
the two marks.10 
¶9 
                                                
In determining whether confusion is likely, evidence of actual confusion is often 
given considerable weight and preferred status. Some courts view evidence of actual 
confusion as “persuasive” evidence of likelihood of confusion.11  Other courts have used 
a variety of adjectival phrases to describe the utility of the presence or lack of evidence of 
actual confusion.12  Some decisions even give evidence of actual confusion status as a 
 
9  See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984) 
(noting differences between trademark protection and copyright and patent protection); 
Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1979); see 
generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2:14 (discussing nature of property right 
conferred by trademark law). 
10  See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 382 (7th Cir. 
1976) (“[A] side-by-side comparison of the marks is not the proper test.”), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 830 (1976), superceded by statute as stated in Scandia Down Corp. v. 
Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir. 1985); Willowbrook Home Health Care Agency, 
Inc. v. Willow Brook Retirement Ctr., 769 S.W.2d 862, 867 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). 
11  See, e.g., Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 
319 (5th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted), reh’g denied, 659 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1981); AMF 
Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 352 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted); Carrington 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 683 P.2d 1220, 1227-28 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984) (citation 
omitted). 
12  See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 102 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (“very helpful”); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 228 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“highly effective” and “powerful indication”); Morningside Group Ltd. v. 
Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 141 (2d Cir. 1999) (“convincing 
evidence”) (citation omitted); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128 
F.3d 1111, 1118 (7th Cir. 1997) (“entitled to substantial weight”) (citations omitted); 
Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 937 (4th Cir. 
1995) (“entitled to substantial weight”) (citations omitted); Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 
617 F.2d 1178, 1186 (5th Cir. 1980) (“strong proof”); Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 
69 F.3d 1360, 1365 (7th Cir. 1995) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (“highly probative”); Tisch 
Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1965) (“substantial 
evidence”); Calamari Fisheries, Inc. v. Village Catch, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 994, 1011 (D. 
Mass. 1988) (“highly persuasive”) (citation omitted); KAT Video Prods., Inc. v. KKCT-
FM Radio, 584 N.W.2d 844, 848 (N.D. 1998) (“entitled to substantial weight”) (citation 
omitted); Alderman v. Iditarod Props., Inc., 32 P.3d 373, 392 (Alaska 2001) (“strong 
support”); Thompson v. Thompson Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 884 S.W.2d 555, 
560 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (“probative evidence”) (citation omitted); Bingham v. Inter-
Track Partners, 600 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992) (“weighs in favor of injunctive 
relief”) (citation omitted); McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 
1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“highly persuasive”); Ergon, Inc. v. Dean, 649 S.W.2d 772, 778 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (“strong proof”) (citations omitted).  
4 
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preferred method of proving infringement.13  Courts are receptive to inferring likely 
confusion from instances of actual confusion because instances of actual confusion are 
                                                 
13  See, e.g., Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat’l Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 422-23 
(4th Cir. 1998) (“of paramount importance” and “the best evidence”) (citations omitted); 
Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d 654, 660 
(4th Cir. 1996) (“patently the best evidence”) (citations omitted); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. 
Andres, 783 F.2d 421, 448 n.24 (4th Cir. 1986) (“the most persuasive factor”) (citation 
omitted); Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc., 43 F.3d at 937 (“the most compelling 
evidence”) (citations omitted); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 203 
(5th Cir. 1998) (“the best evidence”) (quoting Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 
F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980); Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 
F.2d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The best evidence of likelihood of confusion is provided 
by evidence of actual confusion.”) (citation omitted); Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O’Neal, 513 
F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1975) (“the best evidence”); World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s 
New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir. 1971) (“there can be no more positive or 
substantial proof of the likelihood of confusion than proof of actual confusion”); Daddy’s 
Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 284 (6th Cir. 
1998) (“undoubtedly the best evidence”) (quoting Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 
1183, 1188 (6th Cir. 1988)); Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 974 (10th 
Cir. 2002) (“the best indication”);  David Sherman Corp. v. Heublein, Inc., 340 F.2d 377, 
380 (8th Cir. 1965) (“[O]n occasion [the courts] have gone so far as to say that the best 
test of proving likelihood of deception is actual deception itself.”) (collecting authority); 
Plough, Inc. v. Kreis Labs., 314 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1963) (“[O]ne of the better ways 
to prove likelihood of confusion in the future is to prove it existed in the past.”); Jordache 
Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1987) (“the best 
evidence”); Union Carbide Corp., 531 F.2d at 383 (“the best evidence”) (citations 
omitted); Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co. 252 F.2d 65, 74 (10th Cir. 1958) (“no 
more positive proof”); E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int’l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 
1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1985) (“the best such evidence”) (citation omitted); Conagra, Inc. 
v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1515 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[t]he most persuasive proof”) 
(citation omitted); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 
1166 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Perhaps the most important single factor . . . is the presence of 
actual confusion.”); Waples-Platter Cos. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 439 F. Supp. 551, 582 
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (“the best evidence”); Willowbrook Home Health Care Agency, Inc., 
769 S.W.2d at 868 (“undoubtedly the best evidence”) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted); Gasoline Heaven at Commack, Inc. v. Neconset Gas Heaven, Inc., 743 
N.Y.S.2d 825, 828 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (“arguably the best evidence”) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted); Horseshoe Bay Resort Sales Co. v. Lake Lyndon B. 
Johnson Improvement Corp., 53 S.W.3d 799, 811 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (“the best 
evidence”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. 
Kaushik, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1254 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (characterizing actual confusion 
evidence as “weigh[ing] more heavily in favor of infringement than evidence supporting 
any of the other six factors”); Guillot v. Wagner, 731 So. 2d 335, 337 (La. Ct. App. 1999) 
(“best evidence”); Seafood Rest. Servs., Inc. v. Bonnano, 665 So. 2d 56, 60 (La. Ct. App. 
1995) (“patently the best evidence”) (citation omitted); Phipps Bros., Inc. v. Nelson’s Oil 
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seen as representative examples of how others in the marketplace are likely to react.14  As 
put by one court: “[a]ctual confusion is . . . extremely probative of the likelihood of 
confusion, in that proof of confusion by actual customers is strong evidence that a 
hypothetical reasonable customer would also be deceived.”15  As another court explained: 
“[i]f enough people have been actually confused, then a likelihood that people are 
confused is established.”16  Not all evidence of actual confusion, however, is entitled to 
preferred or favored status.  Rather, such evidence must first survive the particular level 
of scrutiny given to evidence of the types at issue by the jurisdiction in question.17 
¶10 
                                                                                                                                                
Notwithstanding this seeming judicial preference, statements giving undue weight 
to evidence of actual confusion are not consistent with other judicial pronouncements 
regarding the infringement test as a multi-factor test or with other judicial 
pronouncements giving preferred status to other factors in that test.  For example, a 
number of courts have stated that the similarity of the parties’ marks is the most 
important factor in determining likely confusion.18  Intuitively, that approach makes 
 
& Gas, Inc., 508 N.W.2d 885, 889 (S.D. 1993) (“no more positive or substantial proof”) 
(citations omitted); Ackerman Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Design Sec. Sys., Inc., 412 S.E.2d 588, 
589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (“obviously the best evidence”); Tio Pepe, Inc. v. El Tio Pepe de 
Miami Rest., Inc., 523 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (“of foremost 
importance”) (citations omitted).  
14  See, e.g., Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 466 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(“The anecdotal evidence, standing alone, is nearly overwhelming; indeed, we can but 
wonder how often the experiences related by the trial witnesses have been repeated—but 
not reported—in stores across the country”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 976 (1996); see 
generally Allen, supra note 4, at 22; Perlman, supra note 1, at 472; Stolte, supra note 1, 
at 244-45. 
15  Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Zim, 481 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (N.D. Tex. 1979) 
(collecting authority). 
16  Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(emphasis in original). 
17  See Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 319 
(5th Cir. 1981) (characterizing evidence of “past confusion” as “persuasive proof that 
future confusion is likely” but holding that reported instances of confusion were 
“negligible in light of extent of defendant’s activities and where “countervailing 
circumstances . . . lessen[ed] significantly the impact of any actual confusion which may 
have occurred”); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(“[T]his factor is weighed heavily only when there is evidence of past confusion or, 
perhaps, when the particular circumstances indicate such evidence should have been 
available.”); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., 481 F.2d 445, 448-49 (5th Cir. 
1973) (noting that plaintiff was attempting to use evidence of actual confusion to shift 
burden of proof to defendant but finding evidence of actual confusion to be insufficient). 
18  See, e.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 
270, 281 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 
597 F.2d 496, 501 (5th Cir. 1979); Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347, 351 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (citations omitted); King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 
F.3d 1084, 1090 (10th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 
6 
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sense.  Where the parties are competitors for the same type of goods, at least one court 
has gone one step further to opine that, in such cases, courts generally need not look 
beyond the marks at issue.19  Indeed, try as the courts may to escape the appearance of 
subjective comparisons between the parties’ marks by using a multi-factor test, nearly all 
judicial recitations of factors place the similarity of the marks first in the list of factors.  
Judges reason that, ultimately, it is the similarity of the marks that will drive consumer 
confusion.  Yet, in instances where the defendant intended to trade on the plaintiff’s good 
will, that factor has also been recognized to have potential preeminent status.20  Courts in 
the Seventh Circuit have deemed three factors—similarity of the marks, the defendant’s 
intent, and actual confusion—to be the most important.21  In other cases, courts have 
found different subsets of the likelihood of confusion factors to be of paramount 
importance, with emphasis on the similarity of marks.22  Two commentators have deemed 
the most important factors to be the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, the similarity 
between the marks, and the defendant’s intent.23  In any event, actual confusion is but one 
of several factors relevant to determining the likelihood of confusion.24 
¶11 
                                                                                                                                                
As previously noted, any list of factors to be weighed in determining the likelihood 
of confusion will necessarily be non-exhaustive.25  The non-exhaustive nature of such 
factors flows from the fact that the likelihood of confusion standard is designed to assess 
what impression consumers are likely to draw in actual marketplace settings, which are 
infinitely varied.  Thus, any circumstance that would impact a consumer’s impression 
 
F.3d 1308, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Solutech, Inc. v. Consulting Servs., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 
2d 1082, 1088 (E.D. Mo. 2000). 
19  See Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 422 (3d Cir. 
1994) (“Where the trademark owner and the alleged infringer deal in competing goods or 
services, the court need rarely look beyond the mark itself.”) (citation omitted). 
20  See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 258 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(citations omitted). 
21  CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 678 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation 
omitted); Eldon Indus., Inc. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 786, 818 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 
(citing Zeibert Int’l Corp. v. After Market Assocs., Inc., 802 F.2d 220, 226 (7th Cir. 
1986)); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1470 
(E.D. Wis. 1987) (citing Zeibert). 
22  See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(upholding decision that similarity of marks, similarity of products, and area and manner 
of concurrent use were “the three most critical factors”); Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. 
v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, in Internet cases, similarity 
of marks, relatedness of goods or services, and parties’ simultaneous use of Internet as 
marketing channel were most important factors) (citation omitted). 
23  See Sugarman & Small, supra note 1, at 53. 
24  See Stolte, supra note 1, at 238. 
25  See, e.g., Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1510 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(citation omitted); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 110 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(citation omitted). 
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may be relevant to determining whether that consumer is likely to be confused between 
two parties’ marks.26 
II. THE NEED FOR EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL CONFUSION AND QUANTUM OF PROOF 
NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH ACTUAL CONFUSION 
¶12 
¶13 
This section explores two related areas of tension in cases involving actual 
confusion.  The first area of tension concerns whether evidence of actual confusion is 
needed to establish infringement.  Paradoxically, evidence of actual confusion is not 
needed, as a matter of law, but its absence can have great significance—in some cases, so 
much so that evidence of actual confusion is, in reality, needed.  The second and related 
area of tension concerns the extent of proof needed to establish actual confusion—a point 
on which cases are widely inconsistent.  First, this section will explore the reasons why 
such evidence generally is not needed.  Second, this section will discuss why evidence of 
actual confusion, in some circumstances, may be needed.  Third, this section will explore 
the extent of the plaintiff’s need to demonstrate actual confusion and the quantum of 
proof needed to establish that factor. 
A. Evidence of Actual Confusion is Not Required 
It is generally accepted as established law that a party need not produce evidence of 
actual confusion in order to obtain injunctive relief.27  The reasons for this rule are many.  
First, the Lanham Act and state laws governing trademarks and unfair competition only 
require the plaintiff to prove a likelihood of confusion.  Second, courts will prevent harm 
that is likely before such harm actually occurs.  Third, it is often less harsh to the 
infringer to nip the infringing activity in the bud before harm actually occurs.  Fourth, for 
a variety of reasons, it is difficult to prove actual confusion—often, so much so that 
requiring such proof would gut the protections afforded by trademark law. 
1. The Lanham Act Only Requires Proof of Likely Confusion 
¶14 
                                                
The Lanham Act establishes a mere likelihood of confusion as the threshold for 
proving that a second-comer has violated the statute.  Specifically, a trademark owner 
may establish infringement of a registered mark by proving that the second-comer’s 
designation “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. . . .”28  
 
26  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt. a. 
27  See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:12, at 23-48 to 23-49.  By contrast, where a 
trademark plaintiff seeks to recover monetary damages, the plaintiff typically must prove 
actual confusion.  See Resource Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., 
Inc., 926 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); Web Printing Controls Co. v. 
Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1204-04 (7th Cir. 1990); see generally Stolte, supra note 
1.  Nevertheless, even in an action to recover damages, actual confusion may be 
established through circumstantial proof, such as with evidence of actions undertaken 
deliberately for the purpose of deceiving consumers.  See Resource Developers, 926 F.2d 
at 140; U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 1986). 
28  15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, with respect to unregistered marks, the first party to obtain rights in one of the 
marks at issue can establish unfair competition by showing that the second-comer’s 
designation “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. . . .”29  As 
discussed above, actual confusion is but one factor in the multi-factor test used to 
determine the likelihood of confusion.  Accordingly, requiring evidence of actual 
confusion would be inconsistent with the statutory language requiring only likely 
confusion.30  Requiring evidence of actual confusion would likewise conflict with 
common law and state statutory standards, under which only a likelihood of confusion is 
required to prove infringement or unfair competition.31 Similarly, requiring evidence of 
likely confusion would elevate one of many factors potentially probative of actual 
confusion over others that may be more significant in the circumstances of particular 
cases.32 
2. Likely Harm Should be Prevented Before it Occurs 
¶15 
                                                
A principal reason for not requiring evidence of actual confusion to prove likely 
confusion—and one of the principal policy reasons for requiring only proof of likely 
confusion to prevail—is the injustice that would result from allowing likely confusion to 
come to fruition before the infringement can be stopped.  As stated by the First Circuit: 
 
29  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
30  See Lois Sportswear U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 
1986) (citation omitted); Web Printing Controls Co., 906 F.2d at 1204-05; Union Carbide 
Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383 (7th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted); E. Remy 
Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int’l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1529-30 (11th Cir. 1985) ; 
Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Productions, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (D. 
Minn. 1998); Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996); Ergon, Inc. v. Dean, 649 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). 
31  See J.B. Williams Co. v. Le Conte Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 191 n.5 (9th Cir. 
1975); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolster’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 914 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 
Ball v. Am. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228, 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Hair v. 
McGuire, 10 Cal. Rptr. 414, 416-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); Crown Central Petroleum 
Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 135 So. 2d 26, 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Ackerman Sec. 
Sys., Inc. v. Design Sec. Sys., Inc., 412 S.E.2d 588, 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Colston 
Inv. Co. v. Home Supply Co., 74 S.W.3d 759, 766 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); Allied Maint. 
Corp. v. Allied Mech.Trades, Inc., 399 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (N.Y. 1977) (citations 
omitted); Limerick Auto Body, Inc. v. Limerick Collision Ctr., Inc., 769 A.2d 1175, 1180 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); Phipps Bros., Inc. v. Nelson’s Oil & Gas, Inc., 508 N.W.2d 885, 
889 (S.D. 1993) (citations omitted); Bishop v. Hanenburg, 695 P.2d 607, 611 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1985) (citations omitted). 
32  See Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1302 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations 
omitted); Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417, 1443 (S.D. Ohio 
1990) (citation omitted); Jordan K. Rand, Ltd. v. Lazoff Bros., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 587, 
596 (D.P.R. 1982) (citation omitted); Gaylord Entm’t Co. v. Gilmore Entm’t Group, 
LLC, 187 F. Supp. 2d 926, 948 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (citation omitted); Neles-Jamesbury, 
Inc. v. Valve Dynamics, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 964, 973 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
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There is ample reason, at the incipiency of an alleged infringement, in a 
suit seeking injunctive relief, for a plaintiff to argue and a court to rule that 
the similarity of marks is such that confusion is all too likely to ensue.  
Plaintiff should not be expected to stand by and await the dismal proof.33 
¶16 
¶17 
                                                
Other courts have agreed that a trademark plaintiff should not be penalized for 
acting to protect its rights before it has been damaged by actual confusion.34 
One commentator has argued that placing greater emphasis on actual confusion will 
not cause trademark owners to stand by and suffer irreparable harm while they wait for 
such evidence to surface because equity affords relief in advance of such harm.35  The 
problem with this argument is that, in trademark cases, a likelihood of success on the 
 
33  DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 514 (1st Cir. 1975) 
(citing 3 CALLMAN, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS § 80.6, at 559-60). 
34  See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc., 799 F.2d at 875 (“It would be unfair to penalize 
appellee for acting to protect its trademark rights before serious damage has occurred.”); 
Standard Oil Co., 56 F.2d at 976 (“A court of equity will act by injunction to prevent a 
threatened wrongful act which appears to be imminent, if irreparable injury will result 
therefrom. . . .  One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to 
obtain preventative relief.  If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough.”) (citations 
omitted); Drexel Enters., Inc. v. Hermitage Cabinet Shop, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 532, 537 
(N.D. Ga. 1967) (“[T]his circuit is amongst those jurisdictions where the owner need not 
stand idly by until actual confusion and actual damage occurs if there is likelihood of 
future confusion. . . .  The need for diligence could hardly dictate otherwise.”) (citations 
omitted); Ceasars World, Inc. v. Milanian, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1199 (D. Nev. 2003) 
(“[E]vidence of actual confusion is not required to establish a violation of the Lanham 
Act. . . .  In fact, [requiring] such a showing where there has been insignificant 
commercial activity by the infringer would work to penalize the trademark owner for 
taking prompt steps to protect his/her rights.”) (citations omitted); Columbia Broadcast 
Sys., Inc. v. Liederman, 866 F. Supp. 763, 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting Lois 
Sportswear); MGM-Pathe Communications Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 
876 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[I]f the law required proof of actual confusion before likelihood 
could be found, trademark owners would be required to incur actual irreparable harm 
before they could obtain protection for their marks.”);  Ball, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 242 (“One 
does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive 
relief.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); MacSweeney Enters., Inc. v. 
Tarantino, 235 P.2d 266, 271 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (“It is sufficient if injury to the 
plaintiff’s business is threatened or imminent to authorize the court to intervene to 
prevent its occurrence.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  But see 
Western Publ’g Co. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Western 
argues . . . that the absence of actual confusion should not weigh heavily in favor of Rose 
Art because Western acted quickly to protect its rights.  We are not so persuaded. . . .  
[H]ere, sales of the GoldenSlate were not only substantial but occurred during a time 
frame long enough for actual consumer confusion to surface.”). 
35  See Clark, supra note 2, at 397. 
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merits establishes the irreparable harm that is critical to preliminary injunctive relief.36  
Actual confusion is one of the factors in determining the merits of the claim.  
Accordingly, ignoring the factor at the preliminary injunction phase will likely affect the 
substantive standard on the merits by reducing the degree to which published decisions 
addressing the infringement standard reflect the need for such evidence.  More 
importantly, trademark cases are increasingly resolved in the context of motions for 
preliminary injunctions.  Therefore, ignoring actual confusion at that stage—while giving 
greater emphasis to the factor on what is supposedly the final merits—will reduce the 
need for such evidence in the context in which it most often counts while introducing 
dissonance between the infringement standards at different phases of the litigation and, 
thus, further inconsistency in judicial treatment of this factor. 
3. Preventing Harm Before it Occurs is Often Less Harsh to the Infringer Than Waiting 
for Actual Harm 
¶18 
¶19 
                                                
Both substantive trademark law and the law of equity governing injunctions 
encourage a trademark owner to act early so as not to prejudice the defendant.  In 
applying equitable standards governing injunctions, courts will balance the harm to the 
defendant from granting the injunction requested with the irreparable nature of the harm 
to the plaintiff that will occur if the injunction is not granted.37  In applying this standard, 
courts have recognized that it may be less harsh to enjoin a defendant that has invested 
fewer resources to date in an allegedly infringing brand than to wait until the defendant 
has invested more substantial resources in a brand and then enjoin its use.38 
As a matter of substantive law, similar concerns underlie the laches defense.39  
Although delay for the purpose of obtaining evidence of actual confusion may be asserted 
 
36  See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 30:47. 
37  See 11A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:  
CIVIL § 2948.2 (2d ed. 1995). 
38  See Standard Oil Co., 56 F.2d at 976 (“[S]ince defendant has not commenced the 
transaction of business, it will be a simple matter for it to change is corporate name, and 
the decree will result in little inconvenience to it.  On the other hand, defendant would be 
greatly inconvenienced by such a decree rendered after it had engaged in manufacturing 
and marketing its products under the names [at issue].”); Pride Communications L.P. v. 
WCKG, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 895, 904 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (“Defendants are poised to make a 
significant and costly entry into the market using the ‘Star’ name.  They have not, 
however, demonstrated that the harm they will suffer from being preliminarily enjoined 
from use of that name exceeds the harm of denial of an injunction for Plaintiff, whose use 
of the name is established and whose mark is registered.”); Trak, Inc. v. Benner Ski KG, 
475 F. Supp. 1076, 1078 (D. Mass. 1979) (holding that enjoining defendant at 
commencement of sales comapnign would “nip the operation in the bud” whereas denial 
of preliminary relief would result in defendant’s entrenchment, “making permanent relief 
more problematical”). 
39  See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 31:12. 
  11 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 4  
 
as a counter to a laches defense, such a delay may introduce uncertainty into the 
proceedings by prompting the defendant to raise such a defense.40 
4. Difficulty of Obtaining Evidence 
¶20 
                                                
Numerous courts have recognized that it is often difficult for a trademark plaintiff 
to obtain evidence of actual confusion.41  This difficulty is attributable to a number of 
 
40  See, e.g., Air Reduction Co. v. Airco Supply Co., 258 A.2d 302, 307 (Del. Ch. Ct. 
1969) (rejecting laches defense but noting that “plaintiff perhaps took an inordinate 
amount of time assembling data on instances of actual confusion”). 
41  See, e.g., Lois Sportswear U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 
(2d Cir. 1986) (“[A]ctual confusion is very difficult to prove. . . .”); McGregor-Doniger 
Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir. 1979) (“recogniz[ing] the difficulty of 
establishing confusion on the part of retail customers”); Miles Shoes, Inc. v. R.H. Macy 
& Co., 199 F.2d 602, 603 (2d Cir. 1952) (A. Hand, J.) (characterizing “reliable evidence 
of actual instances of confusion” as “practically almost impossible to secure, particularly 
at the retail level”); Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 
270, 291 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We have recognized that it is difficult to find evidence of actual 
confusion. . . .”) (citations omitted); Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s 
Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 284 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Due to the difficulty of securing 
evidence of actual confusion, a lack of such evidence is rarely significant. . . .”); Roulo v. 
Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 938 (7th Cir. 1989) (characterizing evidence of actual 
confusion as “difficult-to-acquire”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990); Tisch Hotels, 
Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1965) (characterizing “reliable 
evidence of actual confusion” as “difficult to obtain”); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 
F.2d 341, 352 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Proving actual confusion is difficult. . . .”) (citation 
omitted); C & C Org. v. AGDS, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 204, 207 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (“evidence 
of actual confusion is difficult to produce”) (citation omitted); Charles Schwab & Co. v. 
Hibernia Bank, 665 F. Supp. 800, 809 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“proving actual confusion is 
difficult”); Pita Delight, Inc. v. Salami, 24 F. Supp. 2d 795, 801 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (“Due 
to the difficulty of securing evidence of actual confusion, a lack of such evidence is rarely 
significant. . . .”); Hair Assocs., Inc. v. National Hair Replacement Servs., Inc., 987 F. 
Supp. 569, 587 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (referring to “inherent difficulty in producing such 
evidence”); Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. Visa Hotel Group, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D. 
Nev. 1983) (noting “difficulty in garnering such evidence”) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); Sunenblick v. Harrell, 895 F. Supp. 616, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(“actual confusion is very difficult to prove”) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(“actual confusion is difficult to prove”) (citation omitted); Chips ‘N Twigs, Inc. v. Chip-
Chip, Ltd., 414 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (“Of course, because of the 
difficulty in obtaining evidence of confusion, any evidence of actual confusion is 
substantial evidence of likelihood of confusion.”) (citations omitted); Waples-Platter Cos. 
v. Gen. Foods Corp., 439 F. Supp. 551, 582 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (recognizing “the great 
difficulty inherent in establishing actual confusion”); Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Cassini 
Tailors, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (“Reliable evidence of actual 
confusion is almost impossible to secure. . . .”) (citation and internal quotation marks 
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circumstances.  First, the infringement may be in its incipient stage.  Second, the relevant 
markets may be sufficiently separated or dispersed, and the market penetration of the 
infringer may be sufficiently low, as to make confused consumers difficult to locate.  
Third, consumers may lack the incentive to contact the trademark plaintiff to report 
confusion.  Fourth, consumers may be so successfully deceived that they do not realize 
their confusion, and thus have nothing to report.  Fifth, evidence of confusion may not be 
sufficiently documented by the parties or others.  The difficulties associated with 
obtaining evidence of actual confusion have led one commentator to conclude that most 
markets simply do not generate real evidence of actual confusion.42 
i) Incipiency of Infringement 
¶21 
                                                                                                                                                
In order for an infringing mark to cause confusion among consumers, that mark 
must be presented to a sufficient number of consumers who are familiar with the 
plaintiff’s mark and who are sufficiently interested in the defendant’s presentation that 
they either make a mistaken purchase or form a mistaken impression.  In many instances, 
at the time an infringement action is adjudicated, there will not have been sufficient 
opportunity for evidence of actual confusion to surface.  For example, if an infringer has 
only recently commenced sales of goods with the mark in question or has only recently 
begun efforts to promote the sale of goods with the mark, the infringer may not have 
reached a sufficient audience to cause actual confusion.43  This problem is particularly 
 
omitted); Carrington v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 683 P.2d 1220, 1228 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1984) (“[P]roof of actual confusion is difficult. . . .”); First Wis. Nat’l Bank v. Wichman, 
270 N.W.2d 168, 175 (Wis. 1978) (“[R]eliable evidence of actual instances of confusion 
is practically almost impossible to secure”) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
42  See Perlman, supra note 1, at 472. 
43  See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 102 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“Here, because Haar has not yet launched its portal in a serious way, there has 
been little or no opportunity for actual confusion to be manifested.”); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF 
Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 221 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Here the CatDog product has not yet 
been launched on the market.  There has been no opportunity for actual confusion to 
arise.”); id. at 228 (“[I]f the junior mark has not yet appeared on the market, there has 
been no opportunity for confusion to manifest itself in the marketplace.  It is a logical 
certainty that no specific incidents of actual confusion will have occurred.”) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M 
Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1227 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The absence of such proof 
is not especially significant . . . , particularly given the short time before trial—four 
months—in which the marks were ‘competing.’”) (citation is omitted); Communications 
Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245, 1251 (4th Cir. 1970) (“Here, quite 
naturally, proof of actual confusion is slight because the suit was instituted when Comcet 
was in its infancy.”); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 462 (4th Cir. 
1996) (noting that trademark owner may have scant evidence of actual confusion when 
seeking relief immediately upon learning of infringement) (quoting 4 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31.06[2][c] (3d 
ed. 1995)); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“The record contains no evidence of actual consumer confusion, but [the plaintiff] 
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pronounced where the demand for the goods or services in question is seasonal and any 
coexistence between the parties has not occurred during the season of peak demand.44  
The problem is further compounded where the plaintiff moves quickly to obtain a 
preliminary injunction or where the court must rule on the issue before discovery has 
been conducted.45  Consequently, a number of courts have recognized that the absence of 
                                                                                                                                                 
cannot be expected to tender such evidence at this stage.  When [the plaintiff] filed this 
lawsuit, [the defendant] had sold less than $2,000 worth of [its product], so it is not 
surprising that [the plaintiff] cannot identify consumers who were actually confused 
about the origin or sponsorship of [the defendant’s product].  Even a statistically reliable 
consumer survey would likely require a greater sampling than the total number of [the 
defendant’s] customers.”); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 
1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Because The Cat NOT in the Hat! has been enjoined from 
distribution, there has been no opportunity to prove confusion in the marketplace.”); Am. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Am. Auto Club, 184 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1950) (“Defendant has not 
as yet engaged in business.  Proof of actual confusion is therefore not obtainable.”);  
Kadant, Inc. v. Seeley Mach., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 19, 31 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[I]t is more 
likely this paucity of specific evidence is attributable to the lack of time usually necessary 
to develop evidence of actual confusion.”); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 
841 F. Supp. 506, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“As Jordache clearly has not infiltrated the 
market with products bearing the ‘101’ trademark, the Court will not make any negative 
inference from the fact that Levi has not shown any anecdotal evidence of actual 
confusion.”) (citation omitted); Elizabeth Taylor Cosmetics Co. v. Annick Goutal 
S.A.R.L., 673 F. Supp. 1238, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (recognizing that difficulty of 
proving actual confusion “is especially true in a case . . . where one party has been in the 
market only a short time”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
44  See Pathfinder Communications Corp. v. Midwest Communications Co., 593 F. 
Supp. 281, 286-87 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (“About the only possible way actual confusion 
could be shown would be through examination of Arbitron ratings diaries.  However, the 
next Arbitron ratings period does not begin until September 20, 1984.  WMCZ has only 
been using its call letters WMCZ since July 9, 1984 and thus, was not rated, as WMCZ, 
in the last Arbitron Ratings period.”); Alliance for Good Gov’t, Inc. v. St. Bernard 
Alliance for Good Gov’t, Inc., 686 So. 2d 83, 86 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (“We recognize . . . 
that AGG is constrained in presenting actual instances of confusion because at the time of 
the injunction hearing . . . the St. Bernard AGG and the St. Bernard chapter of AGG co-
existed in St. Bernard parish for a few months.  Political organizations are active only at 
election time hence it is unlikely that public confusion will be an issue when these groups 
are not visible.”). 
45  See Electropix v. Liberty Livewire Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 
2001) (“[S]uch evidence is rarely available at the Preliminary Injunction stage.”); 
Discovery Communications, Inc. v. Animal Planet, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1289 
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Here, the issue of actual confusion would be especially difficult to 
garner because the issue has yet to be joined and no discovery has been conducted.”); 
Charles Schwab & Co., 665 F. Supp. at 809 (“This court finds that the plaintiff’s 
immediate action in attempting to stop defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s registered 
trademark may have been a contributory factor in rendering a situation in which such 
14 
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evidence of actual confusion will have little or no probative value where the extent of 
infringement has not become sufficiently widespread for actual confusion to manifest 
itself.46 
                                                                                                                                                 
evidence is unavailable.”); Victoria’s Cyber Secret L.P. v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 
F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (noting absence of opportunity to take discovery 
in course of holding proof of actual confusion not necessary); Foxworthy v. Custom 
Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200, 1216 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (noting that evidence of actual 
confusion is particularly difficult to produce where plaintiff seeks preliminary injunctive 
relief before infringing trademark is extensively disseminated); Trans Union LLC v. 
Credit Res., Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (“Of course, at this stage of 
the litigation [i.e., preliminary injunction] the lack of such evidence is neither surprising 
nor fatal. . . .”) (citation omitted); Welch Allyn Inc. v. Tyco Int’l Servs. AG, 200 F. Supp. 
2d 130, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The Court recognizes the difficulty of obtaining this type 
of evidence, particularly at this preliminary stage of the proceeding.  Thus, despite the 
weakness of the evidence of actual confusion, the Court finds that this factor favors 
neither Plaintiff nor Defendants.”); Metrokane, Inc. v. The Wine Enthusiast, 160 F. Supp. 
2d 633, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Since no discovery has yet occurred in this case, certain 
factors must be given less weight, if any consideration at all.  For example, no evidence 
of actual confusion exists, for neither party had the opportunity to present it.”), 
subsequent op., 185 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); NutraSweet Co. v. Venrod Corp., 
982 F. Supp. 98, 102 (D.P.R. 1997) (noting that lack of actual confusion evidence “might 
be attributable to a lack of discovery”). 
46  See, e.g., DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 514 (1st Cir. 
1975) (observing in dicta that plaintiff may bring suit and seek injunction “at the 
incipiency of an alleged infringement” before actual confusion has surfaced); TCPIP 
Holding Co., 244 F.3d at 102 (where infringement was sufficiently minimal that “little or 
no opportunity” was present for actual confusion to surface, held that “absence of 
evidence of actual confusion sheds no light whatever on the problem”) (citation omitted); 
Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 221, 228 (where defendant’s product was not yet launched on 
market, held that absence of evidence of actual consumer confusion had “no probative 
value” and “no relevance”); Centaur Communications, 830 F.2d at 1227; Lois 
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc., 799 F.2d at 875 (refusing to draw inference against plaintiff 
from absence of actual confusion and noting that “sales of [defendant’s] jeans have been 
minimal in the United States” therefore creating “little chance for actual confusion as 
yet”); Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 477 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(holding that district court erroneously found that defendant’s product had been on 
market one year before trial when product had only been available for six months); cf. 
Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d at 284 (“[A] lack of such evidence is rarely 
significant, and the factor of actual confusion is weighted heavily only when there is 
evidence of past confusion, or perhaps, when the particular circumstances indicate such 
evidence should have been available.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 
Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383 (7th Cir. 1976) (refusing to 
discredit confusion by store clerk merely because person was store clerk), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 830 (1976); Copy Cop, Inc. v. Task Printing, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 37, 45-46 (D. 
Mass. 1995) (holding that two years of coexistence in same geographic market was not 
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¶22 One commentator has argued that placing greater emphasis on the actual confusion 
factor will not make it unfairly difficult for the plaintiff to prove infringement.  
According to this argument, a plaintiff should be able to present such evidence with ease, 
given the varieties of anecdotal evidence cited by courts and the ability of parties to 
conduct surveys.47  As will be discussed at length in this article, the many varieties of 
anecdotal evidence regarding actual confusion lend themselves to inconsistent judicial 
treatment.  Anecdotal evidence is often unreliable and open to highly subjective 
judgments.  As for surveys, they are not truly evidence of actual confusion, but, in any 
event, can be extremely expensive and time-consuming.  Furthermore, surveys may be 
impractical where there is no easy way to get widespread access to an appropriate 
universe of people.48 
ii) Nature and Extent of Competition 
¶23 
                                                                                                                                                
The marketplace conditions under which the respective parties are using the 
designations at issue may also make it unlikely that evidence of actual confusion would 
have surfaced.  For example, if the parties’ past operations have been centered in 
geographically distinct areas, one may not expect evidence of actual confusion to have 
surfaced.49  Indeed, even within an overlapping geographic territory, where the parties’ 
marketing efforts are focused on different groups of individuals, there may not have been 
 
enough time to give significance to lack of evidence of actual confusion); Tanel Corp. v. 
Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 774 F. Supp. 49, 55 (D. Mass. 1990) (finding it “neither surprising nor 
significant that plaintiff has not presented evidence of actual confusion” where both 
parties’ products were recently introduced to retailers); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi 
Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“As Jordache clearly has not 
infiltrated the market with products bearing the ‘101’ trademark, the Court will not make 
any negative inference from the fact that Levi has not shown any anecdotal evidence of 
actual confusion.”) (citation omitted); Time Inc. Magazine Co. v. Globe Communications 
Corp., 712 F. Supp. 1103, 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to find lack of evidence of 
actual confusion to have any significance in light of short period of time in which 
defendant was publishing magazine at issue); Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 
732 F. Supp. 1417, 1443 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (finding lack of actual confusion “not fatal” 
given that defendant “only recently began sales”); see also Allen, supra note 4, at 23-24 
(discussing judicial acknowledgement that plaintiff need not prove actual confusion 
where, among other things, defendant’s product has not been on market long); 3A 
RUDOLPH CALLMAN & LOUIS ALTMAN, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21:64, at 
21-856 to 21-858 (4th ed. 2003) (arguing absence of actual confusion not harmful to 
plaintiff’s case where action commenced before defendant began substantial business 
operations). 
47  See Clark, supra note 2, at 397. 
48  See Stolte, supra note 1, at 249-50 (discussing expense and obstacles associated 
with surveys); Sugarman & Small, supra note 1, at 54 (noting that time and money are 
necessary to conduct surveys). 
49  See Physician Formula Cosmetics Inc. v. West Cabot Cosmetics, Inc., 857 F.2d 80, 
85 (2d Cir. 1988); Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1571 
(Fed. Cir. 1983); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23(2); 3A CALLMAN, 
supra note 45, § 21:64, at 21-858. 
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sufficient exposure of both parties to a common customer group to yield evidence of 
actual confusion.50  Similarly, if the parties are not direct competitors, or if there are 
differences in the parties’ channels of trade, actual confusion may take longer to 
surface.51 
iii) Incentive to Report 
¶24 
                                                
In many cases, it will be difficult to gather evidence of actual confusion because 
consumers will lack the incentive to report mistaken purchases.52  For example, many 
will not do so where the price of the goods in question is low and consumers lack ready 
means of contacting a corporate plaintiff.53  They are particularly unlikely to do so where 
 
50  See Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d at 284. 
51  See 3A CALLMAN, supra note 46, § 21:64, at 21-860 to 21-862. 
52  See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 291 
(3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is difficult to find evidence of actual confusion because many 
instances are unreported.”); Kinark Corp. v. Camelot, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 429, 446 (D.N.J. 
1982) (“[T]he vast majority of persons confused about the source of a product do not 
make the effort to contact either of the sources of competing products.”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23 cmt. d (noting that consumers 
typically do not reveal their state of mind). 
53  See, e.g., Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 476 n.12 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (“Because the products at issue represent a small investment for the consumer, 
this may not be a case in which actual confusion would readily manifest itself to the 
manufacturer.”); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 
695, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting difficulty of detecting actual confusion where goods 
are inexpensive); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 928 (10th Cir. 
1986) (“Purchasers are unlikely to bother to inform the trademark owner when they are 
confused about an inexpensive product.”) (citation omitted); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit 
Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 522 (10th Cir. 1987) (“[S]uch evidence of actual confusion when 
the product is low priced is more valuable because purchasers are more likely to avoid 
the brand in the future than complain.”) (citation omitted); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 
812 F.2d 1531, 1544 (11th Cir. 1986) (“It is likely . . . that . . .  those who did realize they 
had been confused chose not to spend the time to register a complaint with a faceless 
corporation about the packaging of an item that retails for approximately $2.50 per six-
pack.”); Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200, 1216 (N.D. Ga. 1995) 
(“[W]here the products are relatively inexpensive and constitute impulse purchases, 
evidence of actual confusion can be elusive.”) (citations omitted); Waples-Platter Cos. v. 
Gen. Foods Corp., 439 F. Supp. 551, 582 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (“The products involved 
herein are quite inexpensive, and individual cases of actual confusion would not be so 
important to the consumer as to motivate him to contact one of the parties.”); Allen, 
supra note 4, at 23-24 (discussing judicial acknowledgement that evidence of actual 
confusion is not needed where products are inexpensive); 3A CALLMAN, supra note 45, 
§ 21:64, at 21-860 to 21-863 (arguing that absence of actual confusion does not mean 
confusion is unlikely where products are inexpensive); RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK, 
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW § 7:8, at 7-25 to 7-27 (Rel. 9 2003) 
(noting that harm may be perceived as too minimal to justify coming forward and that 
consumers may not know where to direct complaints); see 2 JEROME GILSON ET AL., 
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there are no discernible differences in the quality of the respective parties’ goods.54  
Some consumers may even be willing to accept the infringing item in place of the 
genuine article sought after learning of their mistakes.55  Indeed, even if a confused 
consumer is dissatisfied with the goods in question, if the price of those goods is 
sufficiently low, the most efficient way to register that dissatisfaction may be simply to 
avoid the product in the future.56  In some instances, the consumer may not learn of the 
mistake until long after the transaction.57  Some consumers may also feel too embarrassed 
to report their mistakes.58 
¶25 
¶26 
                                                                                                                                                
Consumers may also lack incentive to report complaints if they believe either that 
the problem is already being addressed or that they will become embroiled in legal 
proceedings to address the problem.  For example, the Fifth Circuit held that a lack of 
consumer complaints indicating actual confusion should not be construed against the 
plaintiff where the plaintiff filed a much publicized infringement action shortly after the 
alleged infringement began.  In such instances, the court held that a consumer aware of 
the action would have no reason to complain.59  Of course, such a well publicized 
infringement action would probably reduce the likelihood of consumer confusion 
following publicity regarding the action.60  In addition, the possibility of becoming a 
witness in litigation may deter many from coming forward to report confusion or to 
testify concerning their reports.61 
Notwithstanding these issues, a lack of consumer incentive to report confusion is 
not ubiquitous.  For example, a consumer who mistakenly purchases a subscription to the 
 
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.01[3][a], at 5-10 (Rel. 48 2002); see 3 
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:18, at 99-102. 
54  See, e.g., Fisons Horticulture, Inc., 30 F.3d at 476 n.12 (“The products are not 
likely to malfunction.  If the consumer thinks Fairway peat moss and Fairway Green 
fertilizer are produced by the same company, the manufacturers may not know”); Sicilia 
Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 433 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Where products are 
inexpensive and the goods involved are identical, lack of actual consumer confusion 
should not weight strongly against plaintiff.”) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted); Chevron, 659 F.2d at 700-05 (“It would be exceedingly difficult to detect 
instances of actual confusion when, as here, the goods are relatively inexpensive and their 
actual properties are exactly identical; e.g., Ortho’s Malathion is the same as VPG’s.”). 
55  See Stolte, supra note 1, at 246. 
56  See Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 644 
n.10 (1st Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 
366, 383 (7th Cir. 1976).  But see Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy’s, Inc., 961 F.2d 
200, 205 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Low price, however, does not necessarily mean that 
actual confusion would not be reported.”). 
57  See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 265 F.2d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 1959). 
58  See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:8, at 7-25 to 7-27; Stolte, supra note 1, at 
246. 
59  See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998). 
60  See 3A CALLMAN, supra note 45, § 21:64, at 21-856 to 21-858. 
61  See Stolte, supra note 1, at 247-48. 
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wrong magazine is likely to complain about that mistake after receiving the first issue.62  
Nevertheless, it has been recognized that, in many retail situations, evidence of actual 
confusion is unlikely to surface.63 
iv) Successful Deception 
¶27 
                                                
Where trademark infringement is so successful that consumers are deceived into 
believing that the defendant’s goods are those of the plaintiff and never realize the 
mistake, the deceived consumers may have widely different reactions, depending upon 
the circumstances.  Where the consumer has a reason to communicate with the company 
thought to be the producer of the goods in question, the consumer may mistakenly 
communicate with the wrong company.64  Similarly, where consumers realize that they 
have made mistaken purchases, they may still be confused about where to report such 
mistakes.65  In contrast, where the consumer has no reason to communicate with the 
mistaken producer of the goods, the consumer cannot be expected to report to either 
company a mistake unknown to that consumer.66  Instances where confused consumers 
have no incentive to communicate with the producer of the goods are particularly likely 
where there are no discernible differences between the qualities or characteristics of the 
plaintiff’goods and those of goods sold by the defendant.67  Furthermore, courts have 
held that businesses that purchase low-priced goods for use in their establishments cannot 
be held to a more discriminating standard of actual confusion than an ordinary 
 
62  See Inc. Publ’g Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 387 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 788 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision). 
63  See Miles Shoes, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 199 F.2d 602, 603 (2d Cir. 1952) 
(“[R]eliable evidence of actual instances of confusion is practically almost impossible to 
secure, particularly at the retail level. . . .”). 
64  See, e.g., Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 543 
(2d Cir. 1956) (“numerous mail and packages had been mis-addressed or mis-delivered”). 
65  See Stolte, supra note 1, at 246. 
66  See, e.g., Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 476 (3d Cir. 
1994) (“[T]he court should take into account that the products were ones consumers 
spend little time and care in selecting; in the case of such products, confusion as to their 
origin may pass unnoticed.”); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1544 (11th Cir. 
1986) (“It is likely that many consumers who were confused never realized they had been 
confused. . . .”). 
67  See, e.g., Fisons, 30 F.3d at 476 n.12 (“Because the products at issue represent a 
small investment for the consumer, this may not be a case in which actual confusion 
would readily manifest itself to a manufacturer.  The products are not likely to 
malfunction.”); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 
704 (5th Cir. 1981) (“It would be exceedingly difficult to detect instances of actual 
confusion when, as here, the goods are relatively inexpensive and their actual properties 
are exactly identical.”); Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 
1079, 1091 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[E]ven if the authors of those letters [to the defendants] 
mistakenly assumed that the plaintiff has sponsored or licensed the defendants [sic] toy 
dogs, there would be no reason for the writer to mention this fact in a letter to the 
defendants whose sole purpose was to request to purchase the toy.”); Beer Nuts, Inc., 805 
F.2d at 928. 
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purchaser.68  In some cases, the consumer may not have a meaningful opportunity to 




                                                
Even where confusion is reported, it may have been insufficiently documented such 
that  evidence of actual confusion may be unavailable for use in court.  For example, in 
Wynn Oil Co. v. American Way Service Corp.,70 the defendants argued that marketplace 
conditions in that case should have caused actual confusion to become manifest if, in fact, 
any confusion was likely to occur.  Because actual confusion did not surface, the 
defendants maintained that their mark was unlikely to cause confusion.  The Sixth Circuit 
rejected this argument as incongruous with the defendants’ own recordkeeping 
practices.71  Indeed, where instances of confusion are likely to be reported to the 
defendant and not the plaintiff, it would be particularly unfair to place the plaintiff’s 
prospects of success at the mercy of the defendant’s recordkeeping practices.72  
Nevertheless, assuming that personnel employed by the defendant testify truthfully, it 
should be possible to determine whether such evidence once existed and was not kept.  
Where relevant evidence was destroyed, such destruction may be remedied by laws 
governing spoliation of evidence.73  However, it is also possible that consumers may 
report their confusion to non-party retailers who may not provide such information to the 
parties in litigation.74 
B. The Significance of an Absence of Evidence of Actual Confusion 
Although evidence of actual confusion is not required as a general rule, the lack of 
such evidence can play an important role in the adjudication of many cases.  Indeed, the 
lack of such evidence can significantly detract from—or be fatal to—the plaintiff’s claim 
for at least two reasons.  First, if other circumstances weigh against the plaintiff, a court 
 
68  See LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 
1946). 
69  See Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 878 F.2d 650, 656 (2d Cir. 
1989); see also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:8, at 7-25 to 7-27; Stolte, supra note 1, 
at 246-47. 
70  Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Service Corp., 943 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1991). 
71  Id. at 602 (“Defendants show a remarkable faith in documentation for parties that 
claimed they could not even calculate the profits earned from their service contracts.”); 
see also G.D. Searle & Co. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 265 F.2d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 1959) 
(“A purchaser who has been confused as to a product such as a drug tablet usually makes 
no complaint that can be traced . . . .”). 
72  But see Source Servs. Corp. v. Chicagoland Jobsource, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1523, 
1533 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“[Plaintiff] does attempt to turn the absence of actual confusion 
evidence to its advantage by blaming [defendant] for failing to set up a mechanism to 
monitor confusion.  Of course that is irrelevant.”). 
73  See Mark D. Robins, Computers and the Discovery of Evidence—A New 
Dimension to Civil Procedure, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 421-25 
(1999). 
74  See Stolte, supra note 1, at 246. 
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may look for evidence of actual confusion to establish a likelihood of confusion that other 
factors have not.  Second, the circumstances under which the parties have been operating 
may indicate that evidence of actual confusion should have surfaced. 
1. Actual Confusion as a Counter to Other Factors 
¶30 
                                                
The first reason why courts may require evidence of actual confusion to rule in 
favor of the plaintiff is relatively straightforward: a court may not be persuaded by the 
other factors that confusion is likely.  In such instances, only evidence of actual confusion 
can save the plaintiff’s case—assuming that such evidence is powerful enough and that 
other factors do not undercut such evidence.75  Similarly, if the court assesses the other 
likelihood of confusion factors with respect to a new technological practice, a new 
medium for communicating or a new context for determining infringement, it may find 
that the other factors do not provide a sufficient basis for predicting likelihood of 
confusion in this new context and may look for evidence of actual confusion to guide its 
determination.76 
 
75  See Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Community Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 345 (5th 
Cir. 1984) (“[H]aving considered all the other indicia of confusing similarity and finding 
little to support Falcon’s position, the court simply held that in all probability only a 
showing of actual confusion would be strong enough evidence to swing the case in 
Falcon’s favor. . . .  Actual confusion was one of the factors considered by the trial court, 
but its ultimate inquiry was, as it should have been, whether confusion was likely.”); 
Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1980) (“In the 
absence of any solid evidence of actual confusion, the limited strength of the ‘Domino’ 
mark outside plaintiff’s line of sugars and portion-control condiments compels the 
opposite conclusion, especially in light of the marked dissimilarities between plaintiff and 
defendants in trademark design, retail outlets, purchasers and advertising.”); Edison Bros. 
Stores, Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1547, 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that 
evidence of actual confusion would be helpful in light of weakness of plaintiff’s mark); 
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Panamerican School of Travel, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1026, 
1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[S]ince plaintiff’s mark is weak, such evidence would aid 
plaintiff in demonstrating that the public is likely to be confused as to the source or  
sponsorship of defendant’s service.”); General Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnery Co., 421 F. 
Supp. 359, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (“This meager showing [of actual confusion], in the face 
of the disparate appearance between the plaintiff’s mark and defendant’s cover, coupled 
with the lack of any evidence as to purchaser or advertising media identity, is insufficient 
to move this court to find a likelihood of success on the merits and to grant preliminary 
injunctive relief.”); see also Truckstops Corp. of Am. v. C-Poultry Co., 596 F. Supp. 
1094, 1099 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (“In light of the weakness of the mark and the lack of 
direct competition between the parties, the [declaratory judgment] plaintiff has made a 
strong showing of no [actual] confusion.”). 
76  See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broad. Sys., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 808, 816 
(D. Kan. 1989) (deeming evidence of actual confusion to be “important” due to “largely 
undeveloped nature” of advertising in connection with VCR rentals); see, e.g, Mark D. 
Robins, The Keys to Keyword Advertising, 10 No. 6, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 1, 4 
(March 2004) (arguing that, in cases involving recent practice of triggering particular 
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2. Actual Confusion as an Expected Consequence of Commerce 
¶31 
¶32 
                                                                                                                                                
A second reason why the lack of actual confusion evidence may have significance 
is the logical outgrowth of rationales for not requiring evidence of actual confusion.  
Although there are a variety of circumstances that make evidence of actual confusion 
difficult to obtain, there are cases where those circumstances do not exist.  Indeed, cases 
exist where such evidence should have surfaced if, in fact, it is likely that consumers will 
be confused. 
Notably, where the defendant has achieved a meaningful commercial presence for a 
sufficient duration and there have been no, or few, reported instances of actual confusion, 
that silence may indicate that confusion between the respective parties’ marks is 
unlikely.77  The lack of such evidence may be particularly telling where the marks are so 
 
Internet advertisements based on trademarked search terms, courts are likely to 
emphasize actual confusion or survey evidence as guide to understanding consumer 
perceptions). 
77  See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 228 (2d Cir. 1999) (“If 
consumers have been exposed to two allegedly similar trademarks in the marketplace for 
an adequate period of time and no actual confusion is detected either by survey or in 
actual reported instances of confusion, that can be powerful indication that the junior 
trademark does not cause a meaningful likelihood of confusion.”); Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. 
Animal Feed Supplement, Inc., 182 F.3d 598, 602-03 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding confusion 
unlikely given absence of actual confusion in over two decades of competition); Daddy’s 
Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 284 (6th Cir. 
1998) (“[A]ctual confusion is weighted heavily only when there is evidence of past 
confusion, or perhaps, when the particular circumstances indicate such evidence should 
have been available.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Fisons 
Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 476 (3d Cir. 1994) (“When parties 
have used similar marks for a sufficient period of time without evidence of consumer 
confusion . . . there is an inference that future consumers will not be confused . . . .”); 
Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int’l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding 
that absence of actual confusion, given side-by-side competition in some channels of 
trade and advertising for six years, was highly probative that confusion was unlikely); 
Lois Sportswear U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(“[T]he complete absence of actual confusion evidence after a significant period of 
competition may weigh in a defendant’s favor . . . .”) (citation omitted); Oreck Corp. v. 
U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir. 1986) (“In light of the concurrent use of 
the STEAMEX DELUXE 15 XL name and Oreck’s XL mark for seventeen months, 
Oreck’s inability to point to a single incident of actual confusion is highly significant. . . .  
Considering Oreck’s weak showing on the other factors relevant to a likelihood of 
confusion, probably nothing short of a showing of actual confusion would be strong 
enough to swing the case in its favor.”) (citations omitted); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit 
Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 377-78 (1st Cir. 1980) (three and one-half years of competition 
coupled with “striking differences” in color that made confusion unlikely); McGregor-
Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1136 n.6 (2d Cir. 1979) (five years; no 
reported incidents of confusion); Maas & Waldstein Co. v. Am. Paint Corp., 288 F.2d 
306, 307 (8th Cir. 1961) (two years; similar marks; same territory; no instances of 
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similar and the plaintiff’s mark is so strong that one would expect consumer confusion, 
but for some other countervailing factor (such as use of the respective marks on different 
products).78  In recognition of the importance of the length of time in which the marks 
                                                                                                                                                 
confusion); Application of Myers, 201 F.2d 379, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (“We think the 
failure or inability to show even one instance of the kind in the past creates a strong 
presumption against likelihood of confusion in the future.”); Planet Hollywood (Region 
IV), Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 815, 883 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (finding 
absence of actual confusion to be significant where parties coexisted for more than six 
years); Pampered Chef, Ltd. v. Magic Kitchen, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 785, 795 (N.D. Ill. 
1998) (holding it “impossible” for plaintiffs to prevail on merits where they failed to 
produce evidence of actual confusion during most of a year); Black Dog Tavern Co. v. 
Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48, 56 (D. Mass. 1993) (“[T]he lack of evidence of actual confusion, 
when the marks have been in the same market, may indicate that there is little likelihood 
of confusion.”); Gruner + Jahr USA Publ’g, Div. of Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g Co. 
v. Meredith Corp., 793 F. Supp. 1222, 1232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[W]here, as here, both 
parties’ publications have been simultaneously on sale in newsstands for over six months 
and these products constitute approximately forty percent of the relevant . . . market, we 
find that the absence of evidence of actual confusion weighs heavily against a finding of 
likelihood of confusion.”) (citations omitted); Waples-Platter Cos. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 
439 F. Supp. 551, 582 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (“It also follows from the difficulty of 
establishing proof of actual confusion that the absence of such proof is not normally 
relevant to the issue of likelihood of confusion, although it may become relevant under 
certain factual situations.”) (citations omitted); FS Servs. Inc. v. Custom Farm Servs., 
Inc., 325 F. Supp. 153, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (“The substantial side-by-side use of the 
trademarks and service marks of plaintiff and defendant, without evidence of actual 
confusion, creates a strong presumption against likelihood of any such confusion in the 
future.”) (citations omitted); Societe Anonyme v. Julius Wile Sons & Co., 161 F. Supp. 
545, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (six years; similar names on identical products; no reported 
incidents of confusion); G.B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. P. Lorillard Co., 114 F. Supp. 621, 
627 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (confusion unlikely given absence of actual confusion with side-by-
side sales in 128 drugstores in New York City); Ackerman Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Design Sec. 
Sys., Inc., 412 S.E.2d 588, 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (presumption against likelihood of 
confusion from lack of actual confusion after extensive period of concurrent existence).  
78  See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (use 
on different products:  “Here plaintiff’s mark is a strong one and the similarity between 
the two names is great, but the evidence of actual confusion, when analyzed, is not 
impressive.”).  When differences in the uses at issue are compounded by differences in 
the marks in question, the absence of any actual confusion may become an 
insurmountable practical obstacle to the plaintiff’s ability to prove infringement.  See 
Blue Bell, Inc. v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 497 F.2d 433, 435-36 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that 
“Jaymar” trademark for men’s slacks did not infringe “Jeanie” trademark for women’s 
sportswear:  “[P]laintiff has been unable to demonstrate any actual confusion between the 
two marks or a lack of sophistication on the part of the consuming public.  While it is true 
that actual mistake is but an indicia of the critical factor of a likelihood of confusion, the 
fact remains that the price range and the fairly detailed purchasing process of the goods in 
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have had overlapping usage in valuing evidence of actual confusion, at least one court 
has recast the actual confusion factor as “duration of use without actual confusion.”79  
Another court has gone so far as to articulate the length of time during which there has 
been no actual confusion as a stand-alone factor in the likelihood of confusion test, 
separate from the actual confusion factor.80 
¶33 
                                                                                                                                                
By contrast, where the defendant has achieved a meaningful commercial presence 
for a sufficient duration and where there have been many reported instances of actual 
confusion, those instances will be highly probative of a likelihood of confusion.81  
Indeed, some courts have afforded greater weight to relatively few reported instances of 
actual confusion where alleged infringement is in its incipient stages.82  Other courts have 
held that incipiency merely reduces the weight of the inference to be drawn from the lack 
of evidence of actual confusion.83 
 
question further suggest that it is unlikely that consumers will be misled.”).  On the other 
hand where the similarity of marks and the similarity of uses are both sufficiently strong, 
the inquiry into actual confusion may be rendered superfluous.  See Kiki Undies Corp. v. 
Promenade Hosiery Mills, Inc., 411 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1969) (“The fact that 
there was little or no evidence of actual confusion is of no significance because with 
identical marks and similarity of use, there is great likelihood of confusion of source and 
in the final analysis the decision must rest on the court’s conviction as to possible 
confusion.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Abbott Labs. v. Mead 
Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 22 n.7 (7th Cir. 1992) (trade dress infringement:  “The 
bottles, as the district court observed, are ‘virtually identical’ . . . and [the plaintiff] need 
not present compelling evidence of actual consumer confusion at the preliminary 
injunction stage.”) (citation omitted); Field Enters. Educ. Corp. v. Grosset & Dunlap, 
Inc., 256 F. Supp. 382, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (holding that defendants’ book title “How 
and Why Wonder Books” did not infringe plaintiffs’ “How and Why” trademark for its 
series of books:  “Any instances of actual confusion should have been readily 
ascertainable by plaintiff, but none were shown at the trial.”). 
79  See Dahms v. Jacobs, 272 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Neb. 1978). 
80  See Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 
1978). 
81  See Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 228 (“In contrast, if numerous instances of 
consumer confusion have occurred, that suggests a high likelihood of continuing 
confusion.”). 
82  See, e.g., Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 844 
(11th Cir. 1983) (“When the witnesses saw the Lollipops sign, it had been up only a short 
time and was Skating Clubs’ only advertisement.  Therefore, few reports of actual 
confusion could be expected.”) (citation omitted). 
83  See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (“In 
this case, the lack of complaints is relevant but should have less weight than the district 
court gave it.  Approximately one year after the Richmond location opened, EPE’s suit 
against the Defendants was reported in the press, and this lessens the weight of the lack 
of complaints because there would be no reason to complain to EPE if one knows EPE is 
aware of the possible infringer and has begun legal action.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural 
Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834, 845 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (“[A] respectable consumer 
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C. Extent of Actual Confusion Needed and Quantum of Proof Necessary to Establish 
Actual Confusion 
¶34 Bound up in the question of what effect should be given to the lack of evidence of 
actual confusion is the question of how much evidence of actual confusion is necessary to 
establish actual confusion.  This subsection introduces the issue of “quantum of proof” 
and then reviews various circumstances that can affect how much proof of actual 
confusion may be needed. 
1. Quantum of Proof 
¶35 
                                                                                                                                                
Courts follow widely divergent paths in assessing how much evidence is necessary 
to establish actual confusion.  On the one hand, many courts frequently discount evidence 
of actual confusion as insubstantial or de minimis.84  The likelihood of confusion standard 
is, itself, only satisfied by a showing with respect to an appreciable number of consumers, 
 
survey would probably require sampling reactions of more consumers than have actually 
purchased [defendant’s product] to date.”). 
84  See, e.g., Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 
F.2d 1217, 1227 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding “isolated incidents” of actual confusion to be 
“not probative”); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 
1978) (refusing to credit de minimis instances of actual confusion); Packman v. Chicago 
Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 645 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Even if the four callers fell into the 
relevant category of consumers, however, the district court properly discounted such de 
minimis evidence of confusion.”) (citations omitted); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready 
Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383 (7th Cir. 1976)383 (“[I]solated instances of actual confusion or 
misdirected mail have been held insufficient to sustain a finding of likelihood of 
confusion.”); Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“In some cases, a jury may properly find actual confusion evidence de minimis and thus 
unpersuasive as to the ultimate issue.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 
Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom Am. Inc., 287 F.3d 866, 873-74 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding actual confusion not established by two letters); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 
599 F.2d 341, 352 (9th Cir. 1979) (“courts have often discounted such evidence because 
it was . . . insubstantial”) (citations omitted); Everest & Jennings, Inc. v. E & J Mfg. Co., 
263 F.2d 254, 260 (9th Cir. 1959) (“The likelihood of confusion . . . must be 
demonstrated by more than merely an occasional mis-directed letter.  The showing of a 
mere trace of confusion is insufficient.”); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolster’s Tire Stores, Inc., 
750 F.2d 903, 914 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“evidence of actual confusion is . . . frequently 
discounted as . . . insubstantial”) (citation omitted); King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. 
Chrysler Corp., 968 F. Supp. 568, 576 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding actual confusion not 
established by three isolated incidents); Primedia Intertec Corp. v. Technology Mkg. 
Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 809, 821 (D. Kan. 1998) (“Plaintiff’s two confused consumers do 
not provide persuasive evidence of actual confusion.  These examples are better viewed 
as isolated instances and de minimis evidence of actual confusion.”); Wachovia Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Crown Nation Bancorporation, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 882, 887 (W.D.N.C. 1993) 
(holding actual confusion not established by single incident and refusing to accept 
plaintiff’s “assertion that this example is the tip of an iceberg”). 
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and that showing must be a showing of probable confusion rather than merely possible 
confusion.85  On the other hand, a very influential decision by the Fifth Circuit 
established long ago that “very little proof of actual confusion would be necessary to 
prove the likelihood of confusion.”86  Consistent with this language, some courts appear 
willing to accept any amount of evidence of actual confusion as sufficient to establish the 
factor in the plaintiff’s favor.87 
¶36 
¶37 
                                                
It is hazardous to extrapolate from the cases a particular number of instances that 
must be present for actual confusion to be established; what constitutes the necessary 
critical mass will vary widely from case to case.  The Eleventh Circuit observed: “There 
is no absolute scale as to how many instances of actual confusion establish the existence 
of that factor.”88 
Determining how much evidence is necessary is particularly complicated by the 
fact that, where circumstances indicate that evidence of actual confusion should have 
surfaced in a meaningful way, the plaintiff may need to produce a higher quantum of 
proof not merely to demonstrate that the actual confusion factor favors the plaintiff, but 
 
85  See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 23:2, 23:3; see, e.g., Thane Int’l, Inc., 305 F.3d 
at 902 (“[I]f a party produces evidence from which a reasonable jury could surmise that 
an appreciable number of people are confused about the source of the product, then it is 
entitled to a trial on the likelihood of confusion—although it will not necessarily prevail 
at trial.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
86  World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th 
Cir. 1971). 
87  See Ice Cold Auto Air of Clearwater, Inc. v. Cold Air & Accessories, Inc., 828 F. 
Supp. 925, 937 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (“Actual confusion by a few customers is evidence of 
likelihood of confusion by many customers. . . .  Therefore, a plaintiff usually will not 
have to prove more than a few incidents of actual confusion.”) (citation omitted); Three 
Blind Mice Designs Co. v. Cyrk, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 303, 312 (D. Mass. 1995) (“Even a 
minimal demonstration of actual confusion may be significant.”) (citation omitted); KAT 
Video Prods., Inc. v. KKCT-FM Radio, 584 N.W.2d 844, 848 (N.D. 1998) (“The test . . . 
is whether any consumers have actually been confused. . . .”) (citations and internal 
quotations omitted); Commercial Sav. Bank v. Hawkeye Fed. Sav. Bank, 592 N.W.2d 
321, 331 (Iowa 1999) (“The test . . . is whether any consumers have actually been 
confused. . . .”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Wyndham Co. v. 
Wyndham Hotel Co., 670 N.Y.S.2d 995, 999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (“The fifth factor . . . 
looks to whether any consumers have actually been confused. . . .”); see also Deltona 
Transformer Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1369 (M.D. Fla. 
2000) (finding single incident to be insufficient but noting: “[A] plaintiff usually will not 
have to prove more than a few incidents of actual confusion.”) (citation omitted); see also 
Pride Communications L.P. v. WCKG, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 895, 902 (N.D. Ill. 1994) 
(crediting single inquiry as to whether plaintiff has purchased defendant’s radio station as 
“some minimal evidence of actual listener confusion”). 
88  AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Clark, 
supra note 2, at 406 (asserting that there is no absolute number of incidents that will 
necessarily establish actual confusion). 
26 
Vol. 2:2] Mark D. Robins 
also to maintain the viability of its infringement claim.89  For example, where the alleged 
infringement occurred over a period of years, a dearth of incidents of actual confusion 
                                                 
89  See, e.g., Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp., 73 F.3d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(“Based on Cadbury’s lack of evidence of actual confusion, the district court inferred that 
consumer confusion was not likely. . . .  That inference was arguably proper on the 
limited record before the district court. . . .”) (citation omitted); Lever Bros. Co. v. Am. 
Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251, 257 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Although actual confusion need not be 
shown by Lever, substantial sales of both products over several years, without a single 
example of actual confusion, becomes significant.”) (citations omitted); Soc’y of Fin. 
Examiners v. Nat’l Ass’n of Certified Fraud Examiners Inc., 41 F.3d 223, 228 (5th Cir. 
1995) (“SOFE’s inability to produce an actual instance of confusion, or at most twelve 
examples over a five year period, refutes the likelihood of confusion.”); Oreck Corp. v. 
U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir. 1986) (“In light of the concurrent use of 
the STEAMEX DELUXE 15 XL name and Oreck’s XL mark for seventeen months, 
Oreck’s inability to point to a single incident of actual confusion is highly significant. . . .  
Considering Oreck’s weak showing on the other factors relevant to a likelihood of 
confusion, probably nothing short of a strong showing of actual confusion would be 
strong enough to swing the case in its favor.”); Application of Myers, 201 F.2d 379, 384 
(C.C.P.A. 1953) (“We think the failure or inability to show even one instance of the kind 
in the past creates a strong presumption against likelihood of confusion in the future.”); 
FS Servs. Inc. v. Custom Farm Servs., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 153, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (“The 
substantial side-by-side use of the trademarks and service marks of plaintiff and 
defendant, without evidence of actual confusion, creates a strong presumption against 
likelihood of any such confusion in the future.”); Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. 
Supp. 48, 56 (D. Mass. 1993) (“[T]he lack of evidence of actual confusion, when the 
marks have been in the same market, may indicate that there is little likelihood of 
confusion.”); Barre-Nat’l, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 773 F. Supp. 735, 744 (D.N.J. 1991) 
(“[T]he absence of confusion between Barr’s and Barre’s marks on similar products 
during at least 17 years of concurrent use, weights heavily against a finding of likelihood 
of confusion.”); Gruner + Jahr USA Publ’g, Div. of Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g Co. 
v. Meredith Corp., 793 F. Supp. 1222, 1232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[W]here, as here, both 
parties’ publications have been simultaneously on sale in newsstands for over six months 
and these products constitute approximately forty percent of the relevant . . . market, we 
find that the absence of evidence of actual confusion weighs heavily against a finding of 
likelihood of confusion.”).  But see CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 686 
(7th Cir. 2001) (“Other than its reliance on a twenty-five year history without reported 
incidents of actual confusion, Clean Air has not come forward with hard evidence to 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that consumers are not likely to be confused 
by the parties’ simultaneous use of the CAE mark in connection with their businesses.”) 
(citation omitted); see generally 3A CALLMAN, supra note 46, § 21:64, at 21-848 to 21-
850 (asserting that absence of actual confusion after substantial period of concurrent use 
in same market gives rise to “stron presumption” that confusion is not likely); Allen, 
supra note 4, at 25 (noting that absence of evidence of actual confusion in circumstances 
where such evidence would be expected leads to “an almost insurmountable inference of 
no likelihood of confusion”).  
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may mean that the plaintiff cannot establish the factor in its favor and also become a 
critical factor leading the court to find confusion not likely.90  As an extreme example, 
where an alleged infringement involved a highly successful television show spanning 225 
episodes, court held the plaintiff’s inability to produce more than six witnesses claiming 
to have been confused over the course of eleven years to be dispositive that confusion 
was not likely.91 
¶38 
                                                
Similarly, if a long period of time has elapsed between commencement of the 
alleged infringement and adjudication, or there has been significant market penetration 
for a sufficient period of time, the critical mass required to establish the actual confusion 
factor will be higher.92  For example, where a large number of transactions and 
 
90  See, e.g., DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 514 (1st Cir. 
1975) (holding that sparse evidence of actual confusion indicated confusion was not 
likely where plaintiff waited almost entire limitations period before bringing suit and was 
given opportunity to introduce additional evidence on remand from earlier appeal); Elvis 
Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (“An absence of, or 
minimal, actual confusion, however, over an extended period of time of concurrent sales 
weighs against a likelihood of confusion.”) (emphasis added; citations omitted); Amstar 
Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980) (15 years of extensive 
competition with annual sales of millions of dollars by both parties; only three instances 
of actual confusion) (citation omitted); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., 481 
F.2d 445, 448-49 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding that lack of confusion reported at location 
where parties competed for more than two years outweighed questionable evidence of 
confusion reported to other sources); Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. 
Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1110 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he existence of only a handful 
of instances of actual confusion after a significant time or a significant degree of 
concurrent sales under the respective marks may even lead to an inference that no 
likelihood of confusion exists.”) (citation omitted); Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. Couri, 220 F. 
Supp. 929, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (referring to two instances of actual confusion in course 
of years of side-by-side competition in same area as “what approaches an affirmative 
showing of the absence of confusion”). 
91  See DeCosta, 520 F.2d at 514-15. 
92  See, e.g., Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 
490-91 (1st Cir. 1981) (“Four years is a substantial amount of time . . .  and Pignons’ 
inability to bring forth more than this single, feeble and indirect example of possible 
consumer confusion strongly indicates that Polaroid’s use of the mark ‘Alpha’ has not 
created a likelihood of confusion [with Pignon’s mark ‘Alpa’].”) (citations omitted); 
C.L.A.S.S. Promotions, Inc. v. D.S. Magazines, Inc., 753 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(“The two letters which were admitted are insignificant when contrasted to the hundreds 
of thousands of magazines sold over the years.”) (citations omitted); Scott Paper Co. v. 
Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1231 (3d Cir. 1978) (“The evidence of actual 
confusion in this case is insufficient to determine that injunctive relief is appropriate.  
The evidence relied on by the district court constituted merely nineteen misdirected 
letters received between 1972 and 1976 supported by depositions of some of the authors. 
However, during the same period SLG sold 50 million cans of its products.”); Daddy’s 
Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 284 (6th Cir. 
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widespread advertising had taken place over a period of three years, and where the 
purportedly confused persons could not be identified as potential customers, nineteen 
instances of reported confusion were deemed “negligible” and insufficient to establish 
actual confusion.93  Yet, courts generally do not distinguish between how much evidence 
is necessary to establish the factor and how much evidence is necessary to overcome 
circumstances that may make it necessary to maintain viability of the claim. 
2. Factors Impacting Quantum of Proof 
¶39 
¶40 
                                                                                                                                                
There are numerous and varied factors that impact how much evidence of actual 
confusion may be needed, including: whether there is a relative or statistical benchmark 
for measuring the quantity of incidents of confusion; circumstances showing the duration, 
extent, and nature of any coexistence between the parties; the ability and incentive of 
consumers to report confusion; the stage of the proceedings; the parties’ recordkeeping 
practices; the types of persons confused and the degree of their confusion; the quality of 
the evidence of confusion; and what inferences can be drawn from the other likelihood of 
confusion factors. 
i) Relative and Statistical Significance 
Courts are unlikely to require that evidence of actual confusion surpass any 
“statistical significance” threshold before being credited.94  Indeed, one court held it 
 
1998) (“[I]solated instances of actual confusion after a significant period of time of 
concurrent sales or extensive advertising do not always indicate an increased likelihood 
of confusion and may even suggest the opposite.”) (citations omitted); Homeowners 
Group, Inc., 931 F.2d at 1110 (“Where the parties have been doing business in the same 
area for some time and where they have advertised extensively, isolated instances of 
actual confusion are not conclusive or entitled to great weight in the determination.”) 
(citations omitted); Inc. Publ’g Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 386 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“Given significant volume of sales over time, isolated instances of 
actual confusion may be disregarded as de minimis.”) (citation omitted); A & H 
Sportswear Co., Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 155, 175 (E.D. Pa. 
1999) (“Even assuming that such instances of actual confusion did occur, they are clearly 
de minimis in light of the large volume of sales by the Plaintiffs); cf. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23(2) (asserting that absence of confusion is basis for 
inferring that confusion is not likely where marks have been in use in same geographic 
market for substantial time and confusion would generally be manifested by 
circumstances); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:18, at 99-102 (arguing that absence of 
confusion over long period of time is relevant but not determinative). 
93  Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 319 (5th 
Cir. 1981). 
94  See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(“While not as accurate as a survey might have been, this evidence shows that some 
people were actually confused as to who sponsored defendants’ shirts.”); Forum Corp. of 
N.A. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 443 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[T]his is not a case in which we 
could conclude that there was a statistically insignificant percentage of confusion, since 
the actual percentage is unknown.”); Wuv’s Int’l, Inc. v. Love’s Enters., Inc., 208 
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erroneous to discount evidence of actual confusion as de minimis (in the absence of a full 
survey) because principles of statistical significance do not apply outside the context of a 
formal survey.95  Nevertheless, courts may be persuaded that a particular quantity of 
incidents can be assessed by comparing the number of incidents to a numerical measure 
showing the extent of opportunity for confusion to surface.  One yardstick that has been 
used to measure whether actual confusion is appreciable is the extent of the plaintiff’s 
sales.96  If the number of instances of actual confusion appears small relative to the total 
number of consumer transactions or communications during the same time period, such 
evidence may be discounted.97  However, any such comparison between incidents and 
market presence will necessarily involve a highly subjective judgment. 
                                                                                                                                                 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 736, 753 (D. Colo. 1980) (“The Court rejects plaintiff’s argument that 
defense counsel’s manner of soliciting ‘actual confusion’ witnesses amounts to a survey.  
Some type of solicitation is clearly necessary in these circumstances in order to locate 
individuals with personal knowledge of actual confusion.”); Waples-Platter Cos. v. Gen. 
Foods Corp., 439 F. Supp. 551, 582 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (“[A]ny proof of actual confusion 
is significant in showing that the likelihood of confusion exists; statistical significance is 
not the relevant standard.”) (citations omitted).  However, where the evidence of actual 
confusion is elicited at the plaintiff’s instigation, courts may be more inclined to view the 
resulting evidence as the equivalent of a survey that does not comport with appropriate 
survey methods.  See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Panamerican School of Travel, 
Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1026, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“There is no apparent indication as to the 
nature or scope of plaintiff’s efforts to produce this testimony, i.e., no evidence as to how 
many students were contacted or what questions were asked. . . .  None of these students 
alerted plaintiff as to their confusion until contacted by plaintiff for purposes of this 
trial.”); see also WLWC Ctrs., Inc. v. Winners Corp., 563 F. Supp. 717, 725 (M.D. Tenn. 
1983) (giving “little weight” to consumer inquiries recorded by plaintiff and noting that 
“courts have discounted evidence of actual confusion developed through opinion polls 
because the persons interviewed did not adequately represent a fair sampling of the 
consuming public”) (citation omitted). 
95  See Forum Corp., 903 F.2d at 443 (“[I]t does not seem reasonable to classify 
appellant’s evidence . . . as de minimis, since it was not based on a full survey of 
customers.  In other words, this is not a case in which we could conclude that there was a 
statistically insignificant percentage of confusion, since the actual percentage is 
unknown.”).  But see Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 
964 F. Supp. 733, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (where plaintiff presented small number of 
incidents of actual confusion and survey, court discounted actual confusion in light of 
“the small number of people who allegedly expressed confusion and the absence of a 
valid statistical sample”). 
96  See Jaret Int’l, Inc. v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 69, 72 (E.D.N.Y. 
1993) (holding single order misdirected to plaintiff to be de minimis in contrast to 
plaintiff’s overall sales). 
97  See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1219 (C.D. Cal. 
2000) (“Evidence that ten consumers were actually confused is minimal in light of the 
fact that defendants sold products bearing Princess Diana’s likeness to over 300,000 
customers between September 1, 1997, and March 24, 2000.”), aff’d, 292 F.3d 1139 (9th 
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ii) Duration, Extent, and Nature of Coexistence 
¶41 
                                                                                                                                                
As the foregoing discussion suggests, whether and to what extent evidence of 
actual confusion will be required to establish infringement may turn on the duration, 
extent, and nature of the parties’ coexistence.  For example, the absence of such evidence 
may assume particular importance where the products have been quickly sold in the same 
channels of trade and extensively promoted in the same advertising media.98  Even within 
a narrow geographic market, meaningful evidence of actual confusion may be expected 
where there has been extensive publicity and deep market penetration.99  Another factor 
lending greater importance to the absence of evidence of actual confusion is the 
defendant’s engagement in comparable conduct with respect to other brands in the past, 
without generating evidence of actual confusion in those contexts.100  Courts may give 
 
Cir. 2002); Giant Brands, Inc. v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 646, 657 (D. Md. 
2002) (“[E]ven assuming that the log accurately portrays incidents of actual confusion, 
there is one (1) instance of alleged confusion for every 12,960 transactions (0.007%).”); 
Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting 
that plaintiff and defendant “receive hundreds, if not thousands, of letters and phone calls 
each year commenting on or discussing their products” but that plaintiff “was unable to 
produce a single written document from a customer or a retailer evidencing confusion”), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 77 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 1996); Ivoclar N. 
Am., Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[T]he single 
instance of actual confusion cited by plaintiff is de minimis in light of the large volume of 
sales of both products.”) (citation omitted); Pfizer Inc. v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 858 
F. Supp. 1305, 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“finding insufficient evidence of actual confusion 
given 30 months of coexistence, thousands of prescriptions for products, $50 million in 
sales of defendant’s product, and over $2 billion in sales of plaintiff’s product”); D & J 
Master Clean, Inc. v. ServiceMaster Co., 181 F. Supp. 2d 821, 828 (S.D. Ohio 2002) 
(“Even assuming Plaintiff receives an average of 550 calls and two confused inquir[i]es 
per week, the Court finds that only 0.36%—less than one percent—of all calls logged by 
Plaintiff are from customer supposedly confused by the two marks.  Viewed in context, 
these misplaced phone calls do not support a finding of actual confusion, nor does one 
mislabeled check out of the thousands Plaintiff receives in the normal course of 
business.”); Gaylord Entm’t Co. v. Gilmore Entm’t Group, LLC, 187 F. Supp. 2d 926, 
948 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (“The Court notes that there have been relatively few documented 
instances of confusion as compared to the number of overall ticket sales of the two 
entities over the fourteen year period that The Carolina Opry and Grand Ole Opry have 
simultaneously been in operation.”) (citation omitted); McDonald’s Corp. v. Shop at 
Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (“Given this level of recognition, 
the potential pool for confused consumers is enormous and the production of sixteen 
phone calls borders on insignificant.”). 
98  See Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int’l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 
1993); Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980).  
99  See Info. Clearing House, Inc. v. Find Magazine, 492 F. Supp. 147, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
100  See Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 
419 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Here it is also significant that Nature Labs now parodies at least 
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enhanced weight to an absence of evidence of actual confusion where the plaintiff has 




                                                                                                                                                
By contrast, where the parties have not had the opportunity to compete head-to-
head so as to expose a significant number of actual or potential customers to the 
competing marks and products, little or no confusion would be expected, and, therefore, 
relatively few instances would be given greater weight.102  For instance, in Daddy’s 
Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Center,103 the Sixth Circuit held 
that the lower court erred in finding that a single instance of actual confusion could not 
increase the likelihood of confusion.  In that case, when a consumer requested a catalog 
from the plaintiff, the consumer mentioned that the consumer was familiar with the 
plaintiff’s store at a location that was, in fact, the defendant’s store.  Although the parties 
had been in business for years and the plaintiff had an extensive customer list in the 
location of the defendant’s store, the Sixth Circuit nonetheless held that the case lacked 
the circumstances that would lead one to expect more incidents of actual confusion.  The 
court found such circumstances lacking because there was no evidence of overlap in the 
audience exposed to the parties’ marketing.  The court observed: 
Bearing in mind that a successful Lanham Act plaintiff only must show a sufficient 
potential of confusion, not actual confusion, the fact that some confusion already has 
occurred favors plaintiff at least to some extent.  The District Court therefore should 
reevaluate upon remand the significance of the single instance of actual confusion.104 
Courts must be careful to look past superficial evidence of the extent of the parties’ 
presence to determine whether there has truly been competition or other meaningful 
 
13 other designer brands, not one of which has complained about consumer 
confusion. . . .  That loud silence gives rise to only one inference:  consumers have not 
been confused.”) (citation omitted). 
101  See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:7, at 7-21. 
102  See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(finding evidence of actual confusion not required where defendant had sold little 
product); Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1089-90 
n.6 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff established actual confusion through evidence 
that was “hardly overwhelming” but was gathered in a “relatively brief period of time”); 
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming holding 
that absence of actual confusion was not significant where defendant’s sales were 
minimal); Frank Brunckhorst Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 875 F. Supp. 966, 980 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (crediting limited evidence of actual confusion and noting that absence 
of such evidence is less significant where, as in case at bar, there was short coexistence 
between products); Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 
96, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding actual confusion based on single incident that 
occurred during “short sales period”); Habitat Design Holdings Ltd. v. Habitat, Inc., 436 
F. Supp. 327, 331 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“In that Habitat England’s store had not yet 
opened at the time of trial, it would be unreasonable to expect defendant to have 
produced substantial evidence of actual confusion.  However, this factor has been 
established to some extent [by a single letter].”). 
103  109 F.3d at 284. 
104  Id. at 284-85 (citation omitted). 
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coexistence in a setting that could generate consumer confusion.  For example, parties 
may coexist for a substantial period of time without direct competition.  Thus, in CAE, 
Inc. v. Clean Air Engineering, Inc.,105 the Seventh Circuit held that twenty-five years in 
which no confusion was reported was not sufficient to demonstrate that confusion was 
not likely as a matter of law.  In CAE, the parties had some product overlap but were not 
direct competitors, and the court noted the difficulty of discovering instances of actual 
confusion.106  Nevertheless, courts should consider direct competition in terms of 
competing sales or coexistence in the same channels of trade as well as advertising and 
publicity that reaches a common audience.107 
¶45 
¶46 
                                                
Courts should also recognize that parties may coexist for a substantial period of 
time under conditions not likely to produce confusion and then change practices in a way 
likely to cause confusion.  For instance, in Keycorp v. Key Bank & Trust, the court 
determined that the plaintiff’s case was enhanced by the fact that actual confusion only 
surfaced after the defendant recently modified its name in a way likely to cause consumer 
confusion between the parties.108 
iii) Ability and Incentive of Consumers to Report Confusion 
An additional factor that may affect the quantum of proof a court may require is the 
likelihood in the particular industry at issue that consumers will come forward with such 
evidence.  As discussed earlier, consumers may be unlikely to demonstrate their 
confusion for a variety of reasons.109  In circumstances where few instances of actual 
confusion would be expected, as with inexpensive items or items with limited 
availability, courts have relied upon relatively few instances of actual confusion to find a 
likelihood of confusion.110  In some industries, for example, trademark owners may have 
 
105  CAE Inc., 267 F.3d at 660. 
106  See id. at 686. 
107  See Info. Clearing House, Inc., 492 F. Supp. at 159. 
108  Keycorp v. Key Bank & Trust, 99 F. Supp. 2d 814, 825 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
109  See supra notes 40-68 and accompanying text. 
110  See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1544 (11th Cir. 1986) (where 
witnesses testified as to their confusion in addition to having made contemporaneous 
reports by letter or telephone, and where goods were inexpensive, impulse purchase ice 
cream bars, held that mere four instances of reported confusion were sufficient to 
establish actual confusion notwithstanding high sales volumes of items in question); 
Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 522 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Although this 
is evidence of a single instance, the confused owner is precisely the one whose confusion 
is most significant. . . .  Furthermore, such evidence of actual confusion when the product 
is low priced is more valuable because purchasers are more likely to avoid the brand in 
the future than complain.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Jellibeans, 
Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 844 (11th Cir. 1983) (where only 
three witnesses reported actual confusion but period of infringement prior to litigation 
was brief and survey, albeit flawed, bolstered witnesses’ testimony, held that trial court’s 
finding of actual confusion was supported by evidence); Varitronics Sys., Inc. v. Merlin 
Equip., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1203, 1208-09 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (finding actual confusion 
established by single “compelling incident” in which actual purchaser bought defendant’s 
product believing parties to be affiliated); see generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, 
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evidence about the timing and nature of customer interactions that will explain a lack of 
reported confusion.  For example, in CFM Majestic, Inc. v. NHC, Inc.,111 where both 
parties manufactured iron stoves for residential heating, the court found the lack of actual 
confusion to be excused by a number of factors, including the fact that consumer 
feedback about stoves typically does not occur until after the stove has been installed 
through a burn-season.112 
¶47 
¶48 
                                                                                                                                                
Factors that make it less likely that consumers will report confusion, however, must 
be weighed against other factors indicating that some reports of confusion should have 
surfaced.  For example, one court has held that the passage of sufficient time with 
sufficient competition between the parties and no actual confusion can override any 
consideration that would otherwise be given to the difficulty of obtaining evidence from 
retail consumers.113 
iv) Stage of Proceedings 
Another factor impacting the required quantum of evidence is the stage of the 
proceedings, which affects expectations as to how much evidence of actual confusion 
would ordinarily be available.  For example, if a case is heard on a motion for a 
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, frequently the plaintiff will not 
have had an opportunity to conduct discovery to uncover all of the actual confusion that 
can be located.  Thus, in reversing a district court order denying a motion for preliminary 
injunction, the Seventh Circuit found just four instances of actual confusion to be 
probative and distinguished cases finding isolated instances of actual confusion to be 
insufficient on the ground that those cases “found that such isolated instances were 
insufficient to establish actual confusion in the context of a trial, not in a preliminary 
injunction hearing.”114  Indeed, at least one court has determined that a lack of evidence 
 
§ 23:14 (arguing that evidence of actual confusion must be placed in context of 
opportunities for confusion to appear and that relatively few incidents have greater 
weight in circumstances where such evidence is hard to find, as where goods are 
inexpensive). 
111  CFM Majestic, Inc. v. NHC, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 942, 955-56 (N.D. Ind. 2000). 
112  See also Robarb, Inc. v. Pool Builders Supply of the Carolinas, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 
621, 626-27 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (holding absence of actual confusion did not establish that 
no confusion had occurred given that products were inexpensive and had identical 
essential characteristics). 
113  See Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(“While we recognize that it is difficult to establish actual confusion on the part of retail 
customers . . . , no evidence of confusion for over a three-year period, during which 
substantial sales occurred, is a strong indicator that the likelihood of confusion is 
minimal.”) (citations omitted). 
114  Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1118-19 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (distinguishing Ziebart Int’l Corp. v. After Mkt. Assocs., 802 F.2d 220 (7th 
Cir. 1986); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1482 (10th Cir. 
1987); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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of actual confusion may be excused by the fact that the case was adjudicated on a motion 




                                                
As discussed above, poor recordkeeping practices may make it unlikely that reports 
of consumer confusion would be available.  Accordingly, in assessing the quantum of 
proof of actual confusion, courts should examine the degree to which consumers 
communicate directly with the parties and the degree to which the parties typically 
preserve records of such communications. 
vi) Types of Persons and Degrees of Confusion. 
Factors other than the opportunity for evidence of actual confusion to be generated 
and ascertained can also impact the requisite quantum of such evidence.  As the Fifth 
Circuit explained: “Perhaps as important as, and helping to explain the various 
interpretations of the relevance of, the number of instances of confusion are the kinds of 
persons confused and degree of confusion.”116  Incidents involving actual or potential 
purchasers are likely to receive greater weight, even if those incidents are few in 
number.117 
 
115  See Mallard Creek Indus., Inc. v. Morgan, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 461, 468 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1997). 
116  Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1167 (11th 
Cir. 1982); see also Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 
1100, 1110 (6th Cir. 1991) (same; quoting Safeway); Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Intern’l 
Select Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is not the number of 
people actually confused by the marks that is important, but rather the type of person 
confused.”); see generally KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:3, at 7-5. 
117  See Louisiana World Exposition, Inc. v. Logue, 746 F.2d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 
1984) (upholding finding of actual confusion based on single mistaken purchase); 
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 296-97 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding 
finding of actual confusion based on single incident in which customer reported defects 
to plaintiff in product that was purchased by defendant and indicated that product was 
plaintiff’s); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1543-45 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(upholding finding of actual confusion based on testimony of four customers as to 
mistaken purchases); Safeway Stores, Inc., 675 F.2d at 1167 (holding that two instances 
of actual confusion were “worthy of some consideration” where one incident involved 
person in trade who was less likely to be confused than ordinary consumers and other 
involved actual customer); Varitronics Sys., Inc. v. Merlin Equip., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 
1203, 1208-09 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (finding actual confusion based on affidavit testimony of 
regular customer of plaintiff’s who stated that he purchased product from defendant 
because of mistaken belief in affiliation and attached receipt as exhibit); Hair Assocs., 
Inc. v. National Hair Replacement Servs., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 569, 587 (W.D. Mich. 1997) 
(finding actual confusion based on single customer who testified as to mistaken purchase 
as well as testimony about customers of defendant’s who arrived at plaintiff’s location 
and expressed belief that defendant was affiliated with plaintiff); Council of Better Bus. 
Bureaus, Inc. v. Bailey & Assocs., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1217 (E.D. Mo. 2002) 
(holding actual confusion to be established by four incidents in which consumers mistook 
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¶51 However, when actual consumers mistakenly communicate with the wrong party 
when seeking to make a purchase, courts may afford greater significance to relatively few 
such incidents.118  For example, in Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O’Neal,119 where the trial court 
rejected four instances of mistaken purchases by the plaintiff’s customers as statistically 
insignificant, the Fifth Circuit reversed, based largely on that evidence of actual 
confusion.  The Fifth Circuit noted that, while such evidence was not needed, it was the 
best evidence of infringement.120 
¶52 
                                                                                                                                                
By contrast, relatively few incidents of confusion have been discounted when they 
did not involve individuals responsible for purchasing decisions and reflected initial 
assumptions rather than sustained confusion.121  Similarly, several incidents of actual 
confusion were discounted as de minimis when they were among “random 
acquaintances.”122  However, when actual consumers mistakenly communicate with the 
wrong party when seeking to make a purchase, courts may afford greater significance to 
relatively few such incidents.123  Nevertheless, relatively few such incidents may be 
 
defendant’s product for plaintiff’s where some of consumers acted on mistake and 
purchased membership with defendant); Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art 
Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding actual confusion based on 
single misdirected purchase order); Tio Pepe, Inc. v. El Tio Pepe de Miami Rest., Inc., 
523 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)  (holding actual confusion to be 
established by testimony of three customers as to mistaken belief of ownership because 
customers “are precisely those whose confusion is most significant”). 
118  See Corbitt Mfg. Co. v. GSO Am., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1376 (S.D. Ga. 
2002) (holding actual confusion established by misdirected telephone calls by consumers 
because such persons were type of person whose reactions were most relevant); 
Thompson v. Thompson Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 884 S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1994) (holding actual confusion to be established by three witnesses who 
testified that they mistakenly contacted defendant when attempting to contact plaintiff to 
order repairs). 
119  Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O’Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1975). 
120  Id. at 46 (citations omitted). 
121  See Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207-
08 (1st Cir. 1983). 
122  See Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 557 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 964 (1998); see also Homeowners Group, Inc. 
v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1110 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Short-lived 
confusion or confusion of individuals casually acquainted with a business is worthy of 
little weight, . . . while chronic mistakes and serious confusion of actual customers are 
worthy of greater weight.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 675 F.2d at 1167 (“Short-lived confusion or confusion of individuals 
casually acquainted with a business is worthy of little weight, . . . while confusion of 
actual customers of a business is worthy of substantial weight.”) (citation omitted). 
123  See Corbitt Mfg. Co., 197 F. Supp. 2d at 1376 (S.D. Ga. 2002) (holding actual 
confusion established by misdirected telephone calls by consumers because such persons 
were type of person whose reactions were most relevant); Thompson, 884 S.W.2d at 560 
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insufficient where they consist either of inattentiveness that does not reflect confusion 
engendered by the marks or of mistakes that accompany the introduction of the 
defendant’s mark but do not persist through sustained competition.124 
¶53 
¶54 
                                                                                                                                                
If confusion is transitory and prompted by an event that has passed (as is the case 
with a vague impression left by a competing trademark or confusion that may be 
generated by the introduction to the market of a similar product), then courts are likely to 
give such incidents little weight.125  One court distinguished between incidents of actual 
confusion that are “isolated” and “unrelated” from “an ongoing pattern which has 
occurred in the past and is likely to continue.”126 
vii) Quality of the Evidence 
As will be discussed in Section III, evidence of actual confusion comes in widely 
varying degrees of quality and reliability.  Courts have pointed to defects in quality of the 
evidence as a reason to require a greater quantum of proof.  For example, where evidence 
of (relatively) few incidents consists of out-of-court statements that are subject to 
interpretive problems or pertain to individuals who entertained confusing impressions 
only briefly, the quantum of such evidence may not be sufficient, particularly if the marks 
in question are highly dissimilar.127  In one case, nine letters and a memorandum of a 
telephone call, all of questionable probative value, were held insufficient in light of the 
 
(holding actual confusion to be established by three witnesses who testified that they 
mistakenly contacted defendant when attempting to contact plaintiff to order repairs). 
124  See Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding actual 
confusion not established by “a couple of inconsequential isolated incidents of 
misdelivered mail”); Commercial Sav. Bank v. Hawkeye Fed. Sav. Bank, 592 N.W.2d 
321, 331-32 (Iowa 1999) (discounting “minimal incidents of actual confusion” consisting 
of  inattentiveness by persons doing business with plaintiff and not persisting after 
defendant’s initial entry into market); Madison Reprographics, Inc. v. Cook’s 
Reprographics, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (discounting isolated 
incidents of purported confusion that included misdirected deliveries, one of which was 
due to inattentiveness and others of which were not explained, as well as initial 
misimpressions that were corrected).  With respect to misdirected communications that 
may be generated by inattentiveness or an irrelevant class of individuals, see generally 
infra notes 340-61 and accompanying text. 
125  See 3A CALLMAN, supra note 45, § 21:64, at 21-836. 
126  Breakers of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Int’l Beach Hotel Dev., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 1576, 
1586 (S.D. Fla. 1993). 
127  See Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 505-06 (5th Cir. 
1979) (holding two incidents of purported actual confusion to be insufficient to establish 
factor in plaintiff’s favor where marks were highly dissimilar, evidence was offered 
through out-of-court statements, and statements at issue could be interpreted as 
speculation or humor rather than confusion and holding two other incidents to be 
insufficient where individuals purportedly confused only entertained such impressions 
briefly); Madison Reprographics, Inc., 552 N.W.2d at 449 (discounting isolated instances 
of purported confusion, including initial misimpressions that were corrected and 
misdirected deliveries that were not presented with surrounding context). 
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testimony of a former manager at the plaintiff’s only directly competing location that he 




                                                
Methods for bolstering the credibility of witnesses testifying about actual confusion 
may enhance the quality of the evidence of actual confusion and reduce the quantum of 
such evidence.  For example, small numbers of reported instances of actual confusion 
have been given much weight when recounted in testimony by an employee of the 
defendant.129  Commercial circumstances showing the reasonableness of customer 
confusion may also bolster evidence of actual confusion.130 
Any circumstantial evidence of actual confusion may also give greater significance 
to relatively few instances of actual confusion that can be demonstrated by direct proof.  
For example, in Baker v. Simmons Co., in addition to four of the defendant’s employees 
who testified about instances of confusion that they had observed, the plaintiff introduced 
literature the defendant had supplied to its employees instructing them in how to handle 
confused inquiries.131  The court found this literature to be highly probative of the 
“frequency” with which such confused inquiries arose.132 
viii) Other Likelihood of Confusion Factors 
Notwithstanding an absence of evidence of actual confusion—even in the face of 
sustained competition—any negative inference may be overcome by strong proof of 
likely confusion through other means.  For example, where the parties’ products were 
sold side-by-side for six years without any discernable actual confusion, despite the 
plaintiff’s engagement of paid investigators, the close similarity in names, product types, 
and channels of trade combined to lead to a finding that confusion was likely.133  Indeed, 
a strong showing as to other likelihood of confusion factors may warrant giving greater 
credence to types of actual confusion evidence that might otherwise be tenuous, such as 
inquiries regarding affiliation.134  Moreover, survey evidence indicating confusion may 
 
128  See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., 481 F.2d 445, 448-49 (5th Cir. 
1973). 
129  See, e.g., Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 
1118-19 (7th Cir. 1997) (four misdirected calls); Hair Assocs., Inc. v. National Hair 
Replacement Servs., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 569, 587 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (small number of 
instances bolstered by defendant’s testimony about confused customer). 
130  See Bebe Stores, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Int’l, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 980, 994 
(E.D. Mo. 2002) (finding evidence of actual confusion to be “reasonable” in light of 
nature of competition in relevant market), aff’d, 313 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2002). 
131  Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962). 
132  See id. at 463-64. 
133  See David Sherman Corp. v. Heublein, Inc., 340 F.2d 377, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1965). 
134  See Coach House Restaurant, Inc. v. Coach & Six Restaurants, Inc., 934 F.2d 
1551, 1562 (11th Cir. 1991) (crediting inquiries about affiliation as evidence of actual 
confusion where strong similarities between parties’ logos made it likely that inquiries 
reflected actual confusion regarding affiliation); A.C. Legg Packing Co. v. Olde 
Plantation Spice Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 426, 432 (D. Md. 1999) (“Even anecdotal evidence 
of actual confusion, in proper circumstances, may bolster a finding of a likelihood of 
confusion suggested by the other factors.”) (citation omitted); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra 
Special Prods., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555, 561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (crediting evidence of 
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overcome any negative inference arising from a lack of actual confusion or warrant 
giving greater significance to relatively few incidents of actual confusion.135 
¶58 
¶59 
Where, however, other likelihood of confusion factors point strongly to the 
conclusion that confusion is not likely, then a higher quantum of proof of actual 
confusion may be needed.136  For example, with regard to highly descriptive marks, 
relatively few instances of actual confusion may be discounted as not probative.137 
III. ASSESSING THE VALUE OF EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL CONFUSION 
This Section explores in more depth some of the problems surrounding evidence of 
actual confusion.  First, this Section will review the various types of evidence of actual 
confusion—both circumstantial and direct.  Second, this Section will explore the vexing 
question of whose confusion is relevant to establishing actual confusion.  Third, this 
Section will review a host of shortcomings in many types of evidence of actual 
confusion. 
A. Types of Evidence of Actual Confusion 
1. Circumstantial Proof 
¶60 
                                                                                                                                                
Actual confusion need not be proven through direct evidence.  Although rarely 
employed, circumstantial evidence may be used when available.138  For example, 
 
inquiries about connection when coupled with evidence of palming off); Scholfield Auto 
Plaza, L.L.C. v. Carganza, Inc., 979 P.2d 144, 150 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (crediting 
evidence of inquiries about affiliation where marks were identical, services were 
identical, and defendant adopted mark with intent to benefit from plaintiff’s advertising); 
First Wis. Nat’l Bank v. Wichman, 270 N.W.2d 168, 175 (Wis. 1978) (crediting evidence 
of inquiries about relationship and association where marks were identical, services 
overlapped to some degree, plaintiff’s mark was strong, and defendant adopted mark 
despite warning about likelihood of confusion); 3A CALLMAN, supra note 45, § 21:64, at 
21-863 (asserting that intent to deceive or high degree of similarity between marks and 
products can overcome absence of evidence of actual confusion). 
135  See Lois Sportswear U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d 
Cir. 1986); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383-88 (7th Cir. 
1976); EMPI, Inc. v. Iomed, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1159, 1168-69 (D. Minn. 1996). 
136  See authorities cited supra note 74. 
137  See Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“But given the blandly descriptive character of the term ‘door systems’ compared to the 
more vivid and individual ‘Pro-Line,’ we think it wholly unlikely that any significant 
number of consumers would be misled.  And that is the test . . . , so that the plaintiff’s 
evidence that two consumers (out of how many thousands?) may have been misled 
cannot by itself be thought to create a contestable issue of likelihood of confusion. . . .”) 
(citation omitted). 
138  One commentator has classified certain types of anecdotal evidence of actual 
confusion—such as misdirected communications and inquiries about affiliation or 
connection—as circumstantial evidence.  See Stolte, supra note 1, at 236.  Although such 
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circumstantial evidence can be found when the defendant implements business practices 
for addressing confusion if it appears the practice was designed to respond to past 
instances of reported confusion.  In Baker, defendant furnished sales employees with a 
booklet designed to provide those employees with answers to anticipated questions from 
prospective customers, including whether the defendant was the plaintiff.139  The court 
found “little question” that the inquiry was “based on past salesmen’s experience” and 
observed that “[t]he fact that the very first question to be ‘anticipated’ by the 
[defendant’s] salesman dealt with the relationship between [the plaintiff] and [the 
defendant] speaks volumes as to the doubtful state of the public mind on this question 
and on the frequency with which the question was raised.”140 
¶61 
                                                                                                                                                
It should be noted, however, that, although precautions taken by a defendant 
against future confusion may have been prompted by past instances of actual confusion, 
such precautions may also have been prompted by the defendant’s concern about likely 
confusion based upon other factors, such as similarities in the marks and the parties’ 
goods.  Although circumstantial evidence is inherently subject to such ambiguity, under 
either interpretation of the previous example such evidence is strong proof of 
infringement.  By contrast, some types of ambiguous circumstantial evidence may not be 
sufficiently probative of actual or even likely confusion.  For instance, although a decline 
in the plaintiff’s sales may be consistent with actual confusion, such a sales decline may 
 
evidence may be less probative of the ultimate issue of likelihood of confusion in an 
appreciable number of relevant persons than other types of evidence of actual confusion, 
such evidence is, nonetheless, direct proof of actual confusion.  Circumstantial evidence 
is evidence from which other facts can be inferred.  See BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 576 (7th ed. 1999). 
139  307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962). 
140  Id. at 463-64; see also Rockland Mortgage Corp. v. Shareholders Funding, Inc., 
835 F. Supp. 182, 198 (D. Del. 1993) (noting that common customer of both parties 
circulated flyer among employees “to remedy their difficulties in distinguishing plaintiff 
and defendant”); General Cigar Co., Inc. v. G.D.M. Inc., 988 F. Supp. 647, 657 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that retailer deemed confusion “sufficiently significant to require 
an internal memorandum . . . alerting the store managers to the existence of counterfeit” 
goods); First Wis. Nat’l Bank v. Wichman, 270 N.W.2d 168, 175 (Wis. 1978) 
(“[Defendant] himself thought it necessary to inform his customers that his building 
enterprise was not related to, or associated with, the [plaintiff’s] bank group.”); Dr. Ing. 
h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Zim, 481 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (noting that 
defendants “have repeatedly found it necessary to advise customers that they are not 
connected with the [plaintiff’s] organization.”).  But see Ziebert Int’l Corp. v. After Mkt. 
Assocs., Inc., 802 F.2d 220, 228 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The testimony of [plaintiff’s franchise 
dealer] is said by counsel for [plaintiff] to be ‘circumstantial evidence’ of actual 
confusion. . . .  Based on our review of [dealer’s] testimony, we agree with the district 
court that no actual confusion can be said to have been shown by it, whether as 
‘circumstantial evidence’ or otherwise.”). 
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not show actual confusion if other potential causes exist—even where the defendant’s 
sales increase in the same proportion as the plaintiff’s decline.141 
¶62 Just as the defendant’s business practices may give rise to circumstantial evidence 
of actual confusion, so too can its conduct with respect to the litigation.  For example, if 
the defendant refuses to respond to discovery requests specifically targeting actual 
confusion, the court might infer that the defendant is hiding evidence of actual 
confusion.142  Circumstantial evidence can also be used to demonstrate that confusion is 
not likely.  For example, if the parties exist amicably during a period of time and refer 
business back and forth between the two parties, a court might conclude from such 
coexistence that consumers were not confused.143 
2. Direct Proof 
¶63 
¶64 
                                                
Direct proof of confusion takes two forms: live testimony by a witness purporting 
to have been confused and out-of-court statements or conduct by persons indicating 
confusion.  The latter category includes statements authorized by the persons who were 
purportedly confused (such as letters), instances of purported confusion documented by 
others (such as in a business record), and testimony by witnesses who heard confused 
statements of others or observed confused conduct of others. 
Out-of-court statements or actions indicating confusion come in many varieties.  At 
the most general level of categorization, such statements or actions include: inquiries 
about whether a relationship of identity, source, sponsorship, or affiliation exists between 
 
141  See Eldon Indus., Inc. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 786, 820-21 (N.D. Ill. 
1990); see also A & H Sportswear Co., Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 
2d 155, 175 n. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“We also note that Plaintiffs have not conclusively 
shown that they have lost sales as a result of Defendants’ introduction of [their similarly 
named product].”). 
142  Cf. JouJou Designs, Inc. v. JOJO Ligne Internationale, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 1347, 
1355 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that defendant’s refusal to comply with discovery requests 
made it more difficult for plaintiff to establish actual confusion but not explicitly drawing 
any adverse inference).  Sanctions for failure to respond to a discovery order include 
designating certain facts as established for the purposes of the action.  FED. R. CIV. P. 
37(b)(2).  Where a party destroys or fails to preserve evidence that is relevant to litigation 
that is pending or reasonably anticipated, courts often draw an inference that the spoliated 
evidence would have been unfavorable to the party that failed to preserve it.  See Mark D. 
Robins, Computers and the Discovery of Evidence—A New Dimension to Civil 
Procedure, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 421 (1999). 
143  See Commerce Nat’l Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 
432, 442 (3d Cir. 2000).  Some courts deem survey evidence to be circumstantial 
evidence of actual confusion.  See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 46 F.3d 
1556, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting PPX Enters. v. Audiofidelity Enters., 818 F.2d 266, 
271 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Stolte, supra note 1, at 236.  However, this Article follows 
Professor McCarthy’s view that such evidence is different in kind insofar as a survey 
attempts to replicate market conditions and simulate market transactions in order to 
predict what is likely to occur.  See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:17. 
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the parties;144 misdirected communications or deliveries;145 mistaken purchases;146 
misattribution in published sources (i.e., by newspapers and periodicals);147 mistakes by 
advertisers;148 mislabeling or other mistakes by distributors or retailers;149 mistakes by 
                                                 
144  See, e.g., Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 463 (1st Cir. 1962) (inquiries as 
to identity and connection); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 456 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (questions about origin); Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 
263 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1980) (verbal inquiries about affiliation); Scholfield Auto Plaza, 
L.L.C. v. Carganza, Inc., 979 P.2d 144, 150 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999)  (inquiries about 
relationship). 
145  See, e.g., Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat’l Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 422-23 
(4th Cir. 1998) (misdirected telephone calls and shipments); Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. 
Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d 654, 661 (4th Cir. 1996) (telephone 
calls to plaintiff complaining about late or incomplete shipments from defendant); Amstar 
Corp., 615 F.2d at 263 n.10 (misaddressed letter with bill); Therma-Scan, Inc. v. 
Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 634-36 (6th Cir. 2002) (misdirected e-mails); Meridian 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1118 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(misdirected telephone calls); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 
F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977) (39 misdirected letters and 93 communications from 
retailers tendering coupons for payment by wrong party), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 
(1978); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383-85 (7th Cir. 
1976)(misdirected letters); Advance Mag. Publ’rs Inc. v. Vogue Int’l, 123 F. Supp. 2d 
790, 797 (D.N.J. 2000) (misdirected e-mails); Air Reduction Co. v. Airco Supply Co., 
258 A.2d 302, 305 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1969) (misdirected mail and telephone calls and 
misdirected request for quotation); Superior Gearbox Co. v. Edwards, 869 S.W.2d 239, 
255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (misdirected deliveries); Horseshoe Bay Resort Sales Co. v. 
Lake Lyndon B. Johnson Improvement Corp., 53 S.W.3d 799, 811 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) 
(misdirected e-mail messages). 
146  See, e.g., Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O’Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1975) (persons 
who employed defendants’ service intending to use that of plaintiffs); Pure Foods, Inc. v. 
Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792, 797 (5th Cir. 1954) (purchases of defendant’s frozen 
meats based on mistaken belief that such meats were sold by plaintiff, which sold frozen 
juice concentrates); Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell, 342 P.2d 10, 16 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1959) (“According to their averments, they had observed many occasions in which 
people had purchased appellants’ products and services under the belief that they were 
dealing with respondent.”). 
147  See, e.g., Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 
F.2d 1217, 1227 (2d Cir. 1987) (newspaper misattributions); Warner-Lambert Co. v. 
Schick U.S.A. Inc., 935 F. Supp. 130, 140 (D. Conn. 1996) (incorrect identification in 
trade journal); Sterling Acceptance Corp. v. Tomark, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 454, 464-65 
(D. Md. 2002) (trade magazines); Fourth Toro Family L.P. v. PV Bakery, Inc., 88 F. 
Supp. 2d 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (restaurant guide and news reports); Pro Hardware, 
Inc. v. Home Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 146, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (newspaper 
article); Superior Gearbox Co., 869 S.W.2d at 255 (Dunn and Bradstreet report). 
148  See, e.g., Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 605 (3d Cir. 1978) (mistake 
by copywriters of advertisements); Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d at 466 (in-store 
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less formal resellers;150 mistakes by actual or potential investors;151 prospective and 
current employees who confuse the parties;152 current employees or agents who confuse 
parties’ goods or services;153 mistakes by parties’ service suppliers;154 misdirected 
website searches information about the parties;155 and assumptions of mistaken 
connection in terms of identity, source, sponsorship, or affiliation.156  Often, out-of-court 
                                                                                                                                                 
advertisements and circulars); Warner-Lambert Co., 935 F. Supp. at 140 (mistake by 
advertiser); Armstrong Cork Co. v. Armstrong Plastic Covers Co., 434 F. Supp. 860, 868 
(E.D. Mo. 1977) (mistake by advertiser); Chester Barrie, Ltd. v. Chester Lauri, Ltd., 189 
F. Supp. 98, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (mistake by magazine seeking advertising copy). 
149  See, e.g., Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 
597 (5th Cir. 1985) (distributors and trade show visitors); Imagineering, Inc. v. Van 
Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (dealers); GTFM, Inc. v. Solid 
Clothing, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 273, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (wholesale buyer); Powder 
River Oil Co. v. Powder River Petroleum Corp., 830 P.2d 403, 416-17 (Wyo. 1992) 
(distributors).  
150  See Ott v. Target Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 (D. Minn. 2001) 
(misidentification of products by sellers listing them on eBay). 
151  See Morningside Group Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 
141 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that investors are unlikely to complete transactions  misled as 
to identity but may alter behavior based on confusion about affiliation); Checkpoint Sys., 
Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (investors); 
Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245, 1251 (4th Cir. 1970) 
(investors) (citations omitted); Acxiom Corp. v. Aciom, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 478, 500-01 
(D. Del. 1998) (investor); Contemporary Rest. Concepts, Ltd. v. Las Tapas-Jacksonville, 
Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1560, 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (potential investor); Koppers Co. v. 
Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 843-45 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (investor). 
152  See Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1515 n. 10  (11th Cir. 1984) 
(prospective employees); Rockland Mortgage Corp. v. Shareholders Funding, Inc., 835 F. 
Supp. 182, 198 (D. Del. 1993) (temporary employee); Aura Communications, Inc. v. 
Aura Networks, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 91, 96 (D. Mass. 2001) (prospective employee). 
153  See Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Intern’l Select Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1341 
(11th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff’s professional buyer). 
154  See Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 
1119-20 (6th Cir. 1996) (suppliers); Glen Raven Mills, Inc. v. Ramada Int’l, Inc., 852 F. 
Supp. 1544, 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (supplier); Sterling Acceptance Corp. v. Tomark, 
Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 454, 464-65 (D. Md. 2002) (banks and internet service providers); 
NLC, Inc. v. Lenco Elecs., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1419, 1426 (E.D. Mo. 1992) 
(supplier);Windsor, Inc. v. Intravco Travel Ctrs., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1513, 1524-25 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (supplier); Powder River Oil Co., 830 P.2d at 416-17 (suppliers and 
service companies). 
155  See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1164 
(C.D. Cal. 2000). 
156  See, e.g., Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 
F.3d 654, 660 (4th Cir. 1996) (inquiries as to why prices in defendant’s catalog were 
different than prices quoted by plaintiff); World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New 
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statements or actions are the subject of live testimony.  In such cases, the two forms of 
direct proof converge as the witness testifies first as to a previously confused state of 
mind and then as to contemporaneous statements or actions that flowed from that 
confusion.157 
B. Determining Whose Confusion is Relevant and to What Degree 
¶65 
                                                                                                                                                
Not all confusion is relevant.  At the most obvious level, it is not relevant if a 
person is confused where that person has no interaction with the trademark owner’s 
business and has no interest in purchasing the type of goods sold by that business and 
where that person’s confusion cannot otherwise be viewed as indicative of the reactions 
of persons in such relevant categories.158  However, categories of relevant confusion are 
more difficult to define.  Many incidents of confusion are subject to interpretation in light 
of the credibility of the witness, the extent to which circumstances about the incident are 
known, and the nature of those circumstances.  As a result, some of the decisions 
crediting and discounting various types of actual confusion have apparent 
inconsistencies.  More fundamentally, the leading sources of guidance—the Lanham Act 
and the RESTATEMENT—do not make clear whose confusion is relevant. 
 
World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir. 1971) (telephone calls to plaintiff from 
retailers indicating mistaken belief by retailers that plaintiff had entered retail market); 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 158 (9th Cir. 1963) 
(inquiries as to when plaintiff started making product sold by defendant); Nissan Motor 
Co., 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1164 (inquiries about plaintiff’s products sent to defendant’s e-
mail address); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 321-22 (E.D. Pa. 
1976) (“spontaneous, unsolicited letters to [plaintiff] from gift shop owners and other 
customers asking if (or assuming that) [defendant’s] banks, advertised as ‘certified, 
authentic’ replicas with a certificate of authenticity (but with no manufacturer’s name 
given), are [plaintiff’s] banks.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 587 F.2d 
602 (3d Cir. 1978). 
157  See, e.g., Tools USA & Equip. Co, 87 F.3d at 660 (testimony by customers as to 
prior instances of confusion when they had inquired about discrepancies in prices 
between defendant’s catalog and plaintiff’s quotations); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth 
Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 466 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Six women—most of whom usually bought 
L’eggs® pantyhose—testified that they had purchased (or, in one case, nearly purchased) 
a “Leg Looks® product under the mistaken impression that it was instead a L’eggs® 
product.”); Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O’Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The plaintiffs 
presented evidence of actual confusion . . . by the testimony of four persons who had 
mistakenly employed defendants although intending to use the service of plaintiffs.”); 
Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792, 797 (5th Cir. 1954) (“A number of 
housewives testified to their actual confusion and mistake in buying the defendant’s 
products on their faith in the plaintiff’s reputation.”); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready 
Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 384-85 (7th Cir. 1976) (testimony by witnesses who had contacted 
wrong company);  Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell, 342 P.2d 10, 16 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1959) (affidavits by persons who observed others make mistaken purchases and by 
persons who were themselves confused). 
158  See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:5, at 23-18. 
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1. Textual Authority for Determining the Relevant Categories of Persons Whose 
Confusion is to be Credited 
¶66 
                                                
Originally, the Lanham Act protected trademark owners from a narrow category of 
likely confusion among actual purchasers as to the origin of the trademark owner’s goods 
and services.  Specifically, the statute previously defined actionable infringement as the 
use of a designation that is “likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers 
as to the source of origin of such goods or services.”159  In 1962, the statute was amended 
to its current form, which eliminates any reference to purchasers or source in defining 
infringement.  The current version defines infringement as a use that is “likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. . . .”160  The legislative history pertaining to 
this amendment makes clear that Congress intended to include “potential” as well as 
actual purchasers within the category of persons whose confusion is relevant.161  The 
statutory language, however, is far broader and appears to encompass any type of 
confusion.162  Indeed, a number of courts have cited the 1962 amendments as justification 
for recognizing confusion among classes of persons beyond actual and potential 
customers and types of confusion other than source confusion.163  By contrast, other 
 
159  60 Stat. 437 (1946). 
160  15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
161  See S. Rep. No. 2107, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2844, 2847, 2850-51. 
162  See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 5:6, at 5-14. 
163  See Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 
1971) (“In amending [15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)] in 1962, Congress . . . evince[ed] a clear 
purpose to outlaw the use of trademarks which are likely to cause confusion, mistake, or 
deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers nor simply as to source of origin.”); 
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 300 (3d Cir. 
2001) (“Arguably, the 1962 amendments to the Lanham Act extended actionable 
confusion beyond purchasers to other instances affecting a party’s business or goodwill.  
Investor confusion may well threaten a party’s business or goodwill if it would likely 
deter or inhibit a company’s ability to attract investors and raise capital.”); Marathon 
Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
plaintiff “need not prove confusion on the part of actual customers” in light of 1962 
amendments which were meant “to allow any kind of confusion in support of a trademark 
infringement action”) (citations omitted); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 
597 F.2d 496, 500 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding 1962 amendments made actionable 
confusion between unrelated businesses); Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244-45 
(6th Cir. 1991) (citing amendments—mischaracterized as “1967” amendments—in 
support of holding that confusion beyond point of sale was actionable); Champions Golf 
Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1119-20 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(citing amendments—mischaracterized as “1967” amendments— in support of holding 
that confusion among suppliers and professional in industry were relevant) (citations 
omitted); Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 672 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The 
1962 amendment included confusion of nonpurchasers as well as direct purchasers. . . .”); 
Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 694 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 
1976) (holding that 1962 amendments made actionable confusion as to affiliation and 
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courts have made various pronouncements that have hewn more closely to the legislative 
history and that have indicated that the amended Lanham Act redresses only confusion 
among actual or potential purchasers.164 
                                                                                                                                                 
confusion among people who view products after sale); see also Cosmetic Dermatology 
& Vein Ctrs. of Downriver, P.C. v. New Faces Skin Care Ctrs., Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 
1045, 1055 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (following Champions); Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers 
GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 843 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The [1962] amendment shows 
congressional intent that the persons should not be restricted to purchasers.  The 
amendment also shows such intent that the nature of the confusion should not be 
restricted to the source of origin of goods or services.”); Powder River Oil Co. v. Powder 
River Petroleum Corp., 830 P.2d 403, 416-17 (Wyo. 1992) (noting that 1962 
amendments were meant “to allow evidence of any kind of confusion to support 
infringement” and holding confusion among suppliers, distributors, and service 
companies to be relevant); cf. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 
492-93 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (citing 1962 amendments in support of holding post-sale 
confusion to be actionable).  
164  See Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1206 
(1st Cir. 1983) (“If likelihood of confusion exists, it must be based on the confusion of 
some relevant person; i.e., a customer or purchaser.”); Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 6 
F.3d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993) (“We are dealing here with customer confusion when 
choosing to purchase, or not purchase, the items, not public confusion at viewing them 
from afar.”) (citations omitted); Electronic Design & Sales, Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys. 
Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[W]e do not construe this deletion [of the 
word “purchasers” in the 1962 amendments] to suggest, much less compel, that purchaser 
confusion is no longer the primary focus of the inquiry.  Instead, we believe that, at least 
in the case of goods and services that are sold, the inquiry generally will turn on whether 
actual or potential ‘purchasers’ are confused.”); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Am. Cyanamid 
Co., 361 F. Supp. 1032, 1042 n.13, 1043 (D.N.J. 1973) (noting that legislative history 
indicates purpose of 1962 amendments to be to broaden scope of situations that would 
result in infringement but holding that likelihood of confusion must be determined with 
reference to “the actual consumers of the product in question”) (citation omitted); 
Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(“[T]he trademark laws do not protect against the possibility that a member of the general 
public might fall under the mistaken impression that the companies are related.  Rather, 
the trademark laws are intended to protect those members of the public who are or may 
become customers of either from purchasing the products of one of them under the 
mistaken assumption that they are buying a product produced or sponsored by the 
other.”) (citation omitted); Grotrian, Helffereich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. 
Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 714-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“The 1962 amendment to 
the Lanham Act, broadening the kind of trademark confusion prohibited, recognized the 
commercial reality that in our modern marketing structure goods are sold and offered for 
sale not so much on the identity of the producer as on the buyer’s assurance that he is 
buying the genuine product and not an imitation. . . .  The likelihood of confusion 
between products, therefore, becomes highly significant.”); Smithkline Beckman Corp. v. 
Pennex Prods. Co., 605 F. Supp. 746, 752 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“The inquiry into the 
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2. The RESTATEMENT’S Approach to Determining Whose Confusion is Relevant 
The RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION attempts to synthesize the authorities 
and update the types of confusion deemed actionable.  Specifically, the RESTATEMENT 
provides that confusion will not be actionable unless it “threaten[s] the commercial 
interests of the owner of the mark.”165  This actionable confusion “is not limited to the 
confusion of persons doing business directly with the actor.”166  Nevertheless, the 
RESTATEMENT’S discussion of harm to good will is limited to the plaintiff’s reputational 
damage among potential purchasers.  The Reporter’s Note provides that only where there 
is likely harm to the trademark owner’s commercial interests will confusion among non-
purchasers be actionable.167  Indeed, in a parenthetical reference, the Reporter’s Note 
states that “trademark infringement” protects only against mistaken purchasing decisions 
and not against confusion generally.”168 
¶67 
¶68 A case summarized by the Reporter’s Note is an influential Second Circuit decision 
on the matter of confusion, Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing Co.169  Lang, which 
followed an earlier draft of the RESTATEMENT, concerned misdirected telephone calls 
made by individuals who were neither “purchasers [n]or prospective purchasers.”170  
Since the callers were not actually prospective purchasers, the court noted that “there is 
no reason to believe that any confusion represented by the phone calls could inflict 
commercial injury in the form of either a diversion of sales, damage to goodwill, or loss 
of control over reputation.”171 
3. Judicial Confusion Over Whose Views Affect Good Will 
¶69 
                                                                                                                                                
Consistent with the language in Lang, a number of decisions in the Second Circuit 
and elsewhere have indicated that the scope of actionable confusion extends to persons 
whose views may impact the good will of the trademark owner but have differed in the 
degree to which they are willing to extend this category to classes of persons other than 
actual or potential purchasers.172  The category of persons whose views may impact the 
 
likelihood of confusion is directed towards the time of purchase.  Post-purchase 
confusion which is not the direct consequence of defendants’ action is not a factor.”). 
165  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 cmt. b at 210. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. § 20 cmt. b at 210, reporter’s note to cmt. b at 220. 
168  Id. § 20 reporter’s note to cmt. b at 221 (citing Lang v. Retirement Living Publ’g 
Co., 949 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
169  Lang v. Ret. Living Publ’g Co., 949 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991). 
170  Id. at 583. 
171  Id. 
172  Compare Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 382-83 
(2d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (“The likelihood of confusion test concerns not only 
potential purchasers but also the general public.”), and Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1118 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he fact that a 
company’s goodwill, rather than its pocketbook, is injured by actual confusion does not 
render the confusion meaningless.”), with Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 
89 F.3d 955, 963 (2d Cir. 1996) (“For purposes of the Lanham Act, actual confusion 
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good will of the trademark owner remains largely unsettled.  A number of courts have 
extended the types of persons whose confusion is deemed to be relevant because of harm 
to the trademark owner’s good will to include investors, prospective employees, 
suppliers, distributors, and service companies.173  Other categories of persons whose 
                                                                                                                                                 
means consumer confusion that enables a seller to pass off his goods as the goods of 
another. . . .  To show actual confusion, [the plaintiff] must demonstrate that [the 
defendant’s] use could inflict commercial injury in the form of either a diversion of sales, 
damage to goodwill, or loss of control over reputation.”) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted), and Sterling Acceptance Corp. v. Tomark, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 454, 
464-65 (D. Md. 2002) (following Second Circuit decisions but holding that actual 
confusion among “banks, trade magazines, and internet service providers” was entitled to 
little weight because such confusion did not contribute to consumer confusion.). 
173  See Morningside Group Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 
141 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that investors are unlikely to complete transactions misled as 
to identity but may alter behavior based on confusion about affiliation); Checkpoint Sys., 
Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (reserving 
judgment on whether investor confusion is actionable but noting that 1962 amendments 
to Lanham Act arguably make such confusion actionable); Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 
587 F.2d 602, 605 (3d Cir. 1978) (crediting mistake by copywriters of advertisements); 
Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245, 1251 (4th Cir. 1970) 
(holding likelihood of investor confusion to be sufficient to obtain relief) (citations 
omitted); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 466 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(crediting confusion through in-store advertisements and circulars); Warner-Lambert Co. 
v. Schick U.S.A. Inc., 935 F. Supp. 130, 140 (D. Conn. 1996) (mistake by advertiser); 
Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 
1985) (holding that confusion of distributors and trade show visitors cannot be 
disregarded); Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 
1111, 1119-20 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding district court erred in ruling confusion among 
suppliers to be non-actionable as matter of law); Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Intern’l Select 
Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th Cir. 1999) (crediting but giving little weight to 
vague and self-serving testimony of plaintiff’s professional buyer); Conagra, Inc. v. 
Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1515 n.10 (11th Cir. 1984) (crediting confusion by prospective 
employees); Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (crediting confusion by dealers); Acxiom Corp. v. Aciom, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 478, 
500-01 (D. Del. 1998) (crediting investor confusion); Rockland Mortgage Corp. v. 
Shareholders Funding, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 182, 198 (D. Del. 1993) (crediting misdirected 
bills and confusion by temporary employee who reported to work at wrong party’s 
location); Contemporary Rest. Concepts, Ltd. v. Las Tapas-Jacksonville, Inc., 753 F. 
Supp. 1560, 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (crediting confusion of potential investor); Aura 
Communications, Inc. v. Aura Networks, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 91, 96 (D. Mass. 2001) 
(crediting confusion by prospective employee); Express Funding, Inc. v. Express Mortg., 
Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1095, 1103 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (crediting confusion among members of 
industry); NLC, Inc. v. Lenco Elecs., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1419, 1426 (E.D. Mo. 1992) 
(crediting confusion by supplier); Armstrong Cork Co. v. Armstrong Plastic Covers Co., 
434 F. Supp. 860, 868 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (crediting mistake by advertiser); GTFM, Inc. v. 
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views may impact the good will of a company but who also may be seen as more akin to 
actual or potential customers include persons seeking service with respect to items 
already purchased and persons who return a product or direct complaints about a product 
to the wrong company.174  Such persons may not have been induced to make the initial 
                                                                                                                                                 
Solid Clothing, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 273, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (crediting confusion of 
wholesale buyer); Chester Barrie, Ltd. v. Chester Lauri, Ltd., 189 F. Supp. 98, 102 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (crediting mistake by magazine seeking advertising copy) Koppers Co. 
v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 843-45 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (recognizing 
investor confusion); Powder River Oil Co. v. Powder River Petroleum Corp., 830 P.2d 
403, 416-17 (Wyo. 1992) (crediting confusion among suppliers, distributors, and service 
companies); see also Hoover Co. v. Citicorp Venture Capital Ltd., 674 F. Supp. 460, 461 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding “only scant evidence of investor confusion in connection with a 
single advertisement for a securities offering”); see also Allen, supra note 4, at 48 (noting 
that courts generally credit confusion by suppliers, competitors, and members of trade but 
deem such evidence to be indirect).  But see Sterling Acceptance Corp., 227 F. Supp. 2d 
at 464-65 (holding that actual confusion among banks, trade magazines, and internet 
service providers was entitled to little weight because such confusion did not contribute 
to consumer confusion); Glen Raven Mills, Inc. v. Ramada Int’l, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 1544, 
1552 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (refusing to credit alleged confusion by supplier); Windsor, Inc. v. 
Intravco Travel Ctrs., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1513, 1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (refusing to 
credit alleged confusion by supplier). 
174  See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 818-19 (1st 
Cir. 1987) (crediting confusion by customer seeking warranty service) (citation omitted); 
Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 300 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(deeming instance in which product was returned to wrong company as “strong proof of 
actual confusion”); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 128 F.3d at 1118 (holding confusion among 
insurance policyholders seeking service on policies already purchased is actionable); 
Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1431 (7th Cir. 1985) (crediting 
confusion by perons who complained about goods and services to wrong party), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1147 (1986); Wesley-Jessen Div. Shering Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb 
Inc., 698 F.2d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1983) (crediting instance in which customer mistakenly 
returned products to wrong party); Conagra, Inc., 743 F.2d at 1515 n.10 (crediting 
confusion by customers who complained to wrong party); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-
Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383-85 (7th Cir. 1976) (crediting misdirected letters of 
complaint); Thompson v. Haynes, 305 F.3d 1369, 1373, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(crediting confusion by customer representative seeking assistance with installation of 
product); Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Am. United Ins. Co., 731 F. Supp. 480, 483-84, 485 
(S.D. Fla. 1990) (crediting confusion by customers who called plaintiff to complaint 
about defendant’s service); Porsche Cars N.A., Inc. v. Manny’s Porshop, Inc., 972 F. 
Supp. 1128, 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (crediting confusion among purchasers of plaintiff’s 
cars who sought service from defendant); R.J. Toomey Co. v. Toomey, 683 F. Supp. 873, 
877 (D. Mass. 1988) (crediting misdirected complaint); Midway Mfg. Co. v. 
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 489 (D. Neb. 1981) (crediting complaints to defendant 
made by users of defendant’s games where users complained that they expected 
defendant’s games to work like plaintiff’s); Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 
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purchase out of confusion, but they may be confused with respect to potential future 
purchases.  As such, any dissatisfaction they experience may lead them to give 
misleading views to other potential purchasers.  Another type of confusion that may 
similarly result in misleading information being disseminated to prospective customers is 
mistaken identification of the parties in the media.175  Confusion among those in the 
media may also be seen as relevant insofar as less sophisticated consumers might be 
confused more easily.176 
¶70 
¶71 
                                                                                                                                                
Another form of confusion that may be harmful to the good will of the trademark 
owner is so-called “post-sale” confusion, which may occur among members of the public 
who view the trademark on goods previously purchased—even if the purchaser of the 
goods was not confused.  Even with respect to this type of confusion, courts are split 
between those that limit actionable post-sale confusion to people who are, themselves, 
likely purchasers of the goods or services at issue and those that recognize actionable 
harm to the trademark owner (i.e., people who knowingly purchase counterfeit goods 
bearing prestigious marks).177 
In justifying the expansion of trademark protection to prevent non-purchaser 
confusion that is harmful to the trademark owner’s good will, one court explained: 
A business reputation, earned over years of conscious effort, deserves 
protection from those who would tarnish it unfairly by using a confusingly 
 
725 F. Supp. 790, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (crediting misdirected customer complaint and 
misdirected returns of defective products); Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Zim, 481 F. 
Supp. 1247, 1249 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (crediting confusion by persons seeking warranty 
repairs).  Of course, it is possible—and in many instances likely—that the owner of a 
trademark for the use of a mark in connection with the sale of goods may also own a 
service mark for the use of the same mark in providing service for those goods.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 1053. 
175  See Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 804 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(crediting confusion between parties in newspaper articles); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts 
& Sci. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(crediting mistaken use of trademark in newspaper article); Warner-Lambert Co., 935 F. 
Supp. at 140 (crediting incorrect identification in trade journal); Fourth Toro Family L.P. 
v. PV Bakery, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (crediting confusion in 
restaurant guide and news reports); Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Unger, 14 F. Supp. 2d 339, 
356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (crediting confusion in newspaper articles incorrectly identifying 
defendant’s movie as sequel to plaintiff’s); Pro Hardware, Inc. v. Home Ctrs. of Am., 
Inc., 607 F. Supp. 146, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (crediting confusion between parties in 
newspaper article about trademark dispute); Superior Gearbox Co. v. Edwards, 869 
S.W.2d 239, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (crediting mistaken identification in Dunn and 
Bradstreet report).  But see Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, 
Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1227 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding two instances of misattributions in 
newspaper articles to be “isolated incidents that are not probative on the issue of 
confusion”) (citation omitted). 
176  See Allen, supra note 4, at 48-49. 
177  See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:7, at 23-27 to 23-32. 
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similar trade name.  Entities such as suppliers, distributors and service 
companies certainly consider the business reputation of a firm with which 
they do business; and especially for transactions based on assessment of 
good credit.  If a likelihood of confusion among suppliers, distributors, 
service companies or other relevant classifications exists, it deserves 
consideration as a relevant factor in determining infringement.178 
¶72 
                                                
Nevertheless, this rationale will not protect against confusion among members of 
the public at large who do not have actual, or potential, purchasing or other relationships 
with the trademark owner’s business or do not have the potential to give the knowing 
purchaser of counterfeit goods the recognition associated with the trademark owner’s 
prestige.179  Indeed, some decisions employing language seeming to require confusion 
among actual or prospective purchasers to establish cognizable confusion may be seen as 
driven by alleged instances of confusion among members of the public at large—who 
obviously would not be in a position to affect the trademark owner’s good will unless 
they could be shown to be actual or prospective purchasers.180  Given the difficulty of 
identifying what segment of the public falls within those whose views may impact the 
good will of the trademark owner, one measure may be whether the alleged incidents of 
confusion reflect the type of mistaken impression that the plaintiff seeks to prevent.181 
 
178  Powder River, 830 P.2d at 416; see also NLC, Inc., 798 F. Supp. at 1426 (“In at 
least one instance, a supplier was irritated with plaintiff for failing to pay on time, when 
the bill actually belonged to defendant.  The Court notes such occurrences could be 
particularly harmful to a business, such as plaintiffs, trying to rebuild its reputation for 
creditworthiness after bankruptcy.”). 
179  See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 382-83 (2d 
Cir. 1997)  (“[S]uch third parties are only relevant if their views are somehow related to 
the goodwill of the aggrieved manufacturer.”); Spectrum Vision Sys., Inc. v. Spectera, 
Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 797, 807 (D. Kan. 1998) (“There is no indication that any of the 
incidents of actual confusion alleged by plaintiff, even if characterized as involving ‘post-
sale’ confusion, could ostensibly cause plaintiff to suffer a loss of reputation, good will, 
or business.”); Am. Television & Communications Corp. v. Am. Communications & 
Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[P]laintiff’s evidence of actual 
confusion did not involve consumers, those with whom it contracts to provide services to 
consumers, suppliers, or members of the investment community.”). 
180  See Declemente v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 860 F. Supp. 30, 48-49 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that confusion must involve purchasing decisions to be 
actionable and holding that alleged instances of confusion among members of the public 
did not meet this standard); Harlem Wizards Entmt. Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc., 
952 F. Supp. 1084, 1098 (D.N.J. 1997) (“There is no evidence that these purported 
instances of actual confusion [among members of the public] could have any effect on 
consumer purchasing decisions.”). 
181  See Franklin Resources, Inc. v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 988 F. Supp. 322, 
331-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that plaintiff was concerned about its customers drawing 
mistaken impression about collection tactics and finding that alleged incidents of actual 
confusion did not involve that type of mistake).  See also Lang v. Ret. Living Publ’g Co., 
  51 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 4  
 
¶73 As courts have been slow to recognize actionable confusion among persons other 
than actual or prospective customers and the types of persons who may impact the 
trademark owner’s good will remains relatively undefined, courts have divided on 
whether to recognize confusion among certain types of persons is relevant.  For example, 
courts have had particular difficulty with the question of whether confusion among 
members of the trade is relevant.  Some courts will credit such confusion.182  Others will 
not.183 
                                                                                                                                                 
949 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that alleged instances in which consumers may 
have mistakenly believed that senior user was source of junior user’s product, whereas 
plaintiff complained of reverse confusion, which would require purchasers or prospective 
purchasers of senior user’s product believing that those products were produced by or 
affiliated with junior user).  But see A & H Sportswear Co. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, 
Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 233 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Given the problems litigants typically encounter 
in locating evidence of actual confusion, . . . we decline to create a strict bar to the use of 
‘direct’ confusion evidence in a ‘reverse’ confusion case, or vice versa.”). 
182  See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 466 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The 
service merchandisers also told of massive confusion by store personnel.”); Marathon 
Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 1985) (crediting confusion 
by distributors and buyers who refused to deal with plaintiff based on erroneous belief 
that plaintiff had become retail competitor); World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New 
World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding actual confusion established 
by “uncontradicted testimony that World Carpets had been called by retailers who 
thought World Carpets had entered the retail market”); CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, 
Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 686 (7th Cir. 2001) (“This testimony, absent the identity of the 
speaker and the time-frame in which it was said, is not entitled to great weight, 
particularly because the speaker was not a customer of CAE, Inc. but rather a supplier.”) 
(citation omitted); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 352 (9th Cir. 1979)  
(“AMF introduced evidence that confusion had occurred both in the trade and in the mind 
of the buying public.  A substantial showing of confusion among either group might have 
convinced the trial court that continued use would lead to further confusion.”) (citation 
omitted); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 597 
(5th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he trial court appears to have believed that only actual confusion on 
the part of ultimate purchasers was relevant, and for this reasont to have discounted the 
evidence (and its own findings) of actual confusion on the part of distributors and trade 
show visitors.  This was error. . . .”); Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 
433 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1984) (“The trial court found that evidence that grocers placed 
Pompeii bottles into Sicilia trays did not establish a deliberate attempt by Cox to palm off 
Pompeii as Sicilia.  We think, however, that this evidence was relevant to show actual 
confusion.”); Frostie Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 341 F.2d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 1965) 
(“[A]ppellant tendered in evidence proof that not infrequently bottles of Frostie were 
delivered by bottlers in cartons bearing the name Dr. Pepper.  The court ruled out this 
evidence and other proof tending to link the products in the public mind.  The court held 
that this evidence was inadmissible because it was not the act of the appellee.  This was 
error.”); Americana Trading, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284, 1989 (9th Cir. 
1992) (crediting confusion among retailers); Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Intern’l Select 
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Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding district court erroneously 
discounted as “self-serving” employee’s testimony about professional buyer who was 
confused); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1167 
(11th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he people confused are precisely those whose confusion is most 
significant:  a supplier, presumably relatively familiar with an enterprise since he is 
actually providing it with goods, and a customer, without whom the business would not 
exist.”); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Schick U.S.A. Inc., 935 F. Supp. 130, 140 (D. Conn. 
1996) (crediting confusion by advertising agency); Corbitt Mfg. Co. v. GSO Am., Inc., 
197 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1376-77 (S.D. Ga. 2002) (“While the confusion of Home Depot’s 
employees deserves less weight, it also points to actual confusion.”); Consol. Cigar Corp. 
v. Monte Cristi de Tabacos, 58 F. Supp. 2d 188, 198-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (crediting 
confusion by importer of product); General Cigar Co., Inc. v. G.D.M. Inc., 988 F. Supp. 
647, 664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[Defendant’s] own testimony provided evidence that 
some retailers approached by [defendant] wondered if their product was [one of 
plaintiff’s proucts].”); Veryfine Prods., Inc. v. Colon Bros., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 240, 253 
(D.P.R. 1992) (“Even a store employee thought that Veryfine was sponsoring a juice 
tasting at an establishment when the subject product of that promotional activity was 
Coloso.”); Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc. v. Wright, 811 F. Supp. 237, 243 (N.D. 
Tex. 1993) (crediting confusion among retailers); Waples-Platter Cos. v. Gen. Foods 
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 551, 582 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (“While the relevant area of confusion is 
that which is in the mind of the typical consumer, evidence that retailers were confused 
does support the likelihood of confusion in the mind of the consumer.”) (citation omitted) 
; Superior Gearbox Co. v. Edwards, 869 S.W.2d 239, 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (“While 
none of these incidents [involving suppliers and credit bureau] involved customers, a 
reasonable conclusion is that Defendants’ continued use of the mark SCG would likely 
cause further confusion. . . .”). 
183  See Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 476 (3d Cir. 
1994) (“The test is the likelihood of confusion from the perspective of ordinary 
consumers, not from the perspective of people in the trade.”) (citations omitted); Ford 
Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 300 n.9 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The 
testimony of industry insiders on likelihood of confusion should be given little weight, 
since . . . the determination of likelihood of confusion must be made from the standpoint 
of a reasonably prudent buyer from the lowest stratum of the relevant buying class.”); 
Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 705 n.10 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (noting evidence of actual confusion among retail clerks but not giving weight 
to such evidence as evidence of actual confusion); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, 
Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 506 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to find likelihood of confusion based 
upon testimony of two business persons regarding short-lived confusion); Platinum Home 
Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that confusion among sophisticated members of mortgage service industry who were not 
reasonable and prudent customers was not relevant) (citations omitted); Heartsprings, Inc. 
v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 557 (10th Cir. 1998) (“To be relevant, however, such 
evidence should demonstrate actual confusion among consumers within the 
marketplace.”) (citation omitted); Gold Seal, Inc. v. The Scent Shop, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 
1283, 1286 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (discounting alleged confusion among “wholesale 
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¶74 While a number of courts have indicated that the appropriate perspective for 
determining likely confusion is that of an actual or potential customer,184 other courts 
have found confusion within the industry to be equally relevant.185  One way in which 
                                                                                                                                                 
customers . . . as opposed to customers from the consuming public”); Ocean Bio-Chem, 
Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1546, 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“Even 
were the court to conclude from the first affidavit that Star Brite Sales representatives 
were confused, it would not presume that Star Brite customers are or will be confused 
merely because Star Brite sales representatives were.”) (citation omitted); Munters Corp. 
v. Matsui Am., Inc., 730 F. Supp. 790, 800 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“We give very little weight 
to the evidentiary inference Munters would apparently like us to make:  customers are or 
will be confused because Munters’ sales representatives are confused.”); Barre-Nat’l, Inc. 
v. Barr Labs., Inc., 773 F. Supp. 735, 744 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that evidence of 
confusion by FDA inspector did not involve prospective purchaser and, therefore, “has 
limited value”); Windsor, Inc. v. Intravco Travel Ctrs., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1513, 1524 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[P]laintiff must prove that an appreciable number of reasonable 
consumers—rather than suppliers or retailers—would be confused as to the source of 
defendant’s services.”) (citation omitted). 
184  See Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(holding actual confusion not established by testimony of plaintiff’s own sales people, of 
a person who gave product away, and of person who read review in magazine; noting “no 
testimony by any consumer, retail or wholesale, who intended to buy a Merriam-Webster 
dictionary but mistakenly bought a Random House dictionary because of confusion”); 
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“The 
fact that a plaintiff can point to some evidence of confusion in the abstract does not mean 
that such confusion affects actual purchasing decisions.”) (citation omitted); Coherent, 
Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1055, 1066 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding 
that confusion among those were sellers to defendant, rather than buyers of plaintiff, was 
irrelevant); Commercial Sav. Bank v. Hawkeye Fed. Sav. Bank, 592 N.W.2d 321, 331 
(Iowa 1999) (“The test . . . is whether any consumers have actually been confused . . . .”) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); KAT Video Prods., Inc. v. KKCT-FM 
Radio, 584 N.W.2d 844, 848 (N.D. 1998) (“The test . . . is whether any consumers have 
actually been confused. . . .”) (citations omitted); Wyndham Co. v. Wyndham Hotel Co., 
670 N.Y.S.2d 995, 999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (“The fifth . . . factor looks to whether any 
consumers have actually been confused. . . .”). 
185  See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 384 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(“Assuming the clerk was confused, this gives rise to an inference that purchasers would 
also be confused because salespersons are more likely than customers to be familiar with 
marks on the merchandise they sell and hence are less likely to be confused.”) (citations 
omitted); First Fed’l Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. First Fed’l Savs. & Loan, 929 F.2d 382, 384 
(8th Cir. 1991) (“If a sophisticated federal agency such as the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board, for example, had trouble telling the two savings and loans apart, how would the 
ordinary consumer fare?”); Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 1265 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Because dealers and experts are more sophisticated about the origins 
and sources of product lines than average consumers, their confusion is highly 
probative. . . .”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Gaston’s White River 
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confusion within the industry can have relevance is if confused sales persons unwittingly 
pass one party’s products off as those of a competitor.186  Under another view, there may 
                                                                                                                                                 
Resort v. Rush, 701 F. Supp. 1431, 1438-39 (W.D. Ark. 1988) (“The fact that people 
knowledgeable in the advertising field were confused by the logos indicates that 
confusion is likely.”); CSC Brands LP v. Herdez Corp., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152 (E.D. 
Cal. 2001) (finding confusion by professional food distributor to be “particularly 
significant” because such person was member of trade and, therefore, less likely to be 
confused); Cosmetic Dermatology & Vein Ctrs. of Downriver, P.C. v. New Faces Skin 
Care Ctrs., Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1056 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (“[I]t seems important that 
the confused individual worked in the dermatological field as a supplier and had an 
incentive to accurately differentiate between Cosmetic Dermatology and New Faces/Skin 
Care.”); Express Funding, Inc. v. Express Mortg., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1095, 1103 (E.D. 
Mich. 1995) (“Because these incidents of confusion involved individuals apparently well 
acquainted with the mortgage industry and do not appear to be isolated incidents of 
confusion between commonly distinguished parties, they constitute strong evidence of a 
likelihood of confusion.”); GTFM, Inc. v. Solid Clothing, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 273, 297 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (crediting confusion of wholesale buyer and noting that such confusion 
is “evidence of more widespread confusion by retail consumers”;  “He is the 
quintessential sophisticated buyer.  His confusion speaks volumes about the likely 
confusion of less informed consumers.”); Grotrian, Helffereich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg 
Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“The significance of 
the dealer’s misconception is its role as a harbinger of confusion.”); Stix Prods., Inc. v. 
United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“If the expert is 
confused, the consumer is easy prey to deception.”); Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 
811 F. Supp. at 243 (“The fact that these retailers were confused regarding genuine and 
mislabeled batteries is highly probative of likelihood of confusion in the marketplace 
generally because retail dealers are less likely to be confused than average consumers.”) 
(citation omitted); Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Zim, 481 F. Supp. 1247, 1250 n. 4 (N.D. 
Tex. 1979) (“While the relevant factor is confusion among customers, this confusion 
among suppliers indicates the likelihood of confusion by the public generally, including 
customers in particular.”); Allen, supra note 4, at 45-46 (asserting that most courts deem 
confusion of retailers and distributors to be probative); 2 GILSON, supra note 52, 
§ 5.01[3][c][vii], at 5-28 to 5-29 (arguing that confusion of store employees augurs more 
confusion among less knowledgeable members of public).  See also John H. Harland Co. 
v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 978-79 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding two instances of 
actual confusion not involving ultimate customers were relevant but did not, and of 
themselves, require finding likelihood of confusion); Superior Gearbox Co., 869 S.W.2d 
at 255 (noting that confusion among suppliers augured confusion among end-users of 
equipment rather than manufacturing purchasers who were likely to be more 
sophisticated). 
186  See Spangler Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 353 F.2d 641, 643-44 (7th 
Cir. 1966) (finding actual confusion based, among other things, on incident where 
customer asked for plaintiff’s product and was given defendant’s product by retail 
manager and then bought product thinking it to be plaintiff’s); S.S. Kresge Co. v. Winget 
Kickernick Co., 96 F.2d 978, 987 (8th Cir. 1938) (“While there is no evidence of 
  55 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 4  
 
be multiple “consumers” for a given business, including consumers within the trade.187  
For example, magazine publishers have multiple classes of consumers, including 
advertisers, subscribers, and newsstand purchasers.188  Other courts have held that, where 
a product has a mixed buying class of professional buyers and retail consumers, 
testimony by professional buyers as to the absence of confusion should not be dispositive, 
and that the court should determine confusion from the perspective of the ordinary 
consumer.189  In addition, some persons within the trade may not be actual or prospective 
purchasers. Nevertheless, under an approach that credits any confusion among those 
whose views could impact the trademark owner’s good will—a category that could 
potentially include suppliers, shippers, distributors, providers of credit, investors, 
prospective employees, employment agencies, and industry rating groups—confusion of 
many different types of persons in the trade should be actionable.  Indeed, some courts 
                                                                                                                                                 
deception of any customer . . . , yet it is certain that if clerks who sell a product are 
confused to the point of selling one article for another (as here) such is evidence of the 
probability of confusion by customers.”);  Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 97 F. Supp. 
131, 143 (D. Del. 1951) (“Confusion among clerks is in itself enough to establish 
infringement because it is certain that if clerks who sell a product are confused to the 
point of selling one article for another such is evidence of the probability of confusion by 
customers.”) (internal quotations omitted).  Cf. Union Carbide Corp., 531 F.2d at 384 
(“Although we have great difficulty conceiving that a clerk’s anxiety to make a small-
dollar sale would prompt a deliberate and knowledgeable misrepresentation, if we assume 
that the clerk was not confused, the evidence is nevertheless relevant because it is unfair 
competition for a person to put a product into a dealer’s hands which a producer can 
reasonably anticipate may easily be passed off as the goods of another.”) (citations 
omitted).  
187  See Allen, supra note 4, at 47 (arguing that retail buyers are consumers); 3 
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:5 (arguing that likelihood of confusion should be 
determined among relevant customers and potential customers, which may include 
professional buyers, wholesalers, or retailers in addition to consumers).  See, e.g., 
Marathon Mfg. Co., 767 F.2d at 221 (crediting confusion among distributors and 
professional buyers); Americana Trading, Inc., 966 F.2d at 1289 (crediting confusion 
among retailers); Glen Raven Mills, Inc. v. Ramada Int’l, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 1544, 1552 
(M.D. Fla. 1994) (holding confusion among distributors and end users to be relevant); 
GTFM, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d at 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (crediting instance of actual 
confusion by wholesale buyer); Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 
F. Supp. 2d 935, 970 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (following MCCARTHY treatise). 
188  See Inc. Publ’g Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 386 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Westchester Media Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 970. 
189  See cases cited supra note 163.  See Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., 
Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 297-98 (3d Cir. 1991); Gold Seal, Inc. v. The Scent Shop, Inc., 851 F. 
Supp. 1283, 1286 (E.D. Ark. 1994); see Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman 
Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[A]ny confusion has to exist in 
the mind of a relevant person.  Lab technicians are not in that class, as no evidence has 
identified them as persons who are involved in decisions to buy.  Indeed, purchasing 
directors themselves have only been shown to play a peripheral role in product choice.”). 
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have held actual confusion among members of the trade must be credited because of the 
1962 amendments to the Lanham Act, which expanded the likelihood of confusion 
inquiry to encompass non-purchasers. 
¶75 
¶76 
                                                
There may be reason for caution in assessing evidence of confusion among 
members of the trade, particularly where it takes the form of out-of-court statements by 
those who should not be so easily confused.  Casual questions by sophisticated persons 
asking when the plaintiff went into the business of producing a particular product that 
happens to be a product produced by the defendant and not the plaintiff may well be 
evidence of humor or sarcasm by one who knows better rather than evidence that the 
person asking such questions was actually confused.190  Where the statement is made by a 
particularly knowledgeable and sophisticated person in the trade and the parties have 
been in competition for a sufficient amount of time,, it may be improbable that the person 
had acquired an insufficiently precise understanding of the differences between the two 
parties and their respective marks before making the statement at issue.191  Furthermore, 
allegedly confused communications by persons within the trade may be discounted when 
they do not arise from the context in which the marks are presented to an audience of 
potential consumers.192  In addition, persons within the trade may have particular biases 
due to relationships with one of the parties.193 
Nevertheless, each allegedly confused individual must be assessed in light of that 
person’s credibility and the circumstances surrounding the incident in question.  Indeed, 
under another view, actual confusion among particularly sophisticated and 
knowledgeable members of the trade may augur greater confusion among ordinary, less 
sophisticated and knowledgeable consumers.194  Ultimately, determining whether such 
 
190  See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 158, 159 
n.13 (9th Cir. 1963); see also Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 
505-06 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that it was not possible to determine whether 
commentary in trade journal reflected confusion as opposed to speculation or humor). 
191  See Inc. Publ’g Corp., 616 F. Supp. at 388. 
192  See Chum Ltd. v. Lisowski, 198 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(discounting e-mails from industry professionals where it was possible that persons 
comparing marks in abstract might be confused but where differences in products made it 
impossible that consumers could be confused). 
193  See infra notes 362-74 and accompanying text. 
194  See Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 
1120 (6th Cir. 1996) (“It is significant that in all four instances, the confused individuals 
were knowledgeable about golf clubs, and had an incentive to accurately identify the club 
in question, but nonetheless were unclear about which club was which.”); Tri-Star 
Pictures, Inc. v. Unger, 14 F. Supp. 2d 339, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (crediting confusion in 
newspaper articles:  “[A]ctual confusion already exists even among journalists and film 
reviewers, who arguably are more sophisticated about motion pictures than ordinary 
consumers.”); see also authorities cited supra note 184; cf. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 389, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (appearing to credit 
confusion by government official without explanation); see generally Allen, supra note 4, 
at 47 (arguing that confusion of retail employees is relevant insofar as they are more 
sophisticated than their customers); 3A CALLMAN, supra note 45, § 21:64, at 21-837 
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alleged confusion is relevant depends on assessing the credibility of the particular 
accounts in light of circumstances known and observed as to the particular witnesses and 
the circumstances that purportedly generated the witness’s alleged confusion.195 
¶77 
                                                                                                                                                
Although the infringement standard measures the likelihood of consumer confusion 
under marketplace conditions, actual confusion among actual or potential purchasers 
need not necessarily occur in the context of a sale.  For example, courts have held that 
actual confusion is relevant when it flows from advertising not presented at the point of 
sale.196  In addition, actual confusion by persons seeking service for products previously 
purchased is similarly relevant: confusion in that context may harm the plaintiff’s good 
will and reputation, even where the services offered by the respective parties are purely 
ancillary to the product sold.197  Finally, actual confusion may occur when persons arrive 
at one party’s location in response to another’s advertisements or attempt to exchange 
one party’s merchandise at the location of another.198 
 
(arguing that confusion of more sophisticated persons, including members of trade, 
should receive more weight because such persons are less easily confused than ordinary 
consumers); 2 GILSON, supra note 52, § 5.01[3][c][vii], at 5-28 to 5-29 (arguing that 
confusion of store employees augurs further confusion among less knowledgeable 
public); KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:4, at 7-10 (arguing that confusion of 
sophisticated persons is “not directly  probative” but provides basis for inferring 
confusion of ordinary purchasers). 
195  See, e.g., Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d at 1120 (noting that, in addition to 
being knowledgeable about industry, suppliers who were allegedly confused had 
incentive to accurately identify the parties). 
196  See, e.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544-45 (5th Cir. 
1998) (“[T]wo witnesses testified that Tour 18’s advertising in particular caused their 
confusion. . . .  This confusion was relevant even if it was obviated by playing the course 
and viewing the holes and disclaimers on the golf course designs.”) (citations omitted); 
Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he finding 
by the district court that the Defendants’ advertising practices caused actual confusion 
shows that actual confusion occurred when consumers first observed the mark in 
commerce.”) (citation omitted). 
197  See Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1118 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (“The importance of the actual confusion element rests in the fact that 
confusion leads to an injury to one of the parties, an outcome which is no less present in 
the service context than in the sales context.”); Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG v. Zim, 481 F. 
Supp. 1247, 1249 (N.D. Tex. 1979)  (“In the present case, there is evidence of actual 
confusion on the part of Por-sha customers.  Por-sha has been asked to do Porsche 
warranty work, which of course can only be performed by an authorized Porsche 
dealer.”). 
198  See Money Savers Pharm., Inc. v. Koffler Stores (Western) Ltd., 682 P.2d 960, 
964 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he plaintiff set forth a number of specific instances 
where identified members of the public:  (1) had shopped at the plaintiff’s store expecting 
to rely on the defendant’s advertising circular; (2) came to the plaintiff’s store expecting 
to be able to exchange good which had been purchased at one of the defendant’s stores; 
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4. A Hierarchy of Confusion 
¶78 
¶79 
                                                                                                                                                
Although there may be some dispute as to whether certain types of persons should 
be deemed relevant in determining the presence or absence of actual confusion, there is 
relatively little dispute that the confusion of some persons is more probative than that of 
others.  Those whose confusion generally carries the most weight tend to be actual or 
prospective purchasers.199  The category of prospective purchasers, however, is extremely 
broad and can encompass those who are likely to make a transaction imminently and 
those who may make a transaction at some point in the future.  Similarly, the category of 
persons whose views may affect the good will of the trademark owner encompasses 
persons who may have existing and prospective relationships with the trademark owner.  
Those who have existing relationships and have made serious mistakes based on 
confusion may be more relevant than prospective purchasers who are not proximate to a 
potential transaction. 
Within a given category of persons, however, there is a hierarchy of incidents that 
are given differing degrees of weight by courts.  At the most persuasive end of the 
spectrum are mistaken purchases.200  For those whose views may impact the good will of 
a company, the equivalent to a mistaken purchase would be a mistaken transaction.  
According to one commentator, mistaken purchases are afforded the most weight because 
they do not present any question about the relevance of the person or setting, because 
there is typically little vagueness, ambiguity, or doubt about such evidence, and because 
there are no issues as to the admissibility of such evidence if the confused purchaser 
testifies.201  According to the same commentator, the next most probative types of 
evidence are those in which the confused person has affirmatively taken some action to 
manifest confusion, such as by making complaints to the wrong party, returning 
merchandise to the wrong party, or seeking product repairs or service from the wrong 
party.202  Included in that category are instances in which the wrong party is named in a 
lawsuit203—although, unless the lawsuit is filed by a consumer, the relevance of the 
person and setting would be more attenuated and would seem to flow only from the high 
degree of care expected in such circumstances.  Lesser in probative value are misdirected 
communications, which may be attributable to carelessness, to secretarial or bureaucratic 
errors, to other circumstances not related to confusion between the marks at issue, or to 
unknown causes.204  Still further down in this ranking of types of incidents of confusion 
 
and (3) thought the plaintiff’s store and the defendant’s stores were part of the same 
business.”). 
199  See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:4, at 7-6. 
200  See Allen, supra note 4, at 27, 28-30, 44; Stolte, supra note 1, at 235-36. 
201  See Allen, supra note 4, at 30. 
202  See id. at 30-31.  But see Children’s Factory, Inc. v. Benee’s Toys, Inc., 160 F.3d 
489, 496 (8th Cir. 1998) (treating misdirected warranty calls like other “vague evidence 
of misdirected phone calls and mail” as hearsay) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
203  See Allen, supra note 4, at 30-31. 
204  See id. at 32-37; Stolte, supra note 1, at 237.  For a discussion of confusion 
prompted by carelessness or inattentiveness, see infra notes 340-61 and accompanying 
text. 
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are inquiries about affiliation, which may show some doubt but also tend to show some 
understanding as to the distinctions between the parties and could be motivated by mere 
curiosity—in marked contrast to a mistaken purchase by which the confused person acts 
to his or her detriment.205  Finally, of uncertain status are incidents of purported 
confusion by friends, family, and acquaintances of the trademark owner, who may be 
biased and who may not be representative of actual or prospective customers or of other 
persons whose views would affect the good will of the trademark owner.206  As one court 
has observed: “Attestations from persons in close association and intimate contact with 
its (the trade-mark claimant’s) business do not reflect the views of the purchasing 
public.”207 
¶80 
                                                
Both cases limiting relevant confusion to actual or prospective purchasers and cases 
expanding those limits to include persons whose views may impact the good will of the 
trademark owner appear to share a common feature—namely, that certain types of 
confusion are entitled to no weight at all.  Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit has expressed in 
dicta that trial courts cannot “total[ly] disregard. . . evidence of actual confusion. . . , 
regardless of the identity of the person confused.”208  Yet, any probative value afforded to 
the confusion of persons not deemed to be relevant is likely to be minimal, at best.209  A 
comment in the RESTATEMENT appears to support that actual confusion in an irrelevant 
context is “entitled to little weight,” as opposed to no weight.210  Nevertheless, confusion 
 
205  See Allen supra note 4, at 39-43.  See, e.g., Lloyd’s Food Prods., Inc. v. Eli’s, 
Inc., 987 F.2d 766, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“In this case, the Flachs were not actually 
confused; they only ‘wondered’ at a possible relationship.”).  For a discussion of issues 
surrounding inquiries as to affiliation, see infra notes 290-317 and accompanying text. 
206  See Allen, supra note 4, at 49-50; see, e.g., Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Way, 
757 F.2d 1176, 1185 (11th Cir. 1985) (“the court discounted this testimony because none 
of his friends [who were purportedly confused] were identified as potential customers and 
none of them testified at trial.”); Lloyd’s Food Prods., Inc., 987 F.2d at 768 (holding that 
testimony of actual confusion witnesses should be discounted where they were related to 
proponent’s president and “not shown to be representative of the consuming public”); 
Heartsprings,Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 1539, 1545 (D. Kan. 1996) 
(“[P]laintiff’s evidence concerns random acquaintances and not consumers of the parties’ 
products.”); Madison Reprographics, Inc. v. Cook’s Reprographics, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 
440, 449 n. 10 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (“The testimony of a friend of a shareholder in 
Madison Reprographics who is not a customer or potential customer is not relevant.”) 
(citation omitted).  As will be discussed later, accounts of confusion from such sources 
are also potentially subject to challenge based on bias and credibility.  See infra notes 
362-406 and accompanying text. 
207  Norm Thompson Outfitters, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 448 F.2d 1293, 1297 
(9th Cir. 1971) (quoting 88 cent Stores, Inc. v. Martinez, 361 P.2d 809, 814 (Or. 1961)). 
208  Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 597 (5th 
Cir. 1985). 
209   See, e.g., Am. Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607, 616 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that confusion of five year old child reported to mother was 
“the weakest evidence of actual confusion” where child was not buyer). 
210  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23 cmt. c. 
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among irrelevant members of the general public should be afforded weight, only when 
there is a finding that such confusion augurs confusion in other relevant persons by 




                                                
Not only must the person be relevant, but the setting in which the person is 
confused must similarly be relevant.  Thus, transactions that do not replicate actual 
marketplace conditions may not be probative of likely confusion.  For example, if a 
product is usually purchased by sight on a self-serve basis, a mistake by a sales clerk in 
offering the wrong product when the product was requested verbally may not be 
indicative of likely consumer confusion.211 
The status of the purportedly confused person may play an important role in 
instances where the type of evidence at issue is less reliable.  For example, some courts 
have discounted or discredited mere inquiries about origin, sponsorship, or affiliation 
where the plaintiff could not establish that the persons making such inquiries were 
potential purchasers.212  The connection between type of person and type of evidence is 
particularly important with respect to inquiries, as it is often all too easy for a trademark 
plaintiff to produce friends and acquaintances who can attest to idle curiosity about a 
relationship between the parties.  Thus, it has been held that less weight should be given 
to inquiries representing short-lived confusion among persons casually acquainted with a 
business and more weight to lasting confusion among actual customers.213 
Problems relating to the relationship between status of the purportedly confused 
person and the type of evidence of confusion can also arise with respect to misdirected 
communications.  Specifically, where persons or entities doing business with the plaintiff 
direct communications to the wrong location, such mistakes may be attributable to 
clerical assistants, administrative personnel, or independent delivery services, rather than 
to relevant persons.214  Such incidents are more likely to be credited as strong evidence of 
 
211  See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 385 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(“We do not discredit the sales person’s confusion because he was a sales person but 
rather because he was told of the product and the product is normally bought on a self-
service basis – by sight.”). 
212  See, e.g., Gruner + Jahr Publ’g., 991 F.2d at 1079; Lang v. Ret. Living Publ’g 
Co., 949 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1991); Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun Fed. Savs. & Loan 
Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 1981); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing 
Co., 314 F.2d 149, 158, 159 n.13 (9th Cir. 1963); Microware Sys. Corp. v. Apple 
Computer, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1217 (S.D. Iowa 2000). 
213  See Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1160 n.11 (5th Cir. 
1982) (citation omitted). 
214  See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 298 
(3d Cir. 2001) (“Some of this confusion consisted of misdirected calls and therefore it is 
uncertain whether the consumers were confused by the parties’ similar names or whether 
directory assistance erred in connecting consumers with the parties.”) (citation omitted); 
Alltel Corp. v. Actel Integrated Communications, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1272 (S.D. 
Ala. 1999) (“[T]here is no evidence as to how these calls and letters were misdirected.  
These mistakes could easily have been the result of carelessness on the part of directory 
assistance or the post office.”); U.S. Express, Inc. v. U.S. Express, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 
1241, 1246 (D.D.C. 1992) (“It is significant that Plaintiff did not offer testimony from 
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any customers or other third parties to dispel the inference that the confusion was the 
result of mailing errors.”) (citations omitted); United States Jaycees v. Commodities 
Magazine, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 (N.D. Iowa 1986) (“The evidence presented by 
plaintiff of postal clerical errors does not weigh strongly in its favor.  The postal system 
for returning undeliverable mail is not the relevant marketplace for the analysis of 
likelihood of confusion.”) (citation omitted); Prime Media, Inc. v. Primedia, Inc., 33 F. 
Supp. 2d 932, 939-40 (D. Kan. 1998) (discounting telephone calls misdirected by 
directory assistance was not linked to consumer purchasing decisions); Allstate Ins. Co. 
v. Allstate Inv. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 25, 29 (W.D. La. 1962) (“It is true that there have 
been some instances of misdirected mail and telephone calls.  We are convinced, 
however, that these were the result of mere carelessness on the part of the postal service 
or of persons consulting the Shreveport telephone directory. . . .”); Greentree Labs., Inc. 
v. G.G. Bean, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (D. Me. 1989) (“The letters presented by Ms. 
Hewitt reflect simple misspelling rather than confusion as to source.”); Transamerica 
Corp. v. Trans Am. Abstract Serv., Inc., 698 F. Supp. 1067, 1075 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(holding actual confusion not established by misdirected communications caused by 
“secretarial carelessness”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Polaroid Corp. 
v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 350, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (“All of the 
aforementioned incidents were clearly due to palpable carelessness on the part of the 
clerks or other subordinate employees involved therein, and, since no product is 
manufactured or sold competitively by the parties herein, neither resulted nor could have 
resulted in pecuniary or other loss to the plaintiff.”); Franklin Resources, Inc. v. Franklin 
Credit Mgmt. Corp., 988 F. Supp. 322, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that misdirection of 
form by bank examiners was most likely due to “bureaucratic error”); Vision, Inc. v. 
Parks, 610 F. Supp. 927, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that individual who received 
wrong telephone number from directory assistance “may have been confused as to the 
number” but “was not confused as to the source or origin of the various publications” at 
issue); U.S. Blind Stitch Mach. Corp. v. Union Special Mach. Co., 287 F. Supp. 468, 471 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“The mass of documents in evidence purporting to show confusion are 
either examples of secretarial carelessness caused by a failure to check business addresses 
or of a mix-up caused by the identical abbreviations of corporate names not attributable 
to the marks in question.”); Commercial Sav. Bank v. Hawkeye Fed. Sav. Bank, 592 
N.W.2d 321, 331 (Iowa 1999) (“[T]he majority of mistakes concerning mail and delivery 
of documents were made by other entities doing business with Commercial Savings, not 
by actual consumers.  For the most part, it seems that these mistakes can be attributed to 
inattentiveness on the part of the caller or sender rather than actual confusion.”); Madison 
Reprographics, Inc. v. Cook’s Reprographics, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1996) (discounting testimony of delivery person who delivered to plaintiff package 
addressed to defendant because he saw common word in parties’ names and assumed it 
referred to plaintiff without reading address, as well as testimony about other misdirected 
deliveries without details regarding reasons for mistakes); see generally Allen, supra note 
4, at 32-36.  But see Alliance Metals, Inc. v. Hinely Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 895, 908 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (rejecting argument that post office clerical errors were responsible for 
misdirected deliveries in light of volume of deliveries, specific labeling of deliveries, and 
fact that many deliveries came directly from sender and not via post office); Lamda 
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actual confusion where the plaintiff can demonstrate—from the face of the 
communication or otherwise—that the mistake was made by a relevant person who sent 
the communication rather than by an assistant or third party.215 
¶84 
                                                                                                                                                
With any type of confusion that is subject to challenge or likely to receive less 
weight, such evidence can often be bolstered when accompanied by other forms of 
confusion.216  By contrast, where such episodes are isolated, they are less likely to be 
credited.217 
 
Elecs. Corp. v. Lambda Tech., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 915, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (rejecting 
argument that misdirected checks and orders were based on clerical errors and not 
indicative of confused state of mind where testimony of persons involved indicated 
otherwise and where amounts of money involved were large).  One commentator has 
noted that mistakes by postal officials are arguably persuasive evidence of actual 
confusion insofar as postal officials are charged with taking greater care with delivery 
than ordinary consumers.  See 3A CALLMAN, supra note 45, § 21:64, at 21-866 to 21-867.  
As will be discussed later, misdirected communications are also frequently discounted 
because they do not reflect the requisite level of consumer care.  See infra notes 340-61 
and accompanying text. 
215  See Allen, supra note 4, at 35-36; 3A CALLMAN, supra note 45, § 21:64, at 21-
866 to 21-869; see, e.g., Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Seidenburg, 619 F. Supp. 1173, 1184 
(W.D. La. 1985) (noting mistaken phone calls by two long-term customers who “phoned 
defendant with the mistaken impression that they were phoning the plaintiff, in order to 
make a purchase with plaintiff”). 
216  See, e.g., Emerson Elec. Co. v. Emerson Quiet Kool Corp., 577 F. Supp. 668, 678 
(E.D. Mo. 1983) (“[T]here was evidence that consumers, retailers, stock analysts and 
other members of the investment community, and the news media, have often confused 
the parties and their products.”); Frank Brunckhorst Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 
875 F. Supp. 966, 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (crediting confusion by “sophisticated” and 
“interested” merchandiser when coupled with other incidents of confusion); Veryfine 
Prods., Inc. v. Colon Bros., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 240, 253 (D.P.R. 1992) (crediting 
confusion by store employee when combined with evidence of customers who were 
actually confused); Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. v. Pro-Tech Power Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 
834, 852 (E.D. Va. 1998) (crediting confusion by retailers when coupled with confusion 
by customers); see also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:6, at 7-10 (arguing that weight 
of evidence is enhanced when there is evidence of several different kinds of confused 
persons). 
217  See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 1454, 1460 
(D. Del. 1995) (refusing to credit two instances of mistaken labeling by grocers); cf. 
Express Funding, Inc. v. Express Mortg., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1095, 1103 (E.D. Mich. 
1995) (“Because these incidents of confusion involved individuals apparently well 
acquainted with the mortgage industry and do not appear to be isolated incidents of 
confusion between commonly distinguished parties, they constitute strong evidence of a 
likelihood of confusion.”). 
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C. Assessing Shortcomings in Evidence of Actual Confusion 
¶85 Several problematic features of evidence of actual confusion have already been 
mentioned at various points.  This Subsection explores those features more 
comprehensively.  Roughly, the various problems that detract from the value of evidence 
of actual confusion can be categorized as those inherent in the procedural posture of the 
litigation, those relating to the law of evidence, and substantive issues that impact the 
value of such evidence. 




                                                
There are at least two types of procedural issues that contribute to the 
inconsistencies and difficulties in cases involving evidence of actual confusion.  The first 
type flows from the nature of preliminary injunctive proceedings.  The second flows from 
the standard of review applicable to the likelihood of confusion finding. 
i) Preliminary Injunctions 
A threshold issue that detracts from a clarity in treatment of evidence of actual 
confusion is how the preliminary injunction context (in which so many trademark 
decisions are reported) affects the evidentiary standard.  Courts are afforded a wide 
degree of discretion in granting preliminary injunctions and in what types of procedures 
should attend their determinations.218  This discretion can impact both the types of 
evidence that courts are willing to accept and the types of evidence that parties have an 
opportunity to present. 
For example, a court need not be bound by the rules of evidence in ruling on a 
motion for a preliminary injunction.219  Indeed, the court need not hold an evidentiary 
hearing.220  Thus, where an evidentiary hearing is not held, the only evidence will be by 
way of affidavits and exhibits.  In view of the extraordinary nature of the preliminary 
injunctive remedy, however, some courts will conduct an evidentiary hearing and may 
preclude affidavits from witnesses that a party fails to produce at such a hearing.221  
 
218  See 11A WRIGHT, supra note 36, § 2949. 
219  See, e.g., Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(“Affidavits and other hearsay materials are often received in preliminary injunction 
proceedings.  The dispositive question is not their classification as hearsay but whether, 
weighing all the attendant factors, including the need for expedition, this type of evidence 
was appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding.”) 
(collecting authority); Bebe Stores, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Int’l, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 
980, 988 n.4 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (“Because this is a preliminary injunction hearing, . . . and 
was held on short notice and on an expedited schedule, I believe that receipt of these 
hearsay affidavits is appropriate under the residual exception contained in Fed. R. Evid. 
807.”); see generally 11A WRIGHT, supra note 36, § 2949, at 214-220. 
220  See 11A WRIGHT, supra note 36, § 2949. 
221  See, e.g., Mars, Inc. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 290 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1972) (recognizing that preliminary injunction is “extraordinary remedy” and refusing to 
admit affidavits of witnesses whom proponent had opportunity to call at evidentiary 
hearing but failed to do so). 
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Frequently, however, courts will relax evidentiary requirements in ruling on a motion for 
preliminary injunctive relief.222  This circumstance is important because, as discussed 
below, much evidence of actual confusion is potentially subject to evidentiary objections. 
ii) Appellate Review 
¶89 
¶90 
                                                
Another procedural issue that severely constrains appellate courts’ ability to 
provide guidance and ensure consistency in judicial treatment of evidence of actual 
confusion flows from the deference that appellate courts give to trial courts in this area.  
Determining such matters as credibility is inherently a function of the trial court.  The 
weight that trial courts afford to evidence of actual confusion is given deference by 
appellate courts.223  Furthermore, findings of actual confusion are reviewed under the 
“clearly erroneous” standard.224  Indeed, the entire likelihood of confusion inquiry is so 
fact-intensive that some courts have held that each infringement decision has little 
precedential value.225 
The discretion afforded to district courts on this matter is not unbridled, but it is 
broad.  For example, actual confusion may not be inferred from factors tending to show a 
 
222  KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:6, at 7-16. 
223  See, e.g., McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir. 
1979) (upholding district court’s refusal to find actual confusion based upon single 
instance of momentary confusion claimed by plaintiff’s employee:  “The weighing of 
evidence, particularly where credibility judgments must be made, is for the trial judge.”); 
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding 
that, in absence of explanatory testimony, district court was entitled to find that reported 
instances of clerical errors and joint advertising did not demonstrate actual confusion 
among retail customers); First Nat’l Bank v. First Nat’l Bank, 153 F.3d 885, 890 (8th Cir. 
1998) (“Even if we assume that a different factfinder may have reasonably determined 
that FNB South Dakota’s use of its full name would create a likelihood of confusion, . . . 
where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between 
them cannot be clearly erroneous.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. 
AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1544 n. 68 (11th Cir. 1986) (consumer survey:  
“A finder of fact has great latitude in determining the appropriate weight to accord 
particular evidence.”).  
224  See, e.g., McGregor-Doniger Inc., 599 F.2d at 1136; Miss Universe, Inc. v. 
Patricelli, 408 F.2d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 1969) (citation omitted); Am. Foods, Inc. v. Golden 
Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1963); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 
341, 352 (9th Cir. 1979); Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 
843 (11th Cir. 1983); see generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 23:67 to 23:75. 
225  See Eclipse Assocs. Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(noting “the limited precedential value of likelihood of confusion decisions, each of 
which stands on its own facts”) (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 
1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1985)); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 
F.2d 149, 160 (9th Cir. 1963)  (“It is elementary that in the decision of a case of this kind, 
involving the question of confusing similarity, each case must stand on its own facts, and 
prior decisions are of little assistance.”). 
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likelihood of confusion.226  It has also been held that judgment cannot be rendered in 
favor of the defendant based solely upon a side-by-side comparison of the marks without 
hearing witnesses proffered to show actual confusion.227  In addition, at least one 
appellate court has held it to be reversible error to disregard evidence of actual confusion 
on the part of distributors and trade show visitors.228  Conversely, however, a number of 
courts have held that a plaintiff cannot create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to 
avoid summary judgment on the likelihood of confusion test merely by introducing de 
minimis evidence of actual confusion.229  Similarly, factual findings of actual confusion 
have been held clearly erroneous where there was no evidence that the persons 
purportedly confused had ever seen the allegedly confusing source identifier or where the 
findings were based on hearsay.230  It has also been held that evidence of actual confusion 
does not compel a finding of likely confusion as a matter of law.231 
¶91 
                                                
Apart from unusual categories of instances in which appellate courts have found an 
abuse of discretion, most of the problematic features of evidence of actual confusion are 
 
226  See Miss Universe, Inc., 408 F.2d at 510 (“[T]he [trial] court failed to distinguish 
actual confusion from circumstances which might produce it.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464-65 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that lower court 
improperly characterized factors indicating risk of confusion as evidence of actual 
confusion). 
227  See Woodsmith Publ’g Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir. 
1990) (citation omitted); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Morton Foods, Inc., 316 F.2d 298, 300-01 
(10th Cir. 1963). 
228  See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 597 
(5th Cir. 1985). 
229  See Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 124 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 
1999); Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 1996); 
Duluth News-Tribune, Div. of Northwest Publ’ns, Inc. v. Mesabi Publ’g Co., 84 F.3d 
1093, 1098 (8th Cir. 1996); Woodsmith Publ’g Co., 904 F.2d at 1249; King of the 
Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1092 (10th Cir. 1999); Universal 
Money Ctrs., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1535 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation 
omitted); Metro Publ’g, Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 870, 878 
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (citations omitted); Specialty Surgical Instrumentation, Inc. v. Phillips, 
844 F. Supp. 1211, 1219 (M.D. Tenn. 1994); see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, 
§ 23:13, at 23-56 (arguing that evidence of actual confusion does not raise genuine issue 
of material fact where rebuttal evidence warrants discounting such evidence). 
230  See Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 210-12 (3d Cir. 1995). 
231  See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 
300-01 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding “minimal evidence of actual initial interest confusion” to 
be insufficient to override other factors weighing against likelihood of confusion); Ball v. 
Am. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228, 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (“[A]lthough 
factual instances of confusion may support a determination that confusion of the public is 
likely from the use of identical or similar trade names, they do not compel that conclusion 
as a matter of law.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Schwarz v. 
Slenderella Sys. of Cal., Inc., 271 P.2d 857, 860 (Cal. 1954) (same) (citations omitted). 
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not susceptible to resolution by articulating “bright line” tests to be applied as rules of 
law.  Rare cases of reversible error tend to occur where the trial court incorrectly 
concludes that only one inference can be drawn from the evidence of actual confusion 
when other inferences are permissible or where the trial court misstates facts that impact 
the amount of confusion that would be expected during the period of infringement.232  
One Seventh Circuit decision held—over a vigorous dissenting opinion—that the trial 
court committed reversible error by finding a likelihood of confusion in the absence of 
evidence of actual confusion, given that the evidence offered in support of the other 
factors was only sufficient to establish a scenario under which confusion was 
hypothetically possible.233  A subsequent decision of that court interpreted the ruling to 
mean that the plaintiff must introduce some evidence of actual confusion in order for that 
factor to be weighed in favor of the plaintiff.234  Yet, if all of the likelihood of confusion 
factors are weighed together in light of the particular circumstances of the case, the actual 
confusion factor might be deemed to be less important than the other factors in a case 
where such evidence is not likely to have surfaced.235 
¶92 
                                                
A good example of the discretion afforded to trial courts can be seen in Lever 
Brothers Co. v. American Bakeries Co.236  In that case, the plaintiff used the mark 
AUTUMN for margarine, and the defendant used the mark AUTUMN GRAIN for bread.  
The parties largely sold their products in different geographic markets albeit with some 
area of sales overlap and with extensive advertising by both parties.237  The trial court 
found that the proximity of the products and their impulse purchase nature tended to point 
to a likelihood of confusion but held that confusion was not likely when such factors 
were considered in light of the fact that there had been no actual confusion over several 
years.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that it was unrealistic to expect evidence of actual 
confusion in light of the generally geographically separate nature of the parties’ sales.  
However, because there was some evidence of sales overlap and because an inference 
could be drawn that confusion was unlikely where there were several years of sales in the 
face of the overlap without evidence of actual confusion, the Second Circuit held that it 
could not substitute the plaintiff’s alternative interpretation of the evidence for that of the 
trial court: 
 
232  See, e.g., Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 476 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (holding district court erroneously determined time period in which 
infringement commenced and should reevaluate evidence of actual confusion in light of 
much shorter period of infringement); Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s 
Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 284-85 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that trial court erred in 
holding that a single instance of actual confusion could not increase likelihood of 
confusion where case lacked circumstances that would have led one to expect more 
instances of actual confusion during period of infringement). 
233  See Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 1360 (7th Cir. 1995). 
234  See Barbecue Marx, Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (7th Cir. 
2000) (citing Libman Co.).  
235  See On-Line Careline, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1087 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
236  Lever Bros. Co. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251, 251 (2d Cir. 1982). 
237  Id. at 254-55. 
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Essentially, Lever would have us place the emphasis differently, by 
holding that minor sales overlap cannot be expected to result in actual 
confusion, and accordingly the proximity issue should have been decided 
in Lever’s favor and without reference to the absence of confusion.  
Whether we find this alternative reading of the evidence attractive is not 
the point.  We decline to substitute Lever’s proposed analysis for the one 
employed by Judge Neaher.238 
¶93 
                                                
One consequence of such broad discretion is the potential for outcomes that may 
seem to be in tension with various maxims about actual confusion.  For example, in some 
instances where the parties have had sustained head-to-head competition for sufficient 
time, some courts have required substantial evidence of actual confusion to maintain the 
viability of the claim.239  Yet, in Allied Marketing Group, Inc. v. CDL Marketing, Inc.,240 
the Fifth Circuit refused to overturn a district court finding of likely confusion in such 
circumstances where the evidence of actual confusion was minimal.  In that case, the 
parties each employed similar promotional postcard mailers for approximately one 
year.241  During that year, the parties disseminated millions of these postcard mailers but 
less than ten examples of actual confusion surfaced.242  The defendant argued that this 
evidence was inadequate in light of the degree of competition.  Nonetheless, because 
evidence of actual confusion is typically not required and because the district court had 
relied on factors other than actual confusion, the Fifth Circuit refused to find the 
likelihood of confusion holding to be clearly erroneous.243  Thus, unless appellate courts 
articulate factors to guide the decision-making of trial courts, the trial courts will 
 
238  Id. at 257; see also Life Technologies, Inc. v. Gibbco Scientific, Inc., 826 F.2d 
775, 777 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The district court found that the instances of actual confusion 
were neither frequent nor serious.  Life Technologies now asks that we reweigh the 
evidence and find in its favor.  However, that is not our role on appeal.  Although the 
testimony introduced in the district court is susceptible of different interpretations, it is 
not clearly erroneous for the district court to find that the instances of actual confusion 
were neither frequent nor serious.”). 
239  See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
240  Allied Marketing Group, Inc. v. CDL Marketing, Inc., 878 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 
1989). 
241  Id. at 808-09. 
242  Id. at 814 n.7. 
243  Id.  The Allied Marketing decision is particularly puzzling insofar as it held that 
the district court erred by failing to make findings as to whether the plaintiff’s trade dress 
was sufficiently distinctive to be protectible while upholding the likelihood of confusion 
holding.  Id. at 813-14 & n.7.  Yet, other than actual confusion, the only factors relied 
upon by the district court in finding likelihood of confusion were the similarity of design 
and the identity of purchasers.  Id. at 814 n.7.  However, if the plaintiff had not 
established any source-identifying function for the trade dress, then the similarity of 
design factor would have no significance and the only basis for upholding the likelihood 
of confusion analysis would be the minimal evidence of actual confusion generated 
through head-to-head competition for an identical group of purchasers.  Id. at n.7. 
68 
Vol. 2:2] Mark D. Robins 
frequently be presented with competing sets of precedent that can support diametrically 
opposed outcomes on the questions of whether or not actual confusion is needed and 
whether or not actual confusion has been established. 
2. Evidentiary Defects 
¶94 
¶95 
                                                
Another source of inconsistency and lack of clarity in how courts treat evidence of 
actual confusion lies in the interface between trademark law and the rules of evidence.  
Specifically, much evidence of actual confusion is either inadmissible or, if admissible, 
presents many of the same concerns that underpin the rules for excluding certain types of 
evidence.  The central issue here is the hearsay rule, which excludes, subject to 
exceptions and limitations, statements made by a declarant outside the courtroom when 
offered for the truth of the matters asserted in such statements.244  Underpinning this 
exclusion is the notion that courts should not trust out-of-court statements not made under 
oath where the declarant’s credibility and demeanor cannot be assessed and where the 
declarant cannot be subject to cross examination.245 
Some courts have rejected as hearsay out-of-court statements that are offered as 
evidence of actual confusion.246  This result is particularly likely where there is any 
 
244  FED. R. EVID. 801(c), 802. 
245  5 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, ET AL., WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 802.02[2]-[3] (Rel. 78 2003). 
246  See Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 123-24 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (excluding as hearsay anonymous consumers who allegedly inadvertently 
selected wrong product); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 212 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(excluding as hearsay plaintiff’s vice president’s testimony as to reports of confusion by 
sales manager); Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1330-31 & 
n.2 (7th Cir. 1993) (excluding as hearsay paraphrase of statement by unidentified person); 
Duluth News-Tribune, Div. of Northwest Publ’ns, Inc. v. Mesabi Publ’g Co., 84 F.3d 
1093, 1098 (8th Cir. 1996) (excluding as hearsay “vague evidence of misdirected phone 
calls and mail”); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 505 (5th Cir. 
1979) (excluding as hearsay article in trade magazine); Alchemy II, Inc. v. Yes! Entmt. 
Corp., 844 F. Supp. 560, 570 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (excluding as hearsay telephone 
inquiries, an affidavit recounting another person’s shock to learn of product differences, 
and newspaper articles referring to one product as improved version of another); Michael 
Caruso & Co. v. Estefan Enters., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1454, 1462 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1998) 
(excluding as hearsay memorandum indicating that caller mistook plaintiff’s offices for 
defendant’s restaurant); Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. 
Supp. 1546, 1559-60 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (excluding as hearsay affidavits recounting 
confusion witnessed by others); S Indus., Inc. v. JL Audio, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 878, 893 
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (excluding as hearsay “vague allegations of unknown numbers of 
consumers who allegedly called or wrote to Plaintiff’s related company . . . complaining 
about [defendant’s product].”); Copy Cop, Inc. v. Task Printing, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 37, 
41-42 (D. Mass. 1995) (excluding as hearsay company president’s testimony regarding 
misdirected queries that were made to company employees); Marketing Displays, Inc. v. 
Traffix Devices, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 953, 961 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (excluding as hearsay 
declarations by plaintiff’s employees recounting telephone conversations with 
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question as to whether the statements are genuine or have been shaped in any way by one 
of the parties or its attorneys.247  Often, however, such statements will be admissible 
either by qualifying for the statement of then existing state of mind exception or as a non-
hearsay statement that is offered for purposes other than its truth content.248 
¶96 
                                                                                                                                                
A number of courts have admitted misdirected communications and statements 
reflecting mistaken impressions as a statement of the declarant’s then existing state of 
mind.249  Nevertheless, where the declarant transmits information about someone else’s 
 
  See generally Mark D. Robins, Evidence at the Electronic Frontier:  Introducing 
E-Mail at Trial in Commercial Litigation, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 219, 
255, 293-94 (2003). 
purchasers); Mars Musical Adventures, Inc. v. Mars, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1151-52 
(D. Minn. 2001) (excluding as hearsay misdirected e-mails, telephone calls, mail, and 
personal inquiries); Jaret Int’l, Inc. v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 69, 72-73 
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (excluding as hearsay statement by consumer to witness that consumer 
mistakenly purchased wrong product); Paco Sport, Ltd. v. Paco Rabanne Parfums, 86 F. 
Supp. 2d 305, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (excluding as “textbook hearsay” statements 
recounting third party confusion); Lobo Enters., Inc. v. Tunnel, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 71, 77 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (excluding as hearsay testimony of plaintiff’s former bartender as to 
what third parties told him about their efforts to find him at defendant’s establishment); 
see also Vitek Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 675 F.2d 190, 193 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
district court “properly” gave “little weight” to out-of-court statements of customers that 
were characterized as “hearsay” and as otherwise unreliable). 
247  See Glen Raven Mills, Inc. v. Ramada Int’l, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 1544, 1552-53 
(M.D. Fla. 1994) (rejecting actual confusion evidence as hearsay:  “It is not clear whether 
the letters drafted at the request of Plaintiff reflect the initial concerns expressed by these 
consumers or a modification of those concerns after discussion with Plaintiff’s 
employees.  In any case, Plaintiff has not established a proper foundation for the 
admissibility of any of the letters.”). 
248
249  See, e.g., Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1003-04 
(2d Cir. 1997); Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1160 n.10 (5th 
Cir. 1982); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 
1987); Popular Bank of Fla. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1361 
(S.D. Fla. 1998); Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc., 741 F. Supp. at 1559-60 (citations omitted); 
Chattanooga Mfg., Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 917, 929-30 (N.D. Ill. 2001) 
(citations omitted), aff’d in part, modified in part, 301 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2002); Imperial 
Serv. Sys., Inc. v. ISS Int’l Serv. Sys., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 655, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Reed-
Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Source Servs. 
Corp. v. Source Telecomputing Corp., 635 F. Supp. 600, 612 (N.D. Ill. 1986); 
Heartsprings,Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 1539, 1545 (D. Kan. 1996) (citation 
omitted); Frank Brunckhorst Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 875 F. Supp. 966, 980 
n.22 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Inc. Publ’g Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 
388 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); CCBN.com, Inc. v. C-Call.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 106, 113 (D. 
Mass. 1999) (citations omitted); Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. B.C.-U.S.A., Inc., 840 F. Supp. 
344, 347-48 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Freddie Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Ridgeline, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 
72, 76 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. 
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state of mind, as where a company’s representative makes a telephone call at the 
instigation of someone else within the company who was allegedly confused, the “then 
existing state of mind” exception will not allow the proponent to introduce that statement 
as indicative of the other employee’s state of mind.250  The same reasoning would 
exclude statements of then existing state of mind that are made to one company employee 
and passed to another who testifies about them.251  At least one court has held that an 
affidavit by a plaintiff’s employee recounting telephone conversations with purchasers 
                                                                                                                                                 
Supp. 2d 935, 971 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp., Civil Action 
No. C89-204C, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9055, *8-*9 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 15, 1991); Colston 
Inv. Co. v. Home Supply Co., 74 S.W.3d 759, 765-66 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). 
250  See Versa Prods. Co., 50 F.3d at 212 (excluding as hearsay plaintiff’s vice 
president’s testimony as to reports of confusion by sales manager); Armco, Inc., 693 F.2d 
at 1160 n.10 (“Armco Burglar Alarm argues that the trial court should not have permitted 
Mr. Neumann to testify that his answering service operator had told him she had received 
calls inquiring about Amco Burglar Alarm. . . .  [T]o prove confusion the truth of the 
operator’s out-of-court assertion would be at issue and therefore hearsay.”) (citation 
omitted); Michael Caruso & Co., 994 F. Supp. at 1462 n.3 (excluding as hearsay 
memorandum indicating that caller mistook plaintiff’s offices for defendant’s restaurant); 
Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc., 741 F. Supp. at 1559-60 (excluding as hearsay affidavits 
recounting confusion witnessed by others); Source Servs. Corp., 635 F. Supp. at 612 (“To 
the extent that the reported statements of the members of the public identified therein can 
be considered hearsay, the statements are admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) as a 
statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, i.e., the declarant’s confusion as 
to the source of ‘The Source.’”) (citations omitted); Copy Cop, Inc., 908 F. Supp. at 41-
42 (excluding as hearsay company president’s testimony regarding misdirected queries 
that were made to company employees); Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 
439 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“[I]nsofar as any declarant was informing 
[the testifying witness] about the state of someone else’s mind, as appears to have been 
the case for one or more declarants, the state-of-mind exception would not be 
available.”); KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:6, at 7-16 (asserting that hearsay rule 
excludes out-of-court statement reporting another out-of-court declarant’s statement 
indicating confusion); cf. Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom Am. Inc., 287 F.3d 866, 
873-74 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We agree with the district court that Hasegawa’s affidavit lacks 
foundation for his statement that Japan Telecom received ‘many’ letters and ‘several’ 
calls, because Hasegawa does not state that he personally opens Japan Telecom’s mail 
and answers its phone.”). 
251  See Alltel Corp. v. Actel Integrated Communications, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 
1272 (S.D. Ala. 1999) (excluding as “rank hearsay” evidence of misdirected telephone 
calls and mail where neither of the persons testifying ever received calls or saw mail); 
Popular Bank of Fla., 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 n.5 (excluding as hearsay alleged statements 
offered to show actual confusion where such statements were collected from allegedly 
confused individuals by one employee and passed to a second employee who attempted 
to testify about them); Transamerica Corp. v. Trans Am. Abstract Serv., Inc., 698 F. 
Supp. 1067, 1075 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (excluding as hearsay plaintiff’s senior vice 
president’s affidavit reporting alleged misdirected calls received by her subordinates). 
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will not qualify for the state of mind exception.252  In addition, the Seventh Circuit has 
held that a statement purportedly showing the declarant’s actually confused state of mind 
was properly excluded where the declarant could not be identified and the statement was 
paraphrased by the witness who testified about it.253  Another court has distinguished 
between out-of-court statements that are too vague to show that any purported confusion 
resulted from more than inattentiveness and out-of-court statements where the reason for 
confusion is provided with sufficient detail to determine that the statement is a statement 
of the declarant’s then existing state of mind and is, therefore, admissible.254 
¶97 
¶98 
                                                
Many courts hold that a variety of out-of-court statements indicating confusion are 
not hearsay at all.  The types of communications subject to such holdings include 
misdirected communications and mistaken inquiries.  These courts reason that such items 
are offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted—for instance, that the declarant 
intended to call the wrong party—but, rather, to prove confusion.  If the substance of the 
communication does not assert that the declarant was confused, then the statement is not 
offered for the truth of any matter asserted.255 
Even though out-of-court statements offered as evidence of actual confusion will 
often be admissible as either “statements of then existing state of mind” or as non-hearsay 
 
252  See Marketing Displays, Inc. v. Traffix Devices, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 953, 961 (E.D. 
Mich. 1997). 
253  See Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1330-31 & n.2 
(7th Cir. 1993); cf. Co-Rect Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Adv. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 
1324, 1333 (8th Cir. 1985) (“We have reviewed Mr. Pierce’s testimony and have found 
no reference to confusion by his customers.  More is needed to establish the necessary 
consumer association than merely the self-serving testimony of the plaintiff that some of 
his customers were confused.”). 
254  See Rainforest Café, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 886, 902 (D. Minn. 
1999) (citations omitted); see also S Indus., Inc. v. Stone Age Equip., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 
796, 818 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (excluding as hearsay witness’s claim that he “experienced 
confused customers” at trade shows “who do not and cannot distinguish” between 
respective parties’ products) (internal citations omitted). 
255  See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1989); Fun-
Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 804 (4th Cir. 2001); Armco, Inc., 
693 F.2d at 1160 n.10 (citation omitted); Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty 
Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1090-91 (7th Cir. 1988); Ultrapure Sys., Inc. v. Ham-Let 
Group, 921 F. Supp. 659, 663-64 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Reed-Union Corp., 869 F. Supp. at 
1310; Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48, 56 n. 10 (D. Mass. 1993); 
Rainforest Café, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 902; Inc. Publ’g Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, 
Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA 
Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 935, 971 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Quantum Fitness Corp. v. 
Quantum Lifestyle Ctrs., L.L.C., 83 F. Supp. 2d 810, 830 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (citations 
omitted); Puget Sound Rendering, Inc. v. Puget Sound By-Prods., 615 P.2d 504, 506-07 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (citation omitted); see also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:6 at 
7-15 (noting that hearsay rule excludes out-of-court statements in which declarants 
“explained” that they had been confused). 
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statements that are “not offered for the truth of any matter asserted,” the contents of any 
particular statement will need to be scrutinized carefully.  For example, where the 
statements at issue consist of opinions on the ultimate issue of confusion rather than facts 
indicative of confusion, the statements will not be admissible.256 
¶99 In determining that certain out-of-court statements either are not hearsay or are 
eligible for an exception to the hearsay rule, certain other factors may be influential as 
well.  First, out-of-court statements that clearly and unambiguously indicate confusion 
are likely to be seen as reliable.257  For example, if sufficiently clear and unambiguous, 
misdirected communications by customers may “speak for themselves” without 
explanation by the customers.258  Second, many courts are used to relying on out-of-court 
statements to establish actual confusion.259  Nevertheless, particularly in light of the 
relaxed evidentiary requirements at the preliminary injunctive phase, as well as the fact 
that there are not well established rules delineating such matters as the necessity for 
identification of an out-of-court declarant to qualify for the then existing state of mind 
exception, much evidence of actual confusion is admitted despite its ambiguous quality.  
In such instances, the focus shifts to what weight must be given to such evidence in light 
of its substantive shortcomings.260 
3. Substantive Shortcomings 
¶100 
                                                
The mere fact that out-of-court statements indicating actual confusion may be 
admissible does not mean that such statements will necessarily establish actual confusion.  
Such statements are often subject to shortcomings that may be used in attacking the 
weight of such evidence.261  The potential shortcomings of out-of-court statements are 
numerous.  Some issues that limit the value of evidence of actual confusion have already 
been introduced—namely, questions of whether the persons purportedly confused are 
deemed relevant persons and whether the amount of evidence of actual confusion is of a 
sufficient quantity.  This Subsection reviews several additional factors that may diminish 
the quality of evidence of actual confusion in nearly all cases.  These factors include 
 
256  Compare Model-Etts Corp. v. Merck & Co., 118 F. Supp. 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 
1953) (rejecting as hearsay two letters offered as evidence of actual confusion:  “I do not 
regard the opinions of two of plaintiff’s distributors as sufficient evidence that actual 
confusion has occurred. . . .”), with Int’l Kennel Club, Inc., 846 F.2d at 1090-91 
(“Because the unsolicited letters received by the plaintiff merely requested information 
about purchasing the defendants’ stuffed toy dogs, the letters are competent factual 
evidence of confusion on the part of the authors, and were properly considered by the 
trial court as evidence of a likelihood of confusion.”). 
257  See, e.g., Puget Sound Rendering, Inc., 615 P.2d at 506-07 (misdirected calls and 
mail). 
258  See Air Reduction Co. v. Airco Supply Co., 258 A.2d 302, 306 (Del. Ch. Ct. 
1969) (“[T]he fact that the customers did not testify is not significant.  The documents 
involved speak for themselves.”). 
259  See, e.g., Puget Sound Rendering, 615 P.2d at 506-07 (citation omitted). 
260  See Robins, supra note 249, at 294. 
261  See, e.g Inc. Publ’g Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 388 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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interpretive problems presented by the evidence, the intelligence of the persons 
purportedly confused, the level of care or attentiveness exercised by such persons, the 
potential biases of such persons, and the credibility of actual confusion witnesses. 
i) Interpretive Problems 
a) Vague or Ambiguous Evidence 
¶101 
                                                
Evidence of actual confusion is often vague, ambiguous, or both.262  This problem 
is particularly pronounced where the persons who were purportedly confused are not 
available to testify, as there may be insufficient evidence to determine what induced their 
purportedly confused state of mind.263  As one court observed, where such persons do not 
 
262  See, e.g., Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1214 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(characterizing actual confusion evidence as “equivocal at best”); Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 
281 F.3d 837, 842 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Without some other evidence of actual 
confusion, . . . these inquiries are too ambiguous to demonstrate actual confusion.”) 
(citations omitted); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 352 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(“courts have often discounted such evidence because it was unclear”) (citations 
omitted); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolster’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 914 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (“evidence of actual confusion is . . . frequently discounted as unclear”) (citation 
omitted); Bear U.S.A., Inc. v. A.J. Sheepskin & Leather Outerwear, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 
896, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (characterizing evidence of actual confusion as “ambiguous”).  
One fertile source of vague and ambiguous evidence is electronic mail, which is 
susceptible both to mistakenly typed addresses and messages that are sent too hastily with 
too little thought.  See, e.g., Self-Insurance Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Software and Info. Indus. 
Ass’n, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that e-mail message sent to 
mistaken address did not prove actual confusion); Microware Sys. Corp. v. Apple 
Computer, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215-16 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (holding e-mail 
messages and Internet postings contained irrelevant matter and, at best, demonstrated de 
minimis confusion due to inattentiveness); Shade’s Landing, Inc. v. Williams, 76 F. 
Supp. 2d 983, 991 (D. Minn. 1999) (“The isolated misdirected email to which plaintiff 
refers is insufficient to establish that actual confusion between the parties’ services has 
occurred.”); Yankee Publ’g Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 275 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The evidence offered is vague, and does not clearly show whether 
these inquiries were prompted by such persons having actually seen the New York cover, 
as opposed to having heard about it.  If their inquiries resulted only from their having 
heard about the cover, they shed little light on the cover’s capacity to cause confusion.”); 
Centaur Communications, Ltd., 652 F. Supp. 1105, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Upon 
reading the articles, there is no way to know whose publication each article refers to.”); 
Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. Gemcraft Ltd., 612 F. Supp. 1520, 1528 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting 
“the extreme sketchiness of the testimony”); see generally Robins, supra note 249, at 
295-96. 
263  See Ultrapure Sys., Inc. v. Ham-Let Group, 921 F. Supp. 659, 663-64 (N.D. Cal. 
1995) (“[T]he statements at the trade show must be viewed in context.  The 
circumstances surrounding the statements and motivations of the speakers are unclear.”); 
Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48, 56 (D. Mass. 1993) (“Ms. Alarie’s 
affidavit says little about the context of the conversation, other than that it took place 
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testify, there is no way of “know[ing] why they asked what they asked or said what they 
said.”264  Even if the purportedly confused statement is admissible, essential context may 
be missing to the extent that additional out-of-court statements by the declarant indicating 
why that person formed the purportedly mistaken belief may not be admissible, inasmuch 
as such statements are offered for the truth of the matter asserted and go beyond the scope 
of a statement of contemporaneously existing state of mind.265  Thus, without subjecting 
the declarant to cross examination, it may be unfair to lend much weight to out-of-court 
statements.266  Indeed, at least one court has held that such out-of-court statements should 
be given less weight where the plaintiff had the opportunity but failed to present some of 
                                                                                                                                                 
while the cab was driving by plaintiff’s premises.”); Inc. Publ’g Corp., 616 F. Supp. at 
388 (“[T]he probative value of such [out-of-court] declarations is reduced by uncertainty 
as to what induced them.”); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., 351 F. Supp. 537, 
542 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (“The brevity of the letters, the fact that the writers were not called 
to testify and thus were unavailable for cross-examination, the unsubstantiated legitimacy 
of the letters, and the absence of evidence which corroborates the actual confusion they 
purport to show, all militate against such an interpretation of these letters.  Without more, 
it is rank speculation to assume that defendants’ advertising or defendants’ use of the 
mark caused the letter writers or unnamed third parties to believe there to be a business 
association between plaintiff and defendants.”); Flinkote Co. v. Tizer, 158 F. Supp. 699, 
702 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (characterizing actions of sales clerks who did not testify as “one of 
the most unsatisfactory kinds [of evidence] because it is susceptible of varying 
inferences”); see also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:9.3, 7-32 (arguing that vague 
evidence of actual confusion should be afforded less weight where witnesses are 
unidentified and cannot be cross examined). 
264  Inc. Publ’g Corp., 616 F. Supp. at 388; accord A & H Sportswear Co., Inc. v. 
Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 155, 174-75 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
265  See Executive Employment Serv., Inc. v. Executives Unltd., Inc., 180 F. Supp. 
258, 262 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (“Any statements of the caller as to what induced his belief 
would be objectionable as violative of the hearsay rule and should not be admitted 
without the respondent having an opportunity to cross-examine him on this point.”). 
266  See Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1304, 1310-11 (N.D. Ill. 
1994) (noting out-of-court statements were “inherently unbelievable”); Windsor, Inc. v. 
Intravco Travel Ctrs., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1513, 1525 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discounting single 
incident in which supplier of services to one party sent bill to other party where “no 
testimony was elicited from any witness with personal knowledge of the incident as to the 
reason the bill was sent to the wrong company”); A & H Sportswear Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 
at 174-75 (“Plaintiffs’ second hand accounting is particularly unreliable given the lack of 
opportunity for cross-examination of the caller or sender regarding the reason for the 
‘confusion.’”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Executive Employment 
Serv., Inc., 180 F. Supp. at 262 (“Under these circumstances, the court does not think it is 
fair or proper for it to make the inferences the plaintiff desires from the facts of this call 
when the caller could be produced and explain, subject to cross-examination, what 
induced his belief that he was calling the respondent.”). 
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this evidence through in-court testimony.267  Where the individuals in question are not 
even identified, then the defendant cannot verify the instances or issue subpoenas for 
such persons to appear as witnesses for the defendant.268 
¶102 
                                                
Evidence of actual confusion that is vague or ambiguous is generally entitled to 
little or no weight.269  For example, in Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp.,270 
where the parties were using identical “mushroom” marks on different apparel products, 
and both parties had extensive sales, the court discounted instances of “clerical errors and 
joint advertising involving the two companies’ products” as there was no “testimony to 
 
267  See Popular Bank of Fla. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 
1362 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (citing Mary A. Donovan, Sorry Wrong Number!  Trademark 
Confusion from Misdirected Calls and Letters, 1 No. 11 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 9 
(Aug. 1995)). 
268  See Stolte, supra note 1, at 248 (noting that courts give little weight to evidence of 
confusion in the form of out-of-court statements by persons who are not identified). 
269  See, e.g., Co-Rect Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Adv. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 
1333 (8th Cir. 1985) (“We have reviewed Mr. Pierce’s testimony and have found no 
reference to confusion by his customers.  More is needed to establish the necessary 
consumer association than merely the self-serving testimony of the plaintiff that some of 
his customers were confused.”); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 
1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Although Ornstein’s testimony [as to inquiries about 
affiliation] was admissible, the district court correctly gave it little weight.”); Fisher 
Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980) (“While 
plaintiff claimed incidents of actual confusion, the court found this evidence 
ambiguous.”); Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that 
“evidence of actual confusion is . . . frequently discounted as unclear or insubstantial”); 
Charles Schwab & Co. v. Hibernia Bank, 665 F. Supp. 800, 809 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“[T]he 
courts have often discounted such evidence . . . because it was unclear or insubstantial. ”) 
(citation omitted); Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. 
Supp. 1546, 1560-61 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that plaintiff failed to show actual 
confusion through letter from one of its distributors expressing concern that plaintiff’s 
products be environmentally sound but not linking that concern to defendant’s activities); 
Western Chem. Pumps, Inc. v. Superior Mfg., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1112, 1126 (D. Kan. 
1997) (“In light of the vague testimony regarding customer confusion and the clear labels 
on Superior’s pumps and packaging, we cannot conclude that there is a likelihood that 
ordinary prudent consumers would be confused.”) (citation omitted); HQ Network Sys. v. 
Executive Headquarters, 755 F. Supp. 1110, 1119 (D. Mass. 1991) (“Here the so-called 
evidence of actual confusion is too vague and evanescent to form a credible basis for the 
conclusion that when this rude man spoke to Ms. Whelchel there was actual confusion 
between Executive’s services and that of Network’s.”); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 
599 F.2d 341, 352 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he courts have often discounted such evidence [of 
actual confusion] because it was unclear. . . .”) (citations omitted); KIRKPATRICK, supra 
note 53, § 7:9.3 (arguing that vague evidence is entitled to less weight than evidence that 
is well documented with names, dates, and details). 
270  Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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explain these events. . . .”271  In Armstrong Cork Co. v . World Carpets, Inc.,272 where the 
parties each used the term “world” in connection with their carpet businesses, the court 
found an article in a trade magazine referring to an affiliation between the parties to be 
insufficient to demonstrate actual confusion, where it was undetermined whether the 
author of the article was confused, merely speculating, or being facetious.273  In Black 
Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall,274 where both parties sold T-shirts featuring dogs in the same 
geographic area, requests made of the plaintiff’s screen printer for the defendant’s T-
shirts were held not to be evidence of actual confusion since the screen printer was not 
exclusively working for the plaintiff and it would be reasonable to infer that the 
defendant’s designs may have been in her product line.275 
b) Evidence of Matters Other than Confusion 
¶103 
                                                
In some instances, purported evidence of actual confusion may really be evidence 
of something entirely different.276  For example, mere observations by witnesses as to the 
similarities between the respective parties’ marks do not show that such witnesses were 
 
271  Id. at 48. 
272  Armstrong Cork Co., 597 F.2d 496, 496 (5th Cir. 1979).  
273  Id. at 505-06. 
274  Black Dog Tavern, 823 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1993). 
275  Id. at 56. 
276  See Sykes Lab., Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 861 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1985) 
(holding actual confusion not established by statement in which customer said that 
another company was selling generic version of plaintiff’s brand but that customer would 
not buy it out of loyalty to plaintiff’s brand); Flotec, Inc. v. Sourthern Res., Inc., 16 F. 
Supp. 2d 992, 1011 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“Flotec has offered evidence of a handful of 
incidents in which its distributors thought that Flotec was manufacturing defendants’ 
product and allowing defendants to put their own labels on it. . . .  [T]hat evidence is 
minimal and tends to show that the distributors recognized the brand names and just 
wanted to make sure that the regulators with defendants’ brand names in fact came from 
a source other than Flotec.”); Citrus Group, Inc. v. Cadbury Beverages, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 
386, 392 (D. Md. 1991) (“Although Citrus’ supplier and bottler and a local radio station 
sales manager allegedly inquired about a ‘tie-in’ with the Defendants, those inquiries do 
not reflect a confusion about the source of the lemon ginger ale.”); Laurel Capital Group, 
Inc. v. BT Fin. Corp., 45 F. Supp. 2d 469, 494 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (noting actual confusion 
to be highly probative “so long as the confusion is causally related to the use of similar 
marks”) (citations omitted); WHS Entmt. Ventures v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 
997 F. Supp. 946, 952 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (holding that confusion generated by parody 
was not actionable trademark confusion where such confusion merely concerned whether 
plaintiff was involved in labor dispute); King-Size, Inc. v. Frank’s King Size Clothes, 
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1138, 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (“Another one of plaintiffs’ witnesses 
testified, however, that he had never associated plaintiffs with defendants’ Houston 
store, . . . while yet another one of plaintiffs’ customers stated that she was not sure if she 
ever confused defendants’ Houston store with plaintiffs.”); see also Allen, supra note 4, 
at 28 (asserting that, for confusion to be relevant, it must relate to similarities between 
parties’ marks). 
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confused.277  Similarly, an assumption that one of the parties appropriated its name from 
the other is not evidence of actual confusion, absent some other indication that the person 
was confused with respect to source, sponsorship, affiliation, or connection.278  Actual 
confusion that is attributable to features not subject to trademark protection has been held 
irrelevant.279 
                                                 
277  See, e.g., DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 514 n. 28 
(1st Cir. 1975) (holding that testimony of twenty-one witnesses regarding physical 
similarities between marks “falls short of proof that they were ‘actually deceived’”); see 
also Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 212 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Vetter’s response 
only proves that people thought the valves’ appearances were similar, not that they were 
actually confused by the similar appearances.”); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & 
Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir. 1970) (“The consumer correspondence 
introduced by plaintiff consists largely of complaint letters and does not show trademark 
association of any slogans with plaintiff or ARRID.”); Malibu, Inc. v. Reasonover, 246 F. 
Supp. 2d 1008, 1016 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (“Mr. Reasonover has shown that some people 
associate ‘Malibu Tanning’ with him, but he hasn’t come forth with any evidence of the 
likelihood of confusion among the relevant class of customers and potential customers.”); 
Scholastic Inc. v. Speirs, 28 F. Supp. 2d 862, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“assertions of 
similarity . . . do nothing to establish consumer confusion”) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 199 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir. 1999) (table); see also Scholastic, 
Inc. v. Stouffer, 221 F. Supp. 2d 425, 434-35 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding actual 
confusion not established by e-mails whose contents demonstrated authors recognized 
products as coming from separate sources). 
278  See Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Even if we 
assume that viewers erroneously believe that [the plaintiff] appropriated his name from 
the [defendant’s] TV Series, their confusion is irrelevant to his unfair competition 
claim. . . .  [S]uch proof does not show that any of [the plaintiff’s] fans has actually been 
confused about whether he is affiliated with the TV Series or whether the TV Series is 
based on his name or life.”); see also Smith v. Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 827, 
841 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding statement that person thought someone else owned mark did 
not constitute actual confusion). 
279  See Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1231 (3d Cir. 
1978) (“Selection of a mark with a common surname naturally entails a risk of some 
uncertainty and the law will not assure absolute protection.”); FS Servs., Inc. v. Custom 
Farm Servs., Inc., 471 F.2d 671, 675 (7th Cir. 1972) (“[P]laintiff’s products were sold 
through its members who in their business names had some variant of the generic terms 
represented by the abbreviation FS.  A substantial majority of these local businesses 
known to be supplying the farmer market contained the word ‘service,’ the same word 
which appears in defendant’s corporate name.  If there had been no marks here, confusion 
such as incorrect deliveries or telephone calls which did occur, would have been 
inevitable.”); Cleo Syrup Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co., 139 F.2d 416, 418-19 (8th Cir. 1943) 
(many purportedly confused witnesses admitted under cross-examination that confusion 
resulted from common use of word “Cola” in parties’ names); Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha 
Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 445 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[S]election of a mark with 
a common word, just as one with a common surname, naturally entails a risk of some 
78 
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¶104 Linguistic or spelling errors may not indicate confusion between the marks, 
particularly where there are other circumstances showing that the person in question 
understood the distinction between the two businesses.280  For example, because the mark 
                                                                                                                                                 
uncertainty and the law will not assure absolute protection.”) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); Gold Seal, Inc. v. The Scent Shop, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 1283, 
1286 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (“The more likely explanation for the mishap is the similarity of 
the products themselves rather than any similarity in the trademarks.”); Metro Publ’g, 
Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 870, 878 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“[M]any 
of the witnesses do not state whether they were confused due to the Mercury News’ use 
of the word ‘eye,’ or merely by the similar visual, editorial and marketing traits which 
Metro and eye share as members of the same genre.”); Best Cellars Inc. v. Grape Finds at 
DuPont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“The comments are anecdotal, 
and it is possible that confusion arose because the concepts – selling wine by taste – are 
similar.”); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 322 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1976) 
(discounting letters offered as instances of actual confusion where such letters were 
spurred by ads for defendant’s product but without mention of designation at issue “and 
are therefore indicative of the general confusion to be anticipated whenever identical 
items are sold by differen[t] companies, rather than referable to confusion caused by 
[defendant’s designation]”); Don Alvarado Co. v. Porganan, 21 Cal. Rptr. 495, 500 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 1962) (“[T]he rule is settled that confusion resulting only from the addition of a 
feature or features not originated by the claimant but in common use cannot be the basis 
of a suit for trademark infringement.”); see also Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove 
Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980) (“Much of [the evidence of actual 
confusion] was to the effect that consumers accused one manufacturer of copying the 
other and wanted to know which stove was made first, or inquired as to the differences 
between the two stoves. . . .  Confusion in the legal sense means confusion of source. . . .  
Far from revealing such confusion, the above statements indicate that these customers, at 
least, had the difference in source clearly in mind.”) (citations omitted); Friesland Brands, 
B.V. v. Vietnam Nat’l Milk Co., 228 F. Supp. 2d 399, 408-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding 
confusion generated by trade dress to be irrelevant to claim for infringement of 
trademark); Allen, supra note 4, at 28 (arguing that confusion must be attributable to 
similarity in marks to be actionable).  But see Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 
251 F.3d 1252, 1265 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (characterizing as “deliver[ing] much less than 
promised” testimony in which witnesses merely indicated belief that parties’ trade 
dresses looked similar but, nonetheless, holding such testimony to be “probative of 
likelihood of confusion” but not actual confusion) (emphasis in original).  
280  See Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 489 
(1st Cir. 1981) (discounting evidence that consumers used defendant’s mark when 
referring to plaintiff’s product where defendant’s mark was equivalent to common 
misspelling of plaintiff’s mark and such misspelling by consumers preexisted defendant’s 
use); Ford Motor Co. v. Lloyd Design Corp., 184 F. Supp. 2d 665, 671 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(discounting incident deemed to be “proofreading error” rather than actual confusion); 
Madison Reprographics, Inc. v. Cook’s Reprographics, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1996) (discounting testimony of customer who confused parties’ names when 
speaking to employee of plaintiff). 
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“Alpa” is susceptible to the common misspelling “Alpha,” and because there was 
evidence that consumers used that misspelling before the defendant began using the mark 
“Alpha,” a misspelling that followed the defendant’s adoption of that mark was held not 
to be evidence of actual confusion.281  Mistakes between companies may also result from 
misdirection or miscommunication rather than similarities between the parties’ marks.282 
¶105 
                                                
Other types of non-actionable errors may arise from mistaken assumptions or 
general curiosity resulting from a new entrant in the market.  For example, where two 
parties use identical or nearly identical marks and the second comer has not yet obtained 
a telephone listing, telephone calls may be misdirected solely because of the single 
listing.283  Moreover, where only one business in an industry has existed within a 
geographic region, consumers may assume that representatives of a newcomer are 
working for the first business simply because the first business is the only one they are 
aware of within the industry.284  Furthermore, where a sales clerk offers one product 
instead of another and is not available to testify as to the context of the transaction, it is 
possible that the sales clerk was merely attempting to offer a functionally equivalent 
product without being confused as to source.285  In addition, confusion will not be 
established by a generalized inquiry about what products or services the plaintiff 
produces or by questions or erroneous assumptions about whether the plaintiff produces 
 
281  See Pignons S.A. de Mecanique , 657 F.2d at 489. 
282  See Nassau v. Unimotorcyclists Soc’y of Am., Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1241 
(M.D. Fla. 1999) (“Rowley’s testimony indicates that the confusion stemmed from a 
miscommunication between himself and Regor, rather than actual confusion between the 
different groups’ names.”); Capital Bonding Corp. v. ABC Bail Bonds, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 
2d 691, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“[I]f Landron’s friend was confused, it was because of 
Landron’s confusing directions, not because of ABC’s allegedly confusing image.”). 
283  See Lang v. Ret. Living Publ’g Co., 949 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The 
evidence shows that the [misdirected] calls ceased following the listing of [the second 
comer’s mark] in local phone books, likely indicating that the confusion resulted from the 
absence of any [such] listing. . . .”); Executive Employment Serv., Inc. v. Executives 
Unltd., Inc., 180 F. Supp. 258, 262 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (discounting evidence that person 
called plaintiff in response to defendant’s advertising when advertising listed defendant 
as located in city where defendant had not yet obtained telephone listing). 
284  See Belleville News-Democrat, Inc. v. St. Clair Cty. Publ’rs, Inc., 167 N.E.2d 573, 
576 (Ill. Ct. App. 1960) (“Both of the other incidents occurred very shortly after the 
News Advertiser was first organized, and both involved telephone conversations with 
individuals who had not yet heard of the News Advertiser.  Under those conditions, slight 
inattention on the part of the person called could lead him to assume that he was talking 
to a representative of the only newspaper he was thinking of at the time.”); see also 
Schwartz v. Slenderella Sys. of Cal., 271 P.2d 857, 861 (Cal. 1954) 
 (“much of the difficulty may be attributed to the newness of the defendant’s 
business”). 
285  See Flinkote Co. v. Tizer, 158 F. Supp. 699, 702 (E.D. Pa. 1957). 
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particular products or services.286  These issues help to explain why confusion that is 
fleeting or temporary may not be credited.287 
¶106 In other instances, circumstances that would make confusion unlikely may indicate 
that purported incidents of actual confusion are caused by something other than the use of 
the marks at issue.  For example, where the two parties did not have a coexisting presence 
in the same consumer audience during the time period in which purported incidents of 
confusion occurred, it is unlikely that those incidents are evidence of confusion as to 
source between the parties.288 
c) Inquiries 
¶107 
                                                
Inquiries regarding affiliation are particularly prone to differing interpretations and 
involve inconsistent treatment by courts.  Some courts disfavor evidence of inquiries on 
the grounds that the person making the inquiry is aware of the distinction.289  
 
286  See Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799-802 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000) (reviewing several such communications), aff’d, 295 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
287  See Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 211 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that 
testimony shows “only fleeting uncertainty as to the relationship” between parties and 
does not show confusion); Children’s Factory, Inc. v. Benee’s Toys, Inc., 160 F.3d 489, 
496 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The district court properly concluded that these incidents of actual 
confusion were insufficient because the incidents only occurred during Benee’s inaugural 
year.”); First Nat’l Bank v. First Nat’l Bank, 153 F.3d 885, 890 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Isolated 
evidence of some actual confusion occurring initially upon the creation of a potentially 
confusing mark is not itself sufficient to establish a likelihood of confusion.”); 
Commercial Sav. Bank v. Hawkeye Fed. Sav. Bank, 592 N.W.2d 321, 331 (Iowa 1999) 
(“[T]he incidents of confusion occurred during, or soon after, the time Commercial 
Federal assumed operation of Hawkeye Federal which diminishes the significance of the 
incidents.”) (citation omitted). 
288  See Alltel Corp. v. Actel Integrated Communications, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 
1272-73 (S.D. Ala. 1999); Aztar Corp. v. NY Enter., LLC, 15 F. Supp. 2d 252, 259 
(E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
289  See Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st 
Cir. 1980) (discounting inquiries about affiliation:  “Far from revealing confusion, the 
above statements indicate that these customers, at least, had the difference in source 
clearly in mind.”); Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 124 
(2d Cir. 2001) (“Inquiries about the relationship between an owner of a mark and an 
alleged infringer do not amount to actual confusion.  Indeed, such inquiries are arguably 
premised upon a lack of confusion between the products such as to inspire the inquiry 
itself.”) (citations omitted); Duluth News-Tribune, Div. of Northwest Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Mesabi Publ’g Co., 84 F.3d 1093, 1098 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The question to the reporter 
who was asked to specify which News-Tribune he worked for indicates a distinction in 
the mind of the questioner, rather than confusion.”) (citation omitted); Cohn, 281 F.3d at 
842 n.7 (“Without some other evidence of actual confusion, . . . these inquiries are too 
ambiguous to demonstrate actual confusion.”); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 
828 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1987) (“We hold that even when combined with other 
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Nevertheless, a number of courts accept inquiries about relationship as evidence of actual 
confusion, albeit with limited weight.290  At least one court has held that inquiries should 
be accepted as evidence of actual confusion but should be given limited weight.291  
                                                                                                                                                 
evidence inquiries to the plaintiff about the source of a product are of comparatively little 
value.”); Medic Alert Found. U.S., Inc. v. Corel Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 933, 939 (N.D. Ill. 
1999) (holding actual confusion not established by persons who expressed confusion as 
to whether plaintiff authorized defendant to use plaintiff’s marks:  “What would be 
relevant is evidence of customers contacting [plaintiff’s] representatives—having seen 
[defendant’s] graphic—regarding [plaintiff’s] endorsement or support of [defendant’s] 
software.”); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Ins. Co., 657 F. Supp. 1307, 1317 (M.D. La. 
1985) (“The evidence of actual incidents of confusion demonstrate isolated incidents of 
uncertainty as to whether there was a relationship between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
businesses.”); Pump, Inc. v. Collins Mgmt., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 1159, 1169 (D. Mass. 
1990) (“[T]he mere enquiries of [plaintiff’s representative] as to any affiliation between 
[the parties], while relevant, is insufficient evidence of actual confusion.”); Taj Mahal 
Enters., Ltd. v. Trump, 745 F. Supp. 240, 249-50 (D.N.J. 1990) (“Some courts have 
found that mere inquiries into whether a connection exists between the parties are entitled 
to little weight.”) (citations omitted); Aztar Corp., 15 F. Supp. 2d at 259 (holding that 
inquiry by vendor showed that “vendor was not confused”); Transamerica Corp. v. Trans 
Am. Abstract Serv., Inc., 698 F. Supp. 1067, 1075 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding inquiry was 
not evidence of actual confusion) (citation omitted); Wonder Labs, Inc. v. Procter & 
Gamble Co., 728 F. Supp. 1058, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“this inquiry evidences interest 
in the relationship between the two companies, not confusion between the two 
products.”) (citation omitted); Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 439 F. Supp. 
1128, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“It is clear from the statements as they are described . . . 
that the persons . . . were not so much confused or misled about the origin of the various 
goods and services in question as they were curious as to a possible relationship between 
[the parties]. . . .  Moreover, the fact that the declarants appear . . . to have identified the 
source of the computers in the [defendant’s] ad as [the defendant], as indeed they could 
not reasonably have failed to do, indicates that they were not actually confused or misled 
about that source.”); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:16, at 23-64 (asserting that persons 
making inquiries have less than completely confused state of mind); cf. Quality Weaving 
Co. v. Regan, 369 A.2d 296, 299-300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (holding that “incidental 
customer confusion” including inquiries about connection did not establish secondary 
meaning). 
290  See, e.g., Multi-Local Media Corp. v. 800 Yellow Book Inc., 813 F. Supp. 199, 
204-05 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Otokoyama Co. v. Winde of Japan Import, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 
372, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 
555, 561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Gideons Int’l, Inc. v. Gideon 300 Ministries, Inc., 94 F. 
Supp. 2d 566, 584 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Scholfield Auto Plaza, L.L.C. v. Carganza, Inc., 979 
P.2d 144, 150 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999); First Wis. Nat’l Bank v. Wichman, 270 N.W.2d 168, 
175 (Wis. 1978). 
291  See Malarkey-Taylor Assocs., Inc. v. Cellular Telecomms. Indus. Ass’n, 929 F. 
Supp. 473, 477-78 (D.D.C. 1996) (affording inquiries “some weight” but deeming them 
“not . . . determinative”). 
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Although it is not always clear what leads courts to give credence to such evidence, 
courts may be inclined to accept it more readily where the other factors point strongly 
toward a likelihood of confusion, which may lead courts to interpret an inquiry as 
showing a confused state of mind.292  In addition, courts may be more likely to credit 
such evidence where it is accompanied by other types of evidence of actual confusion.293  
Indeed, according to one leading commentator, such inquiries may be relevant to the 
existence of confusion but are insufficient without other evidence to establish actual 
                                                 
292  See Coach House Restaurant, Inc. v. Coach & Six Restaurants, Inc., 934 F.2d 
1551, 1562 (11th Cir. 1991) (crediting inquiries about affiliation as evidence of actual 
confusion where strong similarities between parties’ logos made it likely that inquiries 
reflected actual confusion regarding affiliation); Polo Fashions, Inc., 451 F. Supp. at 561-
62 (crediting evidence of inquiries about connection when coupled with evidence of 
palming off); Scholfield Auto Plaza, L.L.C., 979 P.2d at 150 (crediting evidence of 
inquiries about affiliation where marks were identical, services were identical, and 
defendant adopted mark with intent to benefit from plaintiff’s advertising); First Wis. 
Nat’l Bank, 270 N.W.2d at 175 (crediting evidence of inquiries about relationship and 
association where marks were identical, services overlapped to some degree, plaintiff’s 
mark was strong, and defendant adopted mark despite warning about likelihood of 
confusion). 
293  See Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1055, 1066 (D. 
Colo. 1990) (“The better view would seem to be that while enquiry evidence is 
admissible and relevant, standing alone with no other evidence it is insufficient proof of 
actual confusion.  Such enquiries alone reveal a less than totally ‘confused’ state of mind 
of the enquiring persons.”) (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:2 at 54 (2d ed. 1984)); Warner-Lambert Co. 
v. Schick U.S.A. Inc., 935 F. Supp. 130, 140 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding actual confusion to 
be established by inquiries coupled with misdirected complaints, mistake by advertising 
agency, and misidentification of products in trade journal); Transfer Print Foils, Inc. v. 
Transfer Print Am., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 425, 439 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding actual confusion 
established by inquiries about affiliation followed by purchase orders sent to wrong 
company, inquiries about products provided by other company, and misdirected 
payments); KAT Video Prods., Inc., 560 N.W.2d at 211-12 (holding eight inquiries 
regarding affiliation combined with four other specific instances of actual confusion were 
sufficient to create fact issue on actual confusion); Phipps Bros., Inc. v. Nelson’s Oil & 
Gas, Inc., 508 N.W.2d 885, 889 (S.D. 1993) (finding “strong evidence of actual 
confusion” based upon inquiries about ownership, misdirected deliveries, confusion by 
customers in making payment, and customer who ceased patronizing plaintiff’s 
establishment because of mistaken impression about ownership by defendant’s owner); 
Bingham v. Inter-Track Partners, 600 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992) (holding actual 
confusion established by customer inquiries about relocation, expansion, and sponsorship 
plus misdirected communications and deliveries, claim filed against wrong party, and 
customers arriving at wrong location); First Wis. Nat’l Bank, 270 N.W.2d at 175 
(crediting evidence of inquiries about relationship and association where defendant had 
found it necessary to disclaim relationship of affiliation as precaution against confusion). 
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confusion.294  However, the value of inquiries can vary depending upon the context of the 
particular inquiry, and some such incidents may be sufficiently strong evidence of actual 
confusion as not to require other types of evidence to establish actual confusion.295  The 
key is whether sufficient context is available to determine the strength of the evidence.296 
¶108 
¶109 
                                                
Courts may be less inclined to credit inquiries revealing a state of mind that appears 
uncertain rather than confused.297  By contrast, where the communication does not 
inquire about source, affiliation, sponsorship, or connection, but reflects a mistaken 
assumption about such a link, then the relevant part of the communication is not an 
inquiry at all and is more likely to be credited as actual confusion.298 
One troubling aspect of inquiries is that any uncertainty in the mind of the person 
making the inquiry is likely to be dispelled with an honest answer.299  Thus, a number of 
 
294  See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:16, at 23-63 to 23-64. 
295  See Allen, supra note 4, at 40-44. 
296  See id.  
297  See, e.g., Pump, Inc. v. Collins Mgmt., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 1159, 1169 (D. Mass. 
1990) (holding actual confusion not established by inquiries of individuals who stated 
that they were aware of who produced product at issue); Aztar Corp. v. NY Enter., LLC, 
15 F. Supp. 2d 252, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding actual confusion not established where 
vendor instructed his wife to call plaintiff and find out if defendant’s product was 
associated with plaintiff or not); see also Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 
695 F. Supp. 198, 217-18 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that inquiries expressing concern about 
potential associations that public might draw between parties was not actual confusion 
but that volume of such concern was sufficiently great as to indicate likely confusion); 
Rosenthal A.G. v. Ritelite, Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 133, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (discounting but 
giving some weight to inquiries about affiliation where inquiries were driven by 
curiosity).  But see Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 
1986) (holding inquiries from professional purchasers as to whether alleged infringer had 
obtained permission from trademark owner to use similar mark). 
298  See M. Fabrikant & Sons, Ltd. v. Fabrikant Fine Diamonds, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 
249, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (distinguishing instances where inquiries have been 
discounted from instant case where callers made incorrect assumptions as to source); see 
also Allen, supra note 4, at 39 (arguing that inquiries about affiliation are less probative 
than inquiries where consumers ask about one of the parties’ goods or services but direct 
such communication to wrong party). 
299  See Pump, Inc., 746 F. Supp. at 1169 (“Crucially, [plaintiff’s representative] 
himself alleviated any confusion by informing [the purportedly confused persons] that 
there was no connection between the two bands.”); McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, 
Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“While defendants argue that these 
inquiries may have been in jest, the fact that they occurred at all strongly suggests that a 
common association between plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks was established in the 
minds of the persons making inquiries.”); Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 
439 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“Mr. Cohen, having failed to see the clear . . . 
identification [of the defendants] in the [defendants’] ad, was not misled into contacting 
the defendants to discuss the purchase of one of their computers but actually called . . . an 
84 
Vol. 2:2] Mark D. Robins 
courts have discounted or discredited instances of confusion that were temporary or 
fleeting.300  Other courts have given more credence to actual confusion that has been 
quickly dispelled.301  The fact that such doubt is dispelled by the responses to such 
inquiries does not address the problem of persons who may harbor similar doubts, but 
may not ask for clarification.302 
¶110 
                                                                                                                                                
Temporary or fleeting instances of confusion may be given greater weight as courts 
increasingly recognize the doctrine of initial interest confusion.  Under this doctrine, 
confusion is deemed relevant if it generates initial interest in a transaction with the 
defendant, even if that confusion is dispelled by further interaction with the defendant or 
 
officer of the plaintiff, who obviously dispelled Mr. Cohen’s initial confusion about the 
source of defendants’ computers.”). 
300  See, e.g., Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 
1207 (1st Cir. 1983); McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d 
Cir. 1979); Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1260 (5th Cir. 1989); 
Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1160 n.11 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(citation omitted); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 505 (5th 
Cir. 1979); Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 
1110 (6th Cir. 1991); Self-Insurance Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Software and Info. Indus. Ass’n, 
208 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 
116 F. Supp. 951, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Microware Sys. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 
126 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1217 (S.D. Iowa 2000); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Ins. Co., 
657 F. Supp. 1307, 1316 n.44 (M.D. La. 1985) (citation omitted); CNBC.com, Inc. v. C-
Call.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 106, 113 (D. Mass. 1999); Pump, Inc., 746 F. Supp. at 
1169; Madison Reprographics, Inc. v. Cook’s Reprographics, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 440, 449 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996). 
301  See, e.g., Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245, 1251 
(4th Cir. 1970) (“One witness . . . testified he was initially confused when his broker 
advised him of the purchase of Comcet’s stock.  The fact that the true identity of Comcet 
was quickly recognized is of little moment.  The significance of this incident is its role as 
a harbinger of confusion”); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544-45 
(5th Cir. 1998) (holding that actual confusion was relevant even when dispelled later by 
disclaimers); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(“Actual confusion that is later dissipated by further inspection of the goods, services or 
premises . . . is relevant to a determination of a likelihood of confusion.”) (citing 3 J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 23:6 
to 23:7 (4th ed. 1997)); Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 
1083, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (crediting inquiries about affiliation as evidence of actual 
confusion); CSC Brands LP v. Herdez Corp., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 
2001) (crediting e-mail inquiring about affiliation as “compelling” evidence of actual 
confusion). 
302  See Allen, supra note 4, at 40-42. 
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its products.303  Such confusion is actionable because it appropriates the plaintiff’s good 
will to draw consumer interest in a potential transaction with the defendant.304 
¶111 
¶112 
                                                
Nevertheless, the fact that initial interest confusion is actionable does not 
automatically translate into a finding that inquiries about affiliation constitute initial 
interest confusion.  For there to be initial interest confusion, it must be likely that the 
defendant’s use of the mark in question would entice consumers into some action 
indicative of interest in a transaction—for example, by “reaching for the [defendant’s] 
product on the shelf”305 or getting off a highway one exit too early because of a 
confusingly placed billboard.306  If a consumer is undeterred from seeking out the 
plaintiff after mistakenly coming across the defendant’s presence or promotional 
materials, then no real initial interest has been generated.307  A mere inquiry about 
affiliation may not be sufficient for a second-comer to get its foot in the door to compete 
for a purchasing decision or any other meaningful action by the person temporarily 
confused. 
Accordingly, it appears that instances of temporary or fleeting confusion are 
particularly likely to be discounted where relatively few in light of the opportunity for 
confusion to surface, where the goods or services at issue are purchased by sophisticated 
purchasers who are likely to make such purchases only after considering source, or where 
the persons purportedly confused are not persons who make purchasing decisions.308  
 
303  See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d at 204 (deeming actual confusion 
generated by advertising but dissipated by actual encounters with defendant’s 
establishment to be relevant under doctrine of initial interest confusion). 
304  See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entmt. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1057 (9th Cir. 2001); Grotian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nahf, 365 F. Supp. 707, 
717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:6. 
305  McNeil PPC, Inc. v. Guardian Drug Co., 984 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (E.D. Mich. 
1997). 
306  Brookfield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1064. 
307  See Yellowbrix, Inc. v. Yellowbrick Solutions, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 575, 581 n.3 
(E.D.N.C. 2001) (holding actual confusion not established by Internet user who mistyped 
domain name and immediately recognized mistake); Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. 
Supp. 2d 372, 377 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“It is clear that Internet surfers are inured to false 
starts and excursions awaiting them and are unlikely to be dissuaded, or unnerved when, 
after taking a stab at what they think is the most likely domain name for a particular web 
site guess wrong and bring up another’s webpage.”) (citations and internal quotation 
marks and brackets omitted); Chatham Int’l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549, 
559 (E.D Pa. 2001) (same); Madison Reprographics, Inc. v. Cook’s Reprographics, Inc., 
552 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (discounting two instances of temporary 
confusion, one of which was dispelled by second look at material containing mark and 
other of which was dispelled by inquiry). 
308  See Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207 
(1st Cir. 1983) (discounting evidence of temporary confusion where instances were few 
in number over course of four years, where goods were purchased by sophisticated 
persons only after considering source, and where persons purportedly confused did not 
participate in purchasing decisions); Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. 
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Furthermore, initial interest is unlikely to harm a plaintiff’s good will where the 
respective parties’ markets are unrelated and unlikely to converge and where there is no 
evidence of intent to capitalize on any such initial interest confusion.309  Thus, for 
example, one court dismissed as de minimis twenty instances of communications by 
customers inquiring about affiliation and potential purchases where the parties had both 
coexisted for five years, in light of the fact that the very different nature of the parties’ 
products and the level of sophistication of the consumers made confusion unlikely.310  By 
contrast, a particularly large volume of inquiries may lead a court to conclude that the 
inquiries are indicative of real mass confusion unlikely to be easily dispelled.311  
Similarly, inquiries may be interpreted as stronger evidence of actual confusion when 
combined with other items such as survey evidence that point to a likelihood of 
confusion.312 
¶113 
                                                                                                                                                
One conceptual difficulty with discounting inquiries about affiliation or 
relationship is that a likelihood of confusion as to affiliation, sponsorship, or connection 
is actionable infringement.313  Yet, an inquiry about affiliation or relationship does not 
necessarily mean confusion as to these items.  For example, the mere fact that one mark 
causes consumers to be reminded of another mark is not evidence of actual confusion 
because such mental comparisons may be consistent with distinguishing between, rather 
 
Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1110 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Short-lived confusion or 
confusion of individuals casually acquainted with a business is worthy of little weight 
. . . , while chronic mistakes and serious confusion of actual customers are worthy of 
greater weight.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Everest & Jennings, 
Inc. v. E & J Mfg. Co., 263 F.2d 254, 260 (9th Cir. 1959) (“The likelihood of confusion 
. . . must be demonstrated by more than merely an occasional mis-directed letter.  The 
showing of a mere trace of confusion is insufficient.”). 
309  See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 297-99 (3d 
Cir. 2001); Rust Env. & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen, 131 F.3d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir. 
1997); Bigstar Entmt., Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
310  See Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d at 297-99. 
311  See Allen, supra note 4, at 42 (arguing that the number of individuals who make 
inquiries as to affiliation is important). 
312  See Keystone Consol. Indus. Inc. v. Mid-States Distrib. Co., 235 F. Supp. 2d 901, 
911 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (finding actual confusion to be established by survey evidence 
companied with unsolicited inquiries as to whether plaintiff had changed brand name). 
313  See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:5, at 7-14; 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, 
§ 23:5; see, e.g., Morningside Group Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 
F.3d 133, 141 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding district court erred in discounting evidence of 
phone calls and inquiries that did not rise to level of completed transactions because 
confusion regarding affiliation or sponsorship is actionable); Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime 
Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 964 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding district court erred in 
refusing to find actual confusion based on communications that showed belief in 
connection between parties’ establishments). 
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than confusion among, sources.314  As one court observed in the course of its holding that 
actual confusion was not established by two e-mails inquiring as to whether the plaintiff 
was associated with the defendant: “I think that anytime a person visits a wrong website, 
in which information on the site does not correspond to the presentation given, questions 
are going to be raised.  I do not find that the above come close to supporting a finding of 
a likelihood of confusion.”315  However, where evidence of confusion as to affiliation or 
relationship indicates that consumers have altered their behavior based on such 
confusion, then actual confusion about affiliation or relationship has been deemed to be 
established.316  Short of such a dramatic illustration of confusion, the contents of inquiries 
and the circumstances surrounding them may reveal genuine confusion. 
d) Context 
¶114 
                                                
Courts must attempt to resolve ambiguities or inconsistencies in evidence of 
alleged actual confusion by interpreting the entire statement or event in context.  For 
example where a witness addressed a letter regarding the defendant’s product to the 
correct address indicated on the defendant’s packaging but then mailed the letter to the 
plaintiff after it was returned for having an insufficient address, the actions of correctly 
and then incorrectly addressing the letter are inconsistent and possibly ambiguous as to 
the witness’s confusion.317  Yet, where the contents of the letter referred to “your fine 
reputation” and the plaintiff had considerable fame among the consuming public, which 
the defendant did not, it becomes clear that the witness was mistakenly communicating 
with the plaintiff regarding the defendant’s product.318  Another example of how context 
can resolve ambiguity lies in a case in which employees’ inquiries as to a union’s 
sponsorship were deemed not to be evidence of actual confusion where the statements 
were made in the context of an organizing drive during which the employees must have 
known that the defendant had distributed the literature that prompted the inquiries.319 
 
314  See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:9. 
315  Imon, Inc. v. Imaginon, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 345, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also 
Microware Sys. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1217 (S.D. Iowa 
2000) (“The Kaplan and Leonard testimony, like some of the e-mail and internet 
evidence above, merely shows that various individuals wondered about the existence of 
an Apple/Microware partnership and sought further information.”). 
316  See Morningside Group Ltd., 182 F.3d at 141 (holding district court erred in 
disregarding evidence of phone calls and inquiries:  “[I]nvestors might be confused about 
the affiliation between two similarly named companies and might very well alter their 
behavior based on that confusion.  Here Morningside Group has demonstrated just such 
confusion by its customers, particularly with regard to Morningside Group’s role in 
Morningside Capital’s acquisition of Carson Products.”); see also Allen, supra note 4, at 
31 (arguing that evidence of actual confusion is more probative where person confused 
has taken some affirmative action to illustrate confusion). 
317  Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1976). 
318  Id. at 384. 
319  See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing 
Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 205 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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¶115 Another contextual problem arises from the coexistence of protectable and 
unprotectable features.  Although confusion attributable to unprotectable features of the 
plaintiff’s mark or product is not actionable, to the extent that each party presents its 
mark in the context of common surrounding features that are not protectable, those 
surrounding features are relevant to the likelihood of confusion inquiry.320  In such cases, 
the challenge is to determine whether instances of actual confusion flow from the 
protectable features in light of the surrounding unprotectable features or whether the 
confusion flows only from the unprotectable features.  Where there is a danger that 
confusion flows from unprotectable features that the court may discount the episode if the 
plaintiff does not submit the materials that caused the confusion.321 
¶116 
¶117 
                                                
Interpretive problems are particularly likely with respect to out-of-court statements 
by persons highly knowledgeable about the industry and, therefore, unlikely to be easily 
confused.  An example can be seen in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing 
Co.,322 in which a distributor of whiskey under the mark BLACK & WHITE sued a 
brewer and grocer for using that mark in connection with the sale of beer.  At trial, a 
regional vice president of the plaintiff was asked whether it was his contention that a 
customer would be confused in buying a can of beer sold by the defendant under the 
BLACK & WHITE name and think that the customer was getting a product of the 
plaintiff’s producer.  The witness responded as follows: 
No.  The only two very isolated instances, I was asked in Southern 
California by people who were in the business, ‘When did you people start 
making beer?’  And that is, as I said, only a couple of instances that has 
happened.  No, my answer is no to your question.323 
In discussing the import of this testimony, the Ninth Circuit noted that it had “some 
difficulty in interpreting” it.324  The Ninth Circuit observed that, because the inquiries 
were “made by those who were in the business and hence should know better, the trial 
judge may have been justified in believing that these inquiries were in the nature of 
 
320  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt. c at 229 (1995) 
(arguing that similarity should be determined based on “the conditions under which the 
designations are encountered by prospective purchasers” as the marks “appear in the 
marketplace and not as they may appear in the artificial context of a courtroom”). 
321  See Self-Insurance Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Software and Info. Indus. Ass’n, 208 F. 
Supp. 2d 1058, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“Because neither declaration includes a copy of 
the brochure that caused the apparent confusion as to the source of the document, it is 
impossible for the Court to determine if the parties’ confusion was based upon the 
composite logo or the use of ‘SIIA’ alone.”). 
322  Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 149 (9th Cir. 
1963). 
323  Id. at 158. 
324  Id. at 159 n.13. 
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jocular remarks used by way of banter.”325  Ultimately, the court “attach[ed] little weight 




                                                
Interpretive problems may also exist with respect to circumstantial evidence.  For 
instance, where a defendant instructs its employees on how to handle inquiries based on 
confusion,327 that instruction could be motivated by something other than previous 
instances of confused inquiries.  As examples, such instructions could be motivated by 
intent to capitalize on anticipated confusion or by the recognition that confusion was 
likely or simply possible. 
One commentator has argued that evidence of actual confusion should be assessed 
according to whether the proponent has taken all feasible steps to present such evidence 
in the most complete and documented form possible.328  While this circumstance is 
relevant, it should not necessarily be controlling in all instances.  For example, where the 
trademark owner is not acting under advice of counsel, many reports of confusion may be 
accumulated but not in the best form possible.  These reports may be more or less reliable 
in light of the various circumstances affecting the quality of the evidence and in light of 
the other factors for assessing evidence of actual confusion. 
ii) Level of Intelligence 
It has long been held that the law does not protect a trademark owner “from all of 
the inadequacies of human thought and memory.”329  Courts examine the question of 
likely confusion from the standpoint of the ordinary consumer of average intelligence.330  
In doing so, courts recognize that some people will always be confused and that such 
confusion is not actionable.331  Such courts discount instances of actual confusion that 
 
325  Id.  
326  Id.  
327  See Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 463-64 (1st Cir. 1962). 
328  See Allen, supra note 4, at 58. 
329  McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. v. Am. Aviation Assocs., Inc., 117 F.2d 293, 295 (D.C. 
Cir. 1940); see also Sunbeam Lighting Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 183 F.2d 969, 974 (9th 
Cir. 1950) (same; citations omitted). 
330  See Ball v. Am. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228, 241-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1971) (“The appropriate individual on the confusion issue is the member of the relevant 
public who is the average prudent man.”); MacSweeney Enters., Inc. v. Tarantino, 235 
P.2d 266, 271 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (“If the facts support the conclusion that a 
purchaser of ordinary intelligence could reasonably be confused, that is all that is 
required.”) (citation omitted); Dell Publ’g Co. v. Stanley Publ’ns, Inc., 211 N.Y.S.2d 393, 
400 (N.Y. 1961) (“It must be assumed that the public will use reasonable 
intelligence. . . .”) (citations omitted). 
331  See Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 912 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“[B]efuddlement is part of the human condition.  No matter how clear the markings, no 
matter how different the names, no matter how distinctive the bottles, some confusion is 
inevitable.”); August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(“Many consumers are ignorant or inattentive, so some are bound to misunderstand no 
matter how careful a producer is.”) (citation omitted); Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Netscape 
Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“Some people are 
always confused.  Accordingly, to impose liability, the plaintiff must show confusion of a 
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cannot be attributed to anything other than cognitive failure.332  Similarly, where wide 
disparities between the parties’ marks make it highly unlikely that persons of normal 
intelligence could be confused, courts are likely to interpret inquiries as not indicative of 
actual confusion.333 
¶121 
                                                                                                                                                
Other courts have expressed solicitude for consumers who are ignorant, 
inexperienced, and gullible.334  However, solicitude for such persons is often expressed as 
part of the standard for identifying confusion at the level of the “ordinary purchaser”.335  
 
significant number of prospective purchasers.”) (citations omitted); Mattel, Inc., 28 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1148 (quoting Reed-Union); Dell Publ’g Co., 211 N.Y.S.2d at 400 (“The law 
does not justify interference on behalf of ignorant . . . persons. . . .”) (citations omitted); 
see also Revlon Consumer Prods. Corp. v. Jennifer Leather Broadway, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 
1268, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting survey expert:  “In any survey, a certain amount of 
people are confused.  There are some people that are just always confused.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 cmt. g (1995) (“[S]ome residual 
confusion exists in most markets, and a few particularly undiscerning persons may make 
purchasing decisions under a wide range of misconceptions.”). 
332  See Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 211 (3d Cir. 1995); Sunbeam 
Lighting Co., 183 F.2d at 974 (citations omitted); McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., 117 F.2d at 
295. 
333  See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing 
Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 205 (1st Cir. 1996) (“The fundamental problem with the Hartford 
affidavit is that, even taking its contents as literally true, it does not undermine what is 
perfectly obvious from a reading of the record:  no person of ordinary prudence and 
normal intelligence, aware of what was happening around her, would have been confused 
as to the source or sponsorship of the letters.”). 
334  See, e.g., Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910) 
(“The law is not made for the protection of experts, but for the public—that vast 
multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making 
purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearance and general 
impressions.”); Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 
1965) (“[T]he law protects the ignorant, the inexperienced, and the gullible, as well as the 
worldly wise, the intelligent and the astute.”) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1948) (“It may well 
be true that a prudent and worldly-wise passerby would not be so deceived.  The law, 
however, protects not only the intelligent, the experienced, and the astute.  It safeguards 
from deception also the ignorant, the inexperienced, and the gullible.”); Marquis Who’s 
Who, Inc. v. North Am. Adv. Assocs., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 139, 143 n.5 (D.D.C. 1976) 
(“The factual test which the Court applies in determining the likelihood of confusion is 
not that of a careful and discriminating purchaser, but that of an ordinary and casual 
buyer, or perhaps even an ignorant, inexperienced and gullible purchaser.”) (citations 
omitted); Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell, 342 P.2d 10, 16 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1959) (similar; citations omitted). 
335  See Am. Distilling Co. v. Bellows & Co., 226 P.2d 751, 759-60 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1951).   
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In other words, a person of ordinary intelligence can, nevertheless, be ignorant, 
inexperienced, and gullible in the commercial marketplace. 
¶122 
¶123 
                                                
Evidence of actual confusion among particularly sophisticated persons—where 
credible—may be afforded greater weight.336  Nevertheless, where a sophisticated 
member of the trade has had sufficient opportunity to become acquainted with the 
respective parties, any purported confusion by that person may not be viewed as 
credible.337  In addition, sophisticated members of the trade might be expected to make 
inquiries about affiliation without becoming actually confused.338  Furthermore, “gossip” 
within the trade about whether a new company has anything to do with an already 
existing company has been discounted when not indicative of actual marketplace impact 
of the two companies’ marks on the consuming public.339 
iii) Carelessness or Inattentiveness 
Much confusion is attributable to carelessness or inattentiveness.  How such 
confusion should be treated is a matter of some dispute.  Typically, courts assume that an 
average degree of care will be used by the relevant populace in determining likelihood of 
confusion.340  Accordingly, a number of courts have discounted instances of confusion 
that appear to be driven by carelessness or inattentiveness.341  If a consumer exercises 
 
336  See Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 495 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“If the expert is confused, the consumer is easy prey to deception.”); 
Ball v. Am. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228, 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (“[T]here 
were actual instances of confusion even among members of the bar, the bench, and others 
closely related to the legal profession.”). 
337  See Inc. Publ’g Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 388 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
338  See Glow Indus., Inc. v. Lopez, 252 F. Supp. 2d 962, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2002) 
(“Here, at most, Glow, Inc. present[ed] de minimis evidence of actual confusion; some of 
it, moreover involves ‘sophisticated’ wholesalers who might be expected to inquire about 
the affiliation, if any, between the companies.”). 
339  See Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 444-45 
(9th Cir. 1980); Inc. Publ’g Corp., 616 F. Supp. at 389. 
340  See Ball, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42 (“The appropriate individual on the confusion 
issue is the member of the relevant public who is the average prudent man.”); Dell Publ’g 
Co., 211 N.Y.S.2d at 400 (“It must be assumed that the public will use reasonable . . . 
discrimination. . . .”) (citations omitted); 2 GILSON, supra note 52, § 5.01[3][c][vii], at 5-
27 (asserting that test is whether ordinary purchaser using ordinary care would likely be 
confused). 
341  See, e.g., Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 636 (6th Cir. 
2002) (“[T]he fact that the confusion occurred in e-mail messages raises the possibility 
that consumers sent the inquiries . . . to TSI rather than to Thermoscan because they were 
inattentive or careless, as opposed to being actually confused.”) (citation omitted); S.C. 
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 266 F.2d 129, 141 (6th Cir. 1959) (“The owner of a 
trademark is not entitled to a guarantee against confusion in the minds of careless and 
indifferent buyers, and merely occasional cases of confusion or thoughless error by very 
inattentive purchasers are of very little significance in trademark and unfair competition 
cases.”) (citation omitted); Duluth News-Tribune, Div. of Northwest Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
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less than ordinary care, any resulting confusion is irrelevant.342  This issue tends to arise 
with respect to misdirected communications.  Such incidents are particularly likely to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mesabi Publ’g Co., 84 F.3d 1093, 1098 (8th Cir. 1996) (discounting actual confusion 
evidence that was “de minimis” and merely “show[ed] inattentiveness on the part of the 
caller or sender rather than actual confusion”); Palmer v. Gulf Pub. Co., 79 F. Supp. 731, 
738 (S.D. Cal. 1948) (characterizing “undelivered letters, misdirected telephone calls and 
telephone calls to persons connected with one rather than the other of the publications” as 
being “of small significance, and entitled to little weight”); Altira Group LLC v. Philip 
Morris Cos., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1201 (D. Colo. 2002) (“I am not persuaded that Mr. 
Stellar mistyping A-L-T-R-I-A for A-L-T-I-R-A in an Internet search of Mr. 
McDermott’s company constitutes actual confusion.”); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Comstock 
Partners, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1029, 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding misdirected telephone 
call and misdirected mailing did not show actual confusion); Pizzazz Pizza & Restaurant 
v. Taco Bell Corp., 642 F. Supp. 88, 93 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (“[T]he presentation of 
coupons shows only lack of care on the part of the consumers.”); Ball, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 
242 (“That a few particularly undiscerning members might be misled is not enough.”); 
Belleville News-Democrat, Inc. v. St. Clair Cty. Publ’rs, Inc., 167 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ill. 
Ct. App. 1960) (“In effect they were isolated instances arising out of the newness of the 
second paper, ignorance of its existence and inattention and indifference on the part of 
those solicited.”); Commercial Sav. Bank v. Hawkeye Fed. Sav. Bank, 592 N.W.2d 321, 
331 (Iowa 1999) (discounting evidence of misdirected calls and letters that were 
attributable to inattentiveness); Dell Publ’g Co., 211 N.Y.S.2d at 400 (“The law does not 
justify interference on behalf of . . . careless persons. . . .”) (citations omitted).  As 
discussed earlier, when such errors are made by clerical assistants, directory assistance, 
or post office employees, such persons are arguably not within the relevant class of actual 
or prospective purchasers or others whose views may impact the good will of the 
company.  See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text. 
342  See Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[I]nstances 
of actual confusion may not weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion unless 
the confused consumer was acting with the care expected of consumers purchasing the 
type of good at issue.”) (citation omitted); August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 
616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Many consumers are ignorant or inattentive, so some are 
bound to misunderstand no matter how careful a producer is. . . .   If such a possibility 
created a trademark problem, then all comparative references would be forbidden, and 
consumers as a whole would be worse off.”) (citation omitted); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue 
Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 117 (D. Mass. 1999) (“[T]o the extent that [the] 
affidavits show actual confusion, they do not show reasonable confusion, which is 
required to find infringement. . . .  Considering the vast difference between Clue 
Computing’s services and Hasbro’s game and the explicitness of Clue Computing’s Web 
site as to the nature of its business, any confusion shown by Hasbro seems to fit into the 
latter category of ‘carelessness, indifference, or ennui.’”) (citations omitted); see 
generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:5. 
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discounted when they are minimal in light of the total volume of communications 
processed by a party.343 
¶124 
                                                
Other courts, however, have given far more weight to confusion that is attributable 
to carelessness or inattentiveness or where the level of care is not certain.344  One 
rationale for giving weight to such confusion is that carelessness or inattentiveness can 
lead to sales for the infringer that might not otherwise be reaped.345  For example, in 
Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc.,346 the plaintiff claimed that the 
defendant’s “Valcream” mark for men’s hair cream infringed the plaintiff’s “Brylcreem” 
mark for the same product.  The trial court found no likelihood of confusion and 
dismissed the action.  The Second Circuit reversed, however, largely based upon the trial 
court’s mischaracterization of evidence of actual confusion.  This evidence consisted of: 
 
343  See Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1098 (discounting actual confusion evidence 
that was “de minimis” and merely “show[ed] inattentiveness on the part of the caller or 
sender rather than actual confusion”); Nutri/Sys., Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 
601, 606 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[I]n light of both parties’ high volume of business, the 
misdirection of several letters and checks proved insignificant.”); Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Am. Auto Club, 184 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1950) (“[T]he possibility that in rare and 
isolate instances relatively few persons may carelessly mistake the source does not 
warrant relief.”); Altira Group LLC., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 (“I am not persuaded that 
Mr. Stellar mistyping A-L-T-R-I-A for A-L-T-I-R-A in an internet search of Mr. 
McDermott’s company constitutes actual confusion.”); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. 
Corp., 182 F. Supp. 350, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (discounting evidence of misdelivered 
communications:  “There were not more than one hundred such instances over a period 
of years, an insignificant fraction of the mail received by the plaintiff and the defendant, 
the daily volume of which, according to the testimony, numbered approximately 1,000 
and 600 respectively.”) (emphasis in original); McGraw-Hill, Inc., 743 F. Supp. at 1035 
(holding misdirected telephone call and misdirected mailing did not show actual 
confusion); Ball, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 242 (“That a few particularly undiscerning members 
might be misled is not enough.”); Belleville News-Democrat, Inc., 167 N.E.2d at 576 (“In 
effect they were isolated instances arising out of the newness of the second paper, 
ignorance of its existence and inattention and indifference on the part of those 
solicited.”); cf. B.D. Communications, Inc. v. Dial Media, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 1011, 1014-
15 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (discounting several instances of misdirected mail as de 
minimis and collecting authority to same effect). 
344  See, e.g., Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 761-
62 (2d Cir. 1960) (“Confusion on the part of the careless or inattentive purchaser may not 
be disregarded.”); Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 
1097 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (crediting as actual confusion instances where one party received 
products or bills intended for other party); Popular Bank of Fla. v. Banco Popular de 
Puerto Rico, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (“Confusion can also be shown 
by misdirected correspondence such as bills or letters.”), judgment entered, 180 F.R.D. 
461 (S.D. Fla. 1998). 
345  See, e.g., Harold F. Ritchie, 281 F.2d at 761 (quoting Am. Chicle Co. v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1953)). 
346  Id. at 755. 
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(1) a television commercial in which the defendant offered to refund purchasers of a 
particular size of the Valcream product with a check signed by a celebrity, which resulted 
in thirteen instances of Brylcreem cartons being mailed to the plaintiff and at least ten 
Brylcreem cartons being mailed to the defendant; (2) the testimony of a store manager 
and the depositions of two employees of another store about incidents whose nature was 
not described in the decision; (3) an instance in which a company mistakenly invoiced the 
plaintiff for the advertising the defendant’s product in a newspaper; (4) an instance in 
which a company sent the plaintiff a letter relating to a price reduction offer made by the 
defendant for the defendant’s products; and (5) a mistake in which Standard & Poor’s 
transposed the names of the respective products and attributed each to the wrong 
corporation.  The Second Circuit held that the trial court erred in discounting these 
instances as carelessness and inattention rather than as actual confusion and noted that 
such carelessness and inattentiveness can be the basis for an infringer to obtain wrongful 
sales.  The Second Circuit also characterized the evidence as “impressive in view of its 




                                                
It may be possible to distinguish confusion that is based on carelessness from 
confusion that is based on similarities between the marks.  Such a distinction is 
purportedly the basis for the decision in Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O’Neal.348  In that case, the 
plaintiff sold sewer, drain, and pipe cleaning services under the ROTO-ROOTER mark, 
and the defendant sold similar services under the mark ROTARY DE-ROOTING.  
Although four witnesses testified that they had mistakenly purchased the defendant’s 
service when intending to purchase the plaintiff’s service, the trial court held that 
confusion was not likely and, in doing so, discounted these instances of actual confusion 
as based on “carelessness” or “inadvertence.”  The Fifth Circuit reversed and held that 
the record did not support the finding that the witnesses’ confusion was based on 
carelessness or inadvertence.  Instead, the Fifth Circuit noted that cross examination of 
these witnesses had demonstrated that the mistaken purchases were made based upon 
reliance on the similarity of marks rather than carelessness or inadvertence.349 
Perhaps, the Roto-Rooter court would have reached a different result if the 
witnesses’ testimony had indicated that they paid scant attention to the marks in making 
the purchasing decision.  However, because that case involved a mistaken purchase, the 
very act of making the purchase can be seen as evidence of the level of care expected in 
connection with such a purchase.  By contrast, with other types of evidence of actual 
confusion, such as inquiries and misdirected communications, carelessness and 
inattentiveness are likely to play a greater role in limiting the value of the evidence. 
Moreover, it may be possible to recognize degrees of care that are commensurate 
with expectations for how an ordinary consumer would react under the circumstances.  
Under such an approach, carelessness that is consistent with a reasonable consumer 
acting under similar circumstances would not discredit that person’s confusion.  For 
example, if reading the fine print on packaging, scrutinizing the defendant’s mark, or 
comparing the parties’ products directly would be necessary to avoid confusion and it 
would not be reasonable to expect a consumer to take such steps, any resulting confusion 
 
347  Id. at 761-62. 
348  Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O’Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 44 (5th Cir. 1975). 
349  Id. at 46. 
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will not be discredited.350  Indeed, even a court that found a low level of confusion 
attributable to inattentiveness to be irrelevant nonetheless observed that infringement will 
be established where an appreciable number of persons are likely to be confused even if 
they could avoid the mistake by exercising greater caution.351  Thus, a “casual purchaser” 
is held to the level of “ordinary care” that is appropriate for such persons.352 
¶128 
                                                
Other courts, although not clearly stating so, may accept evidence of misdirected 
communications without scrutiny based on a particularly large quantity of such 
misdirected communications or based on the fact that they are coupled with evidence of 
customers being enticed to the wrong location or making purchases from the wrong 
entity.353  In such cases, not only can a large volume of such communications seem 
 
350  See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 384-85 (7th Cir. 
1976) (where witness called information to locate the “EVEREADY battery people” 
when trying to locate the seller of EVER-READY bulbs but did not check address on 
package, held that “[h]er testimony cannot be discredited because she did not make an 
exacting examination of the Ever-Ready mark or did not compare it with a product of 
Carbide containing the EVEREADY mark”).   
351  See Ball v. Am. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228, 241-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1971) (citation omitted). 
352  See Am. Distilling Co. v. Bellows & Co., 226 P.2d 751, 759 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1951) (“The test as to infringement against a trade-mark does not depend upon an exact 
similarity in every detail, but if the general appearance is such as to deceive a casual 
purchaser who exercises ordinary care in the selection of the article which he wishes to 
buy, its use may be enjoined. . . .  All that courts of justice can do . . . is to say that no 
trader can adopt a trade-mark, so resembling that of another trader, as that ordinary 
purchasers, buying with ordinary caution are likely to be misled.”) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
353  See Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Seidenburg, 619 F. Supp. 1173, 1184 (W.D. La. 
1985) (noting “numerous” mistakes by individuals, including mistaken phone calls by 
two long-term customers, “many calls” that receptionist testified were misdirected, and 
mistakes by post office and UPS); Grenadier Corp. v. Grenadier Realty Corp., 568 F. 
Supp. 502, 505-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (misdirected letters from attorneys and “numerous” 
other “pieces of misdelivered mail and dozens of misdirected phone calls” as well as 
unspecified confusion among several types of persons, including customers); Wyndham 
Co. v. Wyndham Hotel Co., 670 N.Y.S.2d 995, 999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (four thousand 
misdirected calls per year plus misdirected mail); Seattle Endeavors, Inc. v. Mastro, 868 
P.2d 120, 123, 126 (Wash. 1994) (“numerous incidents of public confusion” including 
misdirected deliveries and customers who arrived at wrong location); Phipps Bros., Inc. 
v. Nelson’s Oil & Gas, Inc., 508 N.W.2d 885, 889 (S.D. 1993) (misdirected deliveries 
plus inquiries about ownership, confusion by customers in making payment, and 
customer who ceased patronizing plaintiff’s establishment based on mistaken assumption 
about affiliation); Bingham v. Inter-Track Partners, 600 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1992) (misdirected calls, shipments, and deliveries plus claim filed against wrong party, 
customers arriving at wrong location, and inquiries about expansion, relocation, and 
sponsorship); Willowbrook Home Health Care Agency, Inc. v. Willow Brook Retirement 
Ctr., 769 S.W.2d 862, 868 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (misdirected telephone calls and mail 
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difficult to ignore, but the volume may be high enough so that it will necessarily include 
consumers and will likely be attributable to more than mere carelessness with telephone 
directories and similar inattentiveness—for example, where persons identified as 
consumers express a mistaken belief that the parties are affiliated or connected or 
complain to the wrong party about goods or services sold by the other party.354  An 
additional reason that may persuade some courts to credit evidence of misdirected 
communications without scrutiny may be that other factors weigh heavily in favor of 
finding a likelihood of confusion.355  Nevertheless, some courts appear to give blanket 
approval to evidence of misdirected communications without regard for context,356 
provided that the communications are from customers.357  However, at least one court 
                                                                                                                                                 
plus “incidents of confusion between the parties by various individuals”); Thompson v. 
Spring-Green Law Care Corp., 466 N.E.2d 1004, 1014 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984) (over 300 
misdirected telephone calls during four years plus “four witnesses who testified as to 
instances of actual confusion”); Puget Sound Rendering, Inc. v. Puget Sound By-Prods., 
615 P.2d 504, 506-07 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (misdirected telephone calls and mail, 
supplies delivered to plaintiff imprinted with defendant’s name, government notices 
misdirected, and “many other instances of confusion”); Powder River Oil Co. v. Powder 
River Petroleum Corp., 830 P.2d 403, 416 (Wyo. 1992) (variety of misdirected calls and 
mail); Mary A. Donovan, Sorry, Wrong Number!  TM Confusion from Misdirected Calls 
and Letters, 1 No. 11 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 9 (Aug. 1995) (arguing that courts will 
credit misdirected communications as evidence of actual confusion when incidents are 
not isolated). 
354  See Rockland Mortgage Corp. v. Shareholders Funding, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 182, 
197-98 (D. Del. 1993) (finding actual confusion established by numerous instances of 
misdirected communications, as well as other evidence, including callers who mistakenly 
believed parties were affiliated, callers who were confused as which party was servicing 
particular accounts, and callers who complained to plaintiff aobut services rendered by 
defendant).  But see Lang v. Ret. Living Publ’g Co., 949 F.2d 576, 582-83 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(refusing to find actual confusion based on four hundred misdirected phone calls and 
several misdirected letters where such communications purportedly reflected mistaken 
belief that was not consistent with reverse confusion theory under which plaintiff sought 
relief). 
355  See Thompson, 466 N.E.2d at 1014 (crediting over three hundred misdirected 
telephone calls where marks were nearly identical, services were similar, and geographic 
territory overlapped).  See, e.g., Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, Inc., 485 S.E.2d 22, 24 
(Ga. 1997); Thompson v. Thompson Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 884 S.W.2d 555, 
560 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). 
356  See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 1988); 
KAT Video Prods., Inc. v. KKCT-FM Radio, 584 N.W.2d 844, 848 (N.D. 1998) (citation 
omitted).  
357  See, e.g., Eckles, 485 S.E.2d at 24; Thompson v. Thompson Air Conditioning & 
Heating, Inc., 884 S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).   
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refused to credit relatively few instances of misdirected communications even when the 
communications are from customers.358 
¶129 
¶130 
                                                
One basis for distinguishing between confusion that is generated by inattentiveness 
from confusion generated by brand identity is to examine whether consumers had any 
reason to know of the entity to whom a mistaken communication was addressed.  For 
example, as one court observed in discounting several e-mails that were directed to the 
defendant but intended for the plaintiff, “[t]he fact that [the defendant] does not advertise 
increases the likelihood that the people who sent the e-mail messages to [the defendant] 
were inattentive or careless when attempting to find the e-mail address for [the plaintiff], 
rather than confused about the source of the [products].”359 
In some cases, courts have cited the service of legal documents or industry 
complaints on the wrong company as evidence of actual confusion.360  Such decisions 
could benefit from greater explanation of context.  For example, where errors in service 
are attributable to carelessness or inattentiveness by a process server or clerical staff, such 
mistakes are analogous to other types of carelessness or inattentiveness in misdirecting 
communications that are not likely attributable to consumer confusion.  However, if the 
mistake was made by a lawyer or by sophisticated support person who is knowledgeable 
about the party intended to be served and is likely to exercise a high degree of care, the 
mistake may augur confusion by less sophisticated and less attentive consumers.  Despite 
this distinction, the prospect of a senior mark owner being tainted by any public 
association with the alleged legal wrongs of a junior user may lead courts to be 
particularly solicitous of misdirected service of process as an indicator of likely 
confusion.  Some courts have gone so far as to find actual confusion in mistakes made by 
the attorneys litigating the case.361 
 
358  See Quality Weaving Co. v. Regan, 369 A.2d 296, 299-300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) 
(holding that “incidental customer confusion” including misdirected correspondence was 
insufficient to establish secondary meaning). 
359  Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 636 (6th Cir. 2002). 
360  See Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell, 342 P.2d 10, 16 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1959); Eckles, 485 S.E.2d at 24; Bingham v. Inter-Track Partners, 600 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Ill. 
Ct. App. 1992); cf. Puget Sound Rendering, Inc. v. Puget Sound By-Prods., 615 P.2d 504, 
506-07 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (confusion by governmental agencies). 
361  See La Maur, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 839, 845 (D. Minn. 1965) (“The 
obvious confusion in the tendency of counsel and the witnesses to become mixed up in 
using the phrases . . . tends to indicate that the ordinary housewife would be subject to the 
same confusion.”); Grenadier Corp. v. Grenadier Realty Corp., 568 F. Supp. 502, 505 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“[I]t is not without interest that on one occasion letters which 
defendant’s counsel intended for his client were delivered to plaintiff.”); Guardian Life 
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Am. Guardian Life Assurance Co., 943 F. Supp. 509, 523 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (“Plaintiff also points to instances, where, during depositions, Defendant’s own 
attorneys confused the two names.”); Pro Hardware, Inc. v. Home Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 607 
F. Supp. 146, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (“The obvious confusion in the tendency of counsel 
to become mixed-up in using the names . . . tends to indicate that the ordinary 
hardware/home improvement shopper would be subject to the same confusion.”). 
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iv) Bias 
¶131 
                                                
Any witness is potentially subject to impeachment based upon bias.  Because so 
much evidence of actual confusion often takes the form of out-of-court statements made 
either contemporaneously with the events in question or through an affidavit where the 
witness cannot be cross-examined for bias, courts should be particularly sensitive to the 
potential for bias in assessing such evidence.  Often, the relationship of the witness to one 
of the parties will be a source of bias.  For example, a number of courts have discounted 
or discredited confusion that was claimed by employees or relatives of employees of the 
plaintiff.362  Although not as inevitably biased as employees and relatives, some courts 
have discounted or discredited confusion that was claimed by acquaintances of the 
plaintiff’s employees.363  Acquaintances are particularly likely to be biased when they 
have business relationships that give them an incentive to support the plaintiff.364  One 
 
362  See, e.g., Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 
1994) (employees of plaintiff); McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 
1136 (2d Cir. 1979) (employee who claimed momentary confusion); Sun Banks of Fla., 
Inc. v. Sun Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 1981) (employees); 
Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 645 (7th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff’s father); 
Vitek Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 675 F.2d 190, 193 (8th Cir. 1982) (employees); Walter 
v. Mattel, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 751, 760 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (family); Inc. Publ’g Corp. v. 
Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“witnesses either 
employed by plaintiffs or affiliated with them.”); Kadant, Inc. v. Seeley Mach., Inc., 244 
F. Supp. 2d 19, 31 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (declarations by plaintiff’s employees); Paco Sport, 
Ltd., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 319-20 (employees and attorney of plaintiff); A & H Sportswear 
Co., Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 155, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1999) 
(employees of plaintiff); Guillot v. Wagner, 731 So. 2d 335, 338 (La. Ct. App. 1999) 
(individual party plaintiff).  But see Frank Brunckhorst Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 
875 F. Supp. 966, 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding evidence of actual confusion offered 
through witnesses affiliated with plaintiff to be relevant but subject to discounting). 
363  See Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1185 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(friends of company president), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985); Packman, 267 F.3d at 
645 (friends of plaintiff); Walter v. Mattel, Inc., 210 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“acquaintances, friends, and family”) (citation omitted); Heartsprings, Inc. v. 
Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 557 (10th Cir. 1998) (random acquaintances); Walter v. 
Mattel, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 751, 760 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (acquaintances and friends); Leigh 
v. Warner Bros., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1383 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (friend and colleague), 
modified on other grounds, 212 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000); Madison Reprographics, Inc. 
v. Cook’s Reprographics, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 440, 449 n. 10 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (friend 
of shareholder) (citation omitted). 
364  See Pump, Inc. v. Collins Mgmt., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 1159, 1170 (D. Mass. 1990) 
(“[E]ach of the four persons [claiming to be confused] is a friend or acquaintance of 
[plaintiff’s representative]. . . .  While the fact that these incidents involved friends of 
[plaintiff’s representative] does not make them less relevant . . . , it does make their 
testimony less probative of actual confusion.”) (citation omitted); cf. Inc. Publ’g Corp., 
616 F. Supp. at  388 (“Defendants attack Novak’s credibility because of his social and 
business relations with Goldhirsh; and on the ground that it is unlikely that Novak, being 
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court observed: “Trademark law is skeptical of the ability of an associate of a trademark 
holder to transcend personal biases to give an impartial account of the value of the 




                                                                                                                                                
Another potential source of bias is the desire of a sales clerk to make a sale by 
substituting an item in stock for a different item that was requested.367  In assessing 
whether this type of bias would have prompted a knowing substitution rather than a 
mistake, the court should consider the dollar value of the item and any other 
circumstances that would shed light on any such potential motive.368  Finally, animosity 
towards a party is yet another source of bias.369 
The question of bias is particularly problematic where the declarant does not appear 
to testify and where circumstances that may indicate bias of that declarant are not known 
or where sources indicating bias cannot be explored on cross examination.370  This 
problem may be compounded further where the out-of-court declarant’s statements are 
filtered through an additional level of bias when offered by the employees of one of the 
parties.371 
 
in the business, had not heard of ‘Manhattan, inc.’ earlier.  These are valid points, but I 
need not characterize Novak’s testimony as unreliable to disregard it under the de 
minimis rule.”).  But see Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 31 n.8 (1st Cir. 
1989) (“The fact that one of these incidents involved a client of [the representative of 
plaintiff’s licensor] does not make it less relevant; rather it explains why the person went 
directly to [that representative] when he had a complaint. . . .”). 
365  Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 59 
F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 1995). 
366  See Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1304, 1311 (N.D. Ill. 
1994) (noting out-of-court statements were “inherently unbelievable”) (noting that all of 
plaintiff’s actual confusion witnesses “were financially interested in the outcome of the 
case”); Kroger Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 570 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 n.7 (S.D. Ohio 1983) 
(refusing to credit affidavits of individuals obtained by plaintiffs from customers who 
received full rebate on price of product purchased where they mailed in affidavits and 
received double rebates where they agreed to personal interviews). 
367  See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 384 (7th Cir. 1976).  
368  See id. (“we have great difficulty conceiving that a clerk’s anxiety to make this 
small-dollar sale would prompt a deliberate and knowledgeable misrepresentation”). 
369  See Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 757 F.2d at 1185-86 (discounting incident of 
alleged confusion by witness who “had a personal dislike” for defendant); Entrepreneur 
Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) (witnesses involved in 
business disputes with defendant). 
370  See A & H Sportswear, Inc., 237 F.3d at 227 (“The District Court, while not 
explicitly discrediting this evidence, viewed it with great skepticism, given the interested 
sources and the inability to cross-examine the supposedly confused individuals.”). 
371  See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 298 
(3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he District Court properly took into account the potential bias of 
Checkpoint Systems’ employees who testified they had been approached by consumers 
interested in Check Point Software’s firewall products as well as Checkpoint Systems’ 
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¶134 Nonetheless, the mere fact that a witness has a relationship with a party or an 
interest in the outcome of the matter may not always discredit that witness’s testimony. 
Where the sources of the bias are explored and the trial judge determines the witness to 
be credible, that determination will not be disturbed by an appellate court.372  
Furthermore, because of the importance of confusion among actual purchasers, it has 
been held to be erroneous to discredit as “self-serving” an employee’s testimony about 
confusion by an unidentified professional buyer where there was no finding that the 
employee’s testimony was not credible.373  Indeed, business acquaintances who have an 
incentive to testify favorably to the plaintiff may also be the very class of persons whose 
state of mind is most relevant—the consumers of the parties’ goods or services.374 
v) Credibility 
¶135 
                                                                                                                                                
Even where evidence of actual confusion survives the various hearsay obstacles to 
admission, the credibility of out-of-court statements can be a particular problem—quite 
apart from obvious sources of bias.  In some instances, the circumstances surrounding a 
purported incident of confusion may simply render it implausible that the witness was 
actually confused by the parties’ marks.  One obvious example is where great differences 
exist between the respective marks at issue and between circumstances relevant to other 
factors that affect the likelihood of confusion analysis.375  In some instances, an out-of-
 
expert security witness who testified they erroneously believed that Check Point Software 
was affiliated with Checkpoint Systems.”) (citations omitted); Vitek Sys., Inc. v. Abbott 
Labs., 675 F.2d 190, 193 (8th Cir. 1982) (discounting testimony by employees and 
consultants of plaintiff and its parent company about customers who allegedly reported 
confusion); EA Eng’g, Science, and Tech., Inc. v. Envtl. Audit, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 853, 
857-58 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding confusion not established by out-of-court statements 
related by plaintiff’s employees). 
372  See Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 31 n.8 (1st Cir. 1989) (“The 
fact that one of these incidents involved a client of [plaintiff’s president] does not make it 
less relevant; rather, it explains why the person went directly to [plaintiff’s president] 
when he had a complaint about the shirt he bought.”); RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock 
Corp., 603 F.2d 1058, 1061 n.1 (2d Cir. 1979) (“Although one of the witnesses was 
employed by plaintiff and the other by one of plaintiff’s distributors, their credibility and 
the weight to be given their testimony was for the trial judge.”); cf. Centaur 
Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1223 (2d Cir. 
1987) (holding that trial court did not err in refusing to discredit testimony by competitor 
of defendant regarding secondary meaning of plaintiff’s mark where defendant 
thoroughly investigated alleged bias and trial court found witness to be credible). 
373  See Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Intern’l Select Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1341 
(11th Cir. 1999).  
374  See id. at 1341 (holding district court erroneously discounted as “self-serving” 
employee’s testimony about professional buyer who was confused because confusion 
among such persons was entitled to qualitatively high significance). 
375  See Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 501-06 (5th Cir. 
1979) (discounting few incidents of actual confusion, one of which was offered as out-of-
court statement, after finding marks to be highly dissimilar); Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line 
Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 1996) (expressing “doubt” as to credibility of 
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court statement purportedly indicating confusion may be contradicted with live testimony 
that is more credible.376  Where witnesses are offered live in court to testify about actual 
confusion, however, it has been held to be reversible error to refuse to hear their 
testimony and, instead, render judgment for the defendant based solely on a side-by-side 
comparison of the marks.377  The court explained that “such comparison cannot 
conclusively negative the likelihood of confusion as a matter of law nor can it negative 
confusion as a matter of fact by the expedient of technically accepting the offered proof 
but summarily rejecting its weight or credibility.”378  Nevertheless, it has also been held 
                                                                                                                                                 
purported instances of confusion in light of comparison of parties’ advertisements); King 
of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1092-93 (10th Cir. 1999)  
(“This handful of anecdotal evidence is de minimis and does not support a finding of a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the likelihood of confusion, especially in light of the 
complete lack of similarity between the defendants’ uses and plaintiff’s mark.”) (citation 
omitted); Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1535-36 
(10th Cir. 1994) (“The de minimis evidence of actual confusion is especially undermined 
in this case by the sheer lack of similarity between the marks.”).  Cf. Keebler Co. v. 
Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378 (1st Cir. 1980) (“The striking difference in the 
predominant colors of the two cans makes it seem highly unlikely that a reasonably 
prudent consumer would confuse one product for the other.”); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue 
Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 124 (D. Mass. 1999) (“Considering the vast 
difference between Clue Computing’s services and Hasbro’s game and the explicitness of 
Clue Computing’s Web site as to the nature of its business, any confusion shown by 
Hasbro seems to fit into the latter category of ‘carelessness, indifference, or ennui.’”) 
(citations omitted); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir. 
1986) (“Considering Oreck’s weak showing on the other factors relevant to a likelihood 
of confusion, probably nothing short of a showing of actual confusion would be strong 
enough to swing the case in its favor.”) (citation omitted).  It has even been suggested 
that some marks can be so different in general appearance or that it can be so 
inconceivable that an ordinary consumer could be confused as to compel a finding for the 
defendant without resort to “extrinsic evidence.”  Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 
F.2d 568, 572 (10th Cir. 1946). 
376  See Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1185-86 (11th Cir. 
1985) (discounting deposition testimony about alleged actual confusion where witness 
offered by defendant in court was credible and contradicted deponent’s account and 
testified that deponent was biased against defendant). 
377  See James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 
1976) (reversing district court’s granting of directed verdict:  “Side-by-side comparison is 
not the test.”) (citation omitted); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Morton Foods, Inc., 316 F.2d 298, 
300-01 (10th Cir. 1963); Frostig v. Saga Enters., Inc., 539 P.2d 154, 158 (Or. 1975); see 
also Chart House, Inc. v. Bornstein, 636 F.2d 9, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding it was 
reversible error for trial judge to deny injunction based on his personal observations 
about respective marks and business establishments without regard for record evidence). 
378  Frito-Lay, Inc., 316 F.2d at 301. 
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that, in some cases, a mere side-by-side comparison of the marks, without more, will be 




                                                
Another circumstance that may render it improbable that a witness was actually 
confused would be where the witness had extensive knowledge and understanding of the 
respective parties.  This circumstance may occur where the witness is a highly 
sophisticated and experienced member of the trade and where the respective parties have 
each achieved sufficient prominence in the trade so as to make it unlikely that a witness 
of such sophistication and experience would not understand the differences between the 
parties.380 
Conversely, however, the purportedly confused persons may have insufficient 
knowledge of the parties to be actually confused.  For example, where the parties did not 
have an overlapping presence among the same consumer audience during the period in 
which purportedly confused persons stepped forward, then it seems unlikely that those 
persons were confused as to the source of products or services offered by the respective 
parties.381 
Ways of attacking the credibility of a witness purporting to recount confusion by 
others include demonstrating that the witness is unable to recall specifics about the 
instances or showing that the number of specific instances the witness can recall conflicts 
with the witness’s blanket generalization about the number of instances of confusion.  For 
example, in Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Kaushik,382 the plaintiff offered two of its 
own employees as witnesses, and these employees recounted episodes of confusion by 
customers.  However, the first employee was unable to identify names of customers or 
dates of the incidents and was only able to give specifics regarding two incidents, each of 
which involved police and fire department personnel arriving at the wrong location.  The 
second employee had recounted “many” instances of confusion among customers in his 
deposition but could only recall one incident at trial.383  Given that the two establishments 
were located across the street from each other and that these employees would have been 
in a position to observe incidents of confusion, the court found it telling that the 
 
379  See Ball v. Am. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228, 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) 
(“In some instances, . . . just the comparison of the two names themselves may be 
adequate to establish the likelihood of confusion.”) (citations omitted); see also Healing 
the Children, Inc. v. Heal the Children, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1209, 1213-14 (W.D. Pa. 1992) 
(“[W]here the owner of the trademark and the infringer deal in competing goods or 
services, the court need rarely look beyond the mark itself to determine whether there is a 
likelihood of confusion among the relevant buyer class.”)  (citation omitted). 
380  Cf. Inc. Publ’g Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 388 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“Defendants attack Novak’s credibility . . . on the ground that it is 
unlikely that Novak, being in the business, had not heard of ‘Manhattan, inc.’ earlier.  
These are valid points, but I need not characterize Novak’s testimony as unreliable to 
disregard it under the de minimis rule.”) 
381  See Alltel Corp. v. Actel Integrated Communications, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 
1272-73 (S.D. Ala. 1999). 
382  Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Kaushik, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1242 (M.D. Ala. 
2000). 
383  Id. at 1254. 
  103 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 4  
 
employees made no effort to document instances of confusion or express concern to the 
plaintiff.384  The court characterized the evidence as “vague and contradictory” and held 
that any actual confusion “was not substantial.”385 
¶139 
                                                
Credibility of the witness may also be subject to challenge where the plaintiff 
instigated the reports of confusion.  In some instances, courts have discounted purported 
confusion that was first reported in response to a communication by a plaintiff who 
sought such evidence.386  Similarly, courts have looked with a jaundiced eye at a party’s 
effort to “manufacture” evidence by contriving transactions.387  Such contrived 
 
384  Id. at 1254-55. 
385  Id.  
386  See, e.g., Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 
319 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The first indicia of confusion offered by Sun Banks came in 
response to a letter written by Sun Banks’ president to all subsidiary banks requesting 
employees to report incidents of confusion. . . .”); Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 
F.2d 387, 396 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The statements were solicited and drafted by Spraying 
Systems’ counsel and were based on interviews with only its own customers.  These 
factors are indicative of bias.”) (citations omitted); Kroger Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 
570 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 n.7 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (refusing to credit affidavits of individuals 
obtained by plaintiffs where “[t]he affidavits were prepared by plaintiffs’ counsel and the 
initial telephone interviews were conducted by counsel or members of is staff”); Pan Am. 
World Airways, Inc. v. Panamerican School of Travel, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1026, 1037 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (refusing to credit instances of actual confusion by persons who did not 
come forward until contacted by plaintiff where there was no evidence as to how plaintiff 
elicited this evidence).. 
387  See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 384 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(attorney’s secretary sent to store to purchase products); Flinkote Co. v. Tizer, 158 F. 
Supp. 699, 702 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (“There is no proof that any customer was ever confused, 
the evidence consisting of the testimony of an investigator, offered to show confusion on 
the part of clerks and salesmen.  This is probably the easiest kind of evidence to get, since 
salesmen are always ready to sell a buyer something ‘just as good’ if what he wants is not 
in stock—which he is entitled to do—but it is also one of the most unsatisfactory kinds 
because it is susceptible of such varying inferences.”); see also Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 
Holiday Out in Am., 481 F.2d 445, 449 n.3 (5th Cir. 1973) (characterizing two letters 
written after suit was filed both referring to a newspaper article published nine months 
earlier as “suspiciously similar” and discrediting such evidence).  Nevertheless, such 
attempts to uncover evidence are not necessarily improper, and such evidence cannot be 
dismissed out of hand.  See Union Carbide Corp., 531 F.2d at 384 (finding that evidence 
that district court characterized as “manufactured” was relevant); Wuv’s Int’l, Inc. v. 
Love’s Enters., Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 736, 753 (D. Colo. 1980) (holding incidents of 
confusion discerned through informal interviews by plaintiff’s counsel to be relevant); 
Giratex, S.r.L v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(“[R]eliable reports from investigators posing as consumers are frequently recognized as 
probative and admissible evidence in trademark disputes.”) (citations omitted); Selchow 
& Richter Co. v. Decipher, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 1489, 1501-02 (E.D. Val. 1984) (crediting 
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transactions are particularly likely to be discredited where the purchaser deliberately 
requests a product by using one party’s mark but the product is only made by the second 
party.388  However, it has been held that a bald allegation of manufacturing evidence of 
actual confusion, without evidence to support the charge, will not be grounds for 
discrediting evidence of actual confusion.389  Nevertheless, witnesses who come forward 
on their own have been deemed more credible.390  A series of identical or nearly identical 
statements, however, may be more open to challenge.391  Out-of-court statements that 
sound contrived or inconsistent with commercial reality will similarly be subject to 
challenge.392  In one example, a court found it incredible that out-of-court witnesses 
                                                                                                                                                 
confusion gleaned from investigator’s questions to sales clerks where answers showed 
sales clerks were confused). 
388  See Philco Corp. v. F. & B. Mfg. Co., 170 F.2d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 1948) 
(discounting instances in which plaintiff employed persons to ask dealers for auto parts 
under plaintiff’s mark where such parts were only made by defendant and dealers 
fulfilled orders by supplying correct parts needed). 
389  See Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 937 
n.18 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Alpha discounts this confusion by arguing that the confusion may 
have been ‘manufactured by Lone Star Steakhouse itself.’ . . .  The record does not 
support this bald allegation.”). 
390  See, e.g., Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 762 
(2d Cir. 1960) (“Here the evidence is impressive in view of its spontaneous 
character. . . .”); Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 844 
(11th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he reports of confusion that do exist appear genuine, given that the 
three witnesses independently and on their own initiative contacted Dr. Feinman to 
inquire about the new rink.”). 
391  See Blue Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers Union Central Exch., Inc., 731 F.2d 415, 
419-20 (7th Cir. 1984) (“We are not unmindful of the fact that BRF’s affidavits were 
suspiciously similar in format.  We recognize that there are cases in which the movant 
will fail to establish the absence of a triable issue because his affidavits are inherently 
unreliable.”); Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom Am. Inc., 287 F.3d 866, 874 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (noting that six declarations “contain[ed] a more or less identical paragraph” 
which was found insufficient to establish confusion as to source and noting that 
declarants all personally knew plaintiff); Source Servs. Corp. v. Source Telecomputing 
Corp., 635 F. Supp. 600, 612-13 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“Defendant asserts these affidavits are 
incredible because they originate with plaintiff’s employees, because they often lack 
specificity as to the details of the alleged conversations, and because their similar format 
suggests that they were prepared by a single source.  The Court agrees that these 
arguments have some validity, but notes that, in each case, the criticism goes to the 
weight to be accorded the evidence, not its admissibility.”) (citations omitted); Pump, Inc. 
v. Collins Mgmt., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 1159, 1169-70 (D. Mass. 1990) (noting that 
affidavits on actual confusion set forth “nearly identical accounts” and holding such 
affidavits to be insufficient on several grounds). 
392  See Glen Raven Mills, Inc. v. Ramada Int’l, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 1544, 1552 (M.D. 
Fla. 1994) (“[T]he Court notes that the letter Ms. Parke sent shows a remarkable grasp of 
key words used in the analysis of likelihood of confusion.”); Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle 
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could have associated the defendant’s logo with the defendant sufficiently to be confused 
so soon after the defendant began using it.393  Similarly suspect are fact witnesses who 
have repeatedly testified for or against one of the parties in the past.394  Out-of-court 
statements may be subject to attack based on credibility where they do not include 
specificity as to the details of the incidents.395 
¶140 
                                                                                                                                                
Apart from circumstances that cast obvious doubt on a witness’s purported 
confusion are unknown circumstances that surround so much evidence in trademark 
litigation.  For example, one fundamental problem of credibility occurs where the persons 
who were purportedly confused cannot be identified.396  This problem is particularly 
pronounced when one cannot identify the individual in question as a potential customer 
for the goods in question.397  Where an out-of-court declarant can be identified, there is 
always the possibility that the declarant will come forward with testimony indicating that 
the statement attributed to that declarant is either incorrect or is not indicative of the 
declarant’s true state of mind.398  One way to measure measure out-of-court declarants’ 
 
Wax, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1304, 1311 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (characterizing an out-of-court 
witness’s alleged dialogue with plaintiff’s sales representative as “inherently 
unbelievable” and as a “story” that “might make a fine commercial”). 
393  See EA Eng’g, Science, and Tech., Inc. v. Envtl. Audit, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 853, 
858 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
394  See S Indus., Inc. v. Stone Age Equip., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 796, 818 (N.D. Ill. 
1998) (“Bianchi’s testimony is inherently unreliable. . . .  Bianchi’s name has surfaced in 
several SI cases as a consumer who was ‘confused’ about whether SI was the source of 
various products, including bug zappers, garage door openers, and radios.”). 
395  See Source Servs. Corp., 635 F. Supp. at 612-13 (noting affidavits subject to less 
weight based on lack of specificity but finding credibility bolstered by testimony of 
others); Hutchinson v. Essence Communications, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 541, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (“This lack of detail dilutes the probative value of the evidence as demonstrating 
actual confusion.”) (citation omitted). 
396  See, e.g Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 
319 (5th Cir. 1981); CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 686 (7th Cir. 
2001); Hasbro, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d at 117; Flinkote Co. v. Tizer, 158 F. Supp. 699, 702 
(E.D. Pa. 1957); Stolte, supra note 1, at 248 (noting that courts have given little weight to 
out-of-court statements by unidentified persons). 
397  See, e.g., Sun Banks, 651 F.2d at 319; CAE, 267 F.3d at 686; Big Top USA, Inc. 
v. Wittern Group, 998 F. Supp. 30, 51-52 (D. Mass. 1998). 
398  See Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207 
(1st Cir. 1983) (where plaintiff offered affidavits of two salespersons reporting that 
different purchasing directors had been confused, defendant then offered affidavit from 
those purchasing directors, one of whom testified that he was never confused and the 
other of whom testified that he was never confused regarding parties’ products or 
sponsorship thereof but had initially assumed that plaintiff’s salesperson worked for 
defendant). 
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credibility may be to compare those statements to the statements of witnesses who 
actually testify—credibly—that they were not confused.399 
¶141 
                                                
The credibility of witnesses purporting to be confused or reporting the confusion of 
others can be bolstered in a number of ways.  Where such statements come from the 
mouths of an opposing party or its employees, the law of evidence deems such 
admissions to be inherently reliable.400  In addition, live testimony may assist in 
establishing the witness’s credibility, depending upon how well the witness testifies.401  
Contemporaneous statements of confusion by the witness, if available, may bolster such 
testimony.402  A consumer survey may also bolster the credibility of witnesses claiming 
to have been confused or reporting confusion.403  Some witnesses’ credibility may be 
bolstered by consistent accounts of confusion that is the subject of testimony by other 
witnesses.404  The credibility of witnesses testifying as to their own confusion or reported 
instances of confusion can be bolstered by any circumstantial evidence of confusion that 
may be available, such any defendant practice of instructing its sales force in how to 
address confused inquiries.405  In addition, the plausibility of accounts of confusion and 
 
399  See Vitek Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 675 F.2d 190, 193 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(discounting out-of-court statements of customers offered by interested employees and 
consultants where other customers also testified but such testimony did not show 
confusion). 
400  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (exempting admissions of party opponent from hearsay 
definition); see, e.g., Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1515 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(crediting confusion reported in defendant’s answers to interrogatories); Les Ballets 
Trockadero de Monte Carlo, Inc. v. Trevino, 945 F. Supp. 563, 571-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(crediting defendant’s admission of confusion by family, friends, and employee of 
plaintiff); Tortoise Island Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Tortoise Island Realty, Inc., 790 
So. 2d 525, 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“Even [the defendant’s] own witness . . . 
testified she had several customers who thought [the defendant] was the exclusive agent 
for [the plaintiff].”), rev. dismissed, 804 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2001); see generally 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 53, § 7:9.2, at 7-31 to 7-32. 
401  See, e.g., Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 844 
(11th Cir. 1983). 
402  See, e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1544 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(upholding trial court’s finding of actual confusion:  “In the instant case, Isaly presented 
four consumers who testified that they had been confused while making purchases in the 
market place.  Each of the witnesses had notified Isaly of his or her confusion by letter or 
telephone.”). 
403  See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 385 (7th Cir. 
1976) (noting that disagreement with district court over interpretation of evidence of 
actual confusion would not prompt reversal but for survey evidence); AmBrit, Inc., 812 
F.2d at 1544 (survey introduced in addition to live witnesses). 
404  See Source Servs. Corp. v. Source Telecomputing Corp., 635 F. Supp. 600, 612-
13 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that affidavits by persons whose credibility was subject to 
challenge gained enhanced credibility through deposition testimony of others establishing 
actual confusion). 
405  See Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 463-64 (1st Cir. 1962). 
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the fact that they are supported by individuals who are not subject to any credibility or 
bias challenge as well as those who are may persuade the court to credit all of the 
accounts.406 
IV. APPROACHES TO EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL CONFUSION 
¶142 
¶143 
                                                
Discerning any formal standard by which to apply the actual confusion factor is 
difficult.  Because so many decisions involving evidence of actual confusion are marked 
by differing treatment of the same or similar types of evidence, they provide limited 
guidance.  In some instances, courts have focused on particular problems affecting such 
evidence—such as whether there has been sufficient opportunity for confusion to 
surface—and addressed such issues in a way that appears to formulate a standard for 
assessing such evidence.407  Piecemeal standards, however, do not provide 
comprehensive guidance.  Other courts have articulated standards and tests that appear to 
be more comprehensive.  Yet, closer examination reveals that even these tests often fail 
to address the full range of issues affecting the actual confusion factor—and, worse, 
either overemphasize the importance of the presence or lack of evidence of actual 
confusion or are too vague to provide meaningful guidance.  This section reviews those 
standards for addressing actual confusion that are more comprehensive in nature and 
concludes that they reflect an insufficient appreciation for the multi-factor nature of the 
likelihood of confusion analysis and the different ways in which so many different 
circumstances impact the proper assessment of such evidence. 
A. Burden Shifting and Presumptions 
A number of jurisdictions apply a form of burden shifting whereby a showing of 
the plaintiff’s actual confusion will place a more substantial burden on the defendant to 
prove that confusion is not likely.  This approach was developed by the Fifth Circuit in 
 
406  See Home Shopping Club, Inc. v. Charles of the Ritz Group, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 
763, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that plaintiff established actual confusion and noting 
that, while certain witnesses were interested, others were not, and that all accounts were 
plausible). 
407  See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 102 (2d Cir. 
2001) (holding that presence or absence of actual confusion is probative only where “two 
marks have existed side by side in commerce” but not where “there has been little or no 
opportunity for actual confusion to be manifested”). Accord Lois Sportswear U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986) (“In any event, the record 
indicates that sales of appellants’ jeans have been minimal in the United States thus far 
and there has been little chance for actual confusion as yet.”); McDonald’s Corp. v. Shop 
at Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 808-09 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (“Evidence of the number 
of instances of actual confusion must be viewed against the background of the number of 
opportunities for confusion before one can make an informed decision as to the weight to 
be given the evidence.”) (quoting 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:14 at 23-43 (4th ed. 1999)). 
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World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New World Carpets.408  In that case, a manufacturer 
and wholesale distributor of carpets under the WORLD mark sued a carpet retailer for 
using the words NEW WORLD CARPETS in its trade name.  The parties went to trial, 
and, after the close of evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
on its infringement claim.409  During the trial, the plaintiff introduced “uncontradicted 
testimony that World Carpets had been called by retailers who [mistakenly] thought 
World Carpets had entered the retail market.”410  Because of this evidence of actual 
confusion and the defendant’s failure to refute it, the Fifth Circuit shifted the burden to 
the defendant and upheld the directed verdict.411  In a frequently quoted passage, the 
court explained: “reason tells us that while very little proof of actual confusion would be 
necessary to prove the likelihood of confusion, an almost overwhelming amount of proof 
would be necessary to refute such proof.”412  A number of courts have followed this 
approach.413 
¶144 
                                                
In light of the preferred status given to evidence of actual confusion, World 
Carpets’ form of burden-shifting appears to shift to the defendant the burden, not merely 
of disproving actual confusion, but also of proving that confusion is not likely.  Indeed, 
 
408  World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 482 (5th 
Cir. 1971). 
409  Id. at 483-85. 
410  Id. at 489. 
411  Id. 
412  Id. 
413  See, e.g., Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 
1119 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting World Carpets, Inc., 438 F.2d at 482; other citation 
omitted); Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1186 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting 
World Carpets, Inc., 438 F.2d at 482); Thompson v. Haynes, 305 F.3d 1369, 1373, 1377 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Once Fluid Controls had established [actual confusion], the burden of 
going forward with the evidence shifted to Thompson to rebut Fluid Controls’ showing of 
actual confusion.  Thompson cannot maintain that Fluid Controls’ ultimate burden of 
persuasion made it unnecessary for him to rebut Fluid Controls’ evidence.”); King-Size, 
Inc. v. Frank’s King Size Clothes, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1138, 1159 (S.D. Tex. 1982) 
(quoting Soweco); Gasoline Heaven at Commack, Inc. v. Neconset Gas Heaven, Inc., 743 
N.Y.S.2d 825, 828 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (“Plaintiff has established actual confusion and 
defendant has not controverted same.”); Horseshoe Bay Resort Sales Co. v. Lake Lyndon 
B. Johnson Improvement Corp., 53 S.W.3d 799, 811 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (following 
World Carpets test) (citations omitted); Tortoise Island Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. 
Tortoise Island Realty, Inc., 790 So. 2d 525, 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“Proof of 
some actual confusion (and it need not be much), is sufficient to establish likelihood of 
confusion.”), rev. dismissed, 804 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2001); Guillot v. Wagner, 731 So. 2d 
335, 337 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (“[P]roof of actual confusion probably requires a finding of 
the likelihood of confusion even in the absence of other proof.”) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); Phipps Bros., Inc. v. Nelson’s Oil & Gas, Inc., 508 N.W.2d 
885, 889 (S.D. 1993) (quoting World Carpets, Inc.).  But see First Keystone Fed’l Savs. 
Bank v. First Keystone Mortgage, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 456, 462 (E.D. Pa. 1995), judgment 
entered, 923 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
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the Fifth Circuit subsequently referred to this test as one that “shift[s] the burden of proof 
on the likelihood of confusion issue to the defendants.”414  According to one court, a 
defendant “may rebut the evidence of actual confusion with evidence, for example, that 
the confused customer was a rarity or drew an unreasonable conclusion and that there 
was no confusion regarding [the products’] history in the overwhelming majority of 
transactions.”415 
¶145 
                                                
As discussed above, a number of courts have held that the lack of actual confusion 
carries evidentiary weight of its own.416  Not surprisingly, some have cast this approach 
as creating a presumption that confusion is not likely from the absence of evidence of 
actual confusion.417  Others do not use the term “presumption” but find that the absence 
 
414  Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., 481 F.2d 445, 449 n.4 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(citing World Carpets, Inc., 438 F.2d at 482). 
415  Neles-Jamesbury, Inc. v. Valve Dynamics, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 964, 973 (S.D. Tex. 
1997).  
416  See authorities cited supra note 76. 
417  See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 818 (1st Cir. 
1987) (“[C]ourts have stated that absence of actual confusion, when marks have been side 
by side in the same market for a substantial period of time, raises a strong presumption 
that there is little likelihood of confusion.”) (citations omitted); Pignons S.A. de 
Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 490 (1st Cir. 1981) (“[A]bsent 
evidence of actual confusion, when the marks have been in the same market, side by side, 
for a substantial period of time, there is a strong presumption that there is little likelihood 
of confusion.”) (quoting 3 RUDOLPH CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 82.3(a), at 849 (3d ed. 1969)); Petro Shopping Ctrs., 
L.P. James River Petro., Inc., 130 F.3d 88, 95 (4th Cir. 1997) (“At worst, the company’s 
failure to uncover more than a few instances of actual confusion creates a presumption 
against likelihood of confusion in the future.”) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(“[T]he fact that only three instances of actual confusion were found after nearly 15 years 
of extensive concurrent sales under the parties’ respective marks raises a presumption 
against likelihood of confusion in the future.”) (citation omitted); Application of Myers, 
201 F.2d 379, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (“We think the failure or inability to show even one 
instance of the kind in the past creates a strong presumption against likelihood of 
confusion in the future.”); FS Servs. Inc. v. Custom Farm Servs., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 153, 
162 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (“The substantial side-by-side use of the trademarks and service 
marks of plaintiff and defendant, without evidence of actual confusion, creates a strong 
presumption against likelihood of any such confusion in the future.”) (citations omitted); 
Greentree Labs., Inc. v. G.G. Bean, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (D. Me. 1989) (quoting 
Pignons); Bayshore Group Ltd. v. Bay Shore Seafood Brokers, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 404, 
413 (D. Mass. 1991) (quoting Pignons); Ackerman Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Design Sec. Sys., 
Inc., 412 S.E.2d 588, 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)  (“Design argues that a presumption 
against a likelihood of confusion is raised if the marks have coexisted in the marketplace 
over a significant period of time with no evidence of actual confusion. . . .  We agree.”) 
(citations omitted); see also Barre-Nat’l, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 773 F. Supp. 735, 744 
(D.N.J. 1991) (“While . . . the Court will not apply a presumption here, it notes that the 
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of such evidence weighs heavily against the plaintiff.418  Still others take a different tack 
and simply hold that an inference may be drawn against the relevant party based on the 
presence or absence of evidence of actual confusion.419  However, where circumstances 
indicate that no confusion would be expected, no negative inference should be drawn 
where no confusion has surfaced.420  Other courts reject any inference from the lack of 
                                                                                                                                                 
absence of confusion . . . during at least 17 years of concurrent use, weighs heavily 
against a finding of likelihood of confusion.”); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803 
F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir. 1986) (“In light of the concurrent use of the STEAMEX 
DELUXE 15 XL name and Oreck’s XL mark for seventeen months, Oreck’s inability to 
point to a single incident of actual confusion is highly significant.”).  Cf. Frink Am., Inc. 
v. Champion Road Mach. Ltd., 48 F. Supp. 2d 198, 211 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding 
absence of evidence of actual confusion to be “a factor strongly favoring defendant”) 
(citation omitted); see also 3A CALLMAN, supra note 45, § 21:64, at 21-848 to 21-850 
(asserting that absence of confusion after substantial period of concurrent use leads to 
“strong presumption” that confusion not likely).  
418  See, e.g., S Indus., Inc. v. Stone Age Equip., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 796, 818 (N.D. 
Ill. 1998) (“weighs heavily”); Barre-Nat’l, Inc., 773 F. Supp. at 744 (“weighs heavily”; 
not applying presumption); Nabisco v. Warner-Lambert Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 690, 699 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“strong indicator”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), 
aff’d, 220 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000). 
419  See, e.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(citation omitted); McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir. 
1979); Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation 
omitted); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1292 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(citation omitted); Ohio Art Co. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 870, 884 (N.D. 
Ill. 1992) (citation omitted); Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
United of Wisconsin, 727 F. Supp. 472, 477 (N.D. Ill. 1990); M & G Elecs. Sales Corp. 
v. Sony Kabushiki Kaisha, 250 F. Supp. 2d 91, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Haven Capital 
Mgmt., Inc. v. Havens Advisors, L.L.C., 965 F. Supp. 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Jim 
Beam Brands Co. v. Beamish & Crawford, Ltd., 852 F. Supp. 196, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); 
Int’l Data Group, Inc. v. J & R Elecs., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(citation omitted), aff’d, 986 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1992); Wonder Labs, Inc. v. Procter & 
Gamble Co., 728 F. Supp. 1058, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v. 
Cosmair, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1547, 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Exxon Corp. v. Xoil Energy  
Resources, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 1008, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citations omitted); Autozone, 
Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 718, 730 (M.D. Tenn. 2001); see also 3 
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:18, at 23-65 (arguing that absence of confusion over long 
period is relevant but not determinative). 
420  See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 814 F.2d at 818 (citation omitted); Versa 
Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); E. & J. 
Gallo Winery, 955 F.2d at 1339; Robarb, Inc. v. Pool Builders Supply of the Carolinas, 
Inc., 696 F. Supp. 621, 626-27 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Knaack Mfg. Co. v. Rally Accessories, 
Inc., 955 F. Supp. 991, 1003-04 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Packerware Corp. v. Corning Consumer 
Prods. Co., 895 F. Supp. 1438, 1451 (D. Kan. 1995) (citation omitted); Tanel Corp. v. 
Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 774 F. Supp. 49, 55 (D. Mass. 1990); Marketing Displays, Inc. v. 
  111 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 4  
 
evidence of actual confusion without making it clear whether that rejection is rooted in 
specific circumstances of the case.421  Finally, another approach simply views the actual 
confusion factor as one of many factors relevant to the likelihood of confusion inquiry 
and views the presence or absence as establishing or not establishing the factor—
although within the decisions taking this approach there is a difference as to whether the 
lack of such evidence means that the factor favors the defendant or is simply neutral.422  
                                                                                                                                                 
Traffix Devices, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 953, 961 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. 
v. New Line Productions, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (D. Minn. 1998) (citations 
omitted); Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 340, 347 (D.N.J. 
1996) (citations omitted); Smithkline Beckman Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 591 F. 
Supp. 1229, 1243-44 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); Clinique Labs., Inc. v. DEP Corp., 945 F. Supp. 
547, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Warnervision Entmt. Inc. v. Empire of Carolina Inc., 915 F. 
Supp. 639, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citation omitted), vacated, 101 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Philip Morris Inc. v. Star Tobacco Corp., 879 F. Supp. 379, 386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(citations omitted); MGM-Pathe Communications Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. 
Supp. 869, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citation omitted); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Action 
Activewear, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1060, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citation omitted); Time Inc. 
Magazine Co. v. Globe Communications Corp., 712 F. Supp. 1103, 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989); Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417, 1443 (S.D. Ohio 
1990); Sidco Indus. Inc. v. Wimar Tahoe Corp., 795 F. Supp. 343, 347 (D. Or. 1992) 
(citation omitted).  Nevertheless, because the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, one 
court found that the absence of evidence of actual confusion weighs against the plaintiff 
even if explained by a lack of direct competition between the parties.  See Narwood 
Productions, Inc. v. Lexington Broadcast Servs. Co., 541 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982); see also Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. Gemcraft Ltd., 612 F. Supp. 1520, 1528 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding, in light of limited opportunity for evidence of actual confusion 
to surface, that lack of such evidence “weighs only slightly in defendants’ favor”).  But 
see Allen, supra note 4, at 24-25 (arguing that, where confusion would not be expected, 
courts treat actual confusion “as a non-factor”). 
421  See Andy Warhol Enters., Inc. v. Time Inc., 700 F. Supp. 760, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988); Richards v. Cable News Network, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 683, 692 (E.D. Pa. 1998) 
(citation omitted); Am. Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass’n, 532 F. Supp. 
1376, 1387-88 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (citation omitted), aff’d, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983); 
Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Cassini Tailors, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (W.D. Tex. 1990). 
422  Compare U. S. v. Six Thousand Ninety-four (6,094) “Gecko” Swimming Trunks, 
949 F. Supp. 768, 773 (D. Haw. 1996) (“When no evidence of actual confusion is 
presented, that is merely one factor to be considered.”) (citation omitted), Chrysler Corp. 
v. Newfield Publ’ns, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 504, 510 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (holding actual 
confusion factor favors defendant “due to a lack of evidence” but noting that finding was 
“not determinative”), E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 
502, 514 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (“[A]ctual confusion or its absence is only one factor in the 
analysis of likelihood of confusion. . . .  The significance of this factor will therefore have 
to be judged in light of the evidence with respect to the other factors.”), Horn’s, Inc. v. 
Sanofi Beaute, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 318, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding 
that actual confusion factor weighs in favor of defendants in light of absence of confusion 
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One commentator has argued that courts should not draw any automatic presumption or 
inference from the absence of evidence of actual confusion but, instead, should consider 
whether such evidence should have surfaced in light of the types of products and 
companies, whether confused consumers would be likely to express their confusion, the 




                                                                                                                                                
These varying approaches are not all consistent with the same type of burden-
shifting.  For example, nothing short of presuming a likelihood of confusion from the 
presence of actual confusion could shift the burden of proving no likelihood of confusion 
to the defendant.  By contrast, a permissive inference that confusion is likely based on 
actual confusion could conceivably shift the burden of coming forward with evidence—
but solely with respect to the actual confusion factor itself and not with respect to the 
entire infringement standard. 
A benefit of the burden-shifting approach is that it could provide guidance to trial 
courts on the amount of evidence required to establish actual confusion and set 
constraints on the trial court’s discretion by making reversal much more likely where 
evidence of actual confusion is ignored—if the courts could settle on a consistent form of 
burden-shifting.  An example is Meridian Mutual Insurance Co. v. Meridian Insurance 
Group, Inc., where an insurer using the MERIDIAN mark sued an insurance broker that 
 
during two and a half years in France and two years in United States), Giorgio Beverly 
Hills, Inc. v. Revlon Consumer Prods. Corp., 869 F. Supp. 176, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(holding actual confusion factor favors defendant “slightly” where products had not yet 
competed in United States and absence of such confusion in Europe during period of 
competition may not be probative given differences in markets), and Pizzeria Uno Corp. 
v. Temple, 566 F. Supp. 385, 399 (D.S.C. 1983) (“In that plaintiff has presented no 
evidence of actual confusion, the court concludes that this factor weighs against a finding 
of likelihood of confusion.”) (citation omitted), aff’d, 747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984), with 
Saks & Co. v. Hill, 843 F. Supp. 620, 623 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (“Here, plaintiff did not 
produce substantial evidence of actual confusion. . . .  On balance, this factor is neutral.”), 
appeal dismissed, 65 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 1995), Mexican Food Specialties, Inc. v. Festida 
Foods, Ltd., 953 F. Supp. 846, 852 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding actual confusion factor 
“favors neither party” given lack of evidence), and Lever Bros. Co. v. Mattel, Inc., 609 F. 
Supp. 1395, 1402-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (deeming factor to be “a wash” in absence of 
evidence), and Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Big Y Foods, 943 F. Supp. 120, 125 (D. 
Mass. 1996) (holding actual confusion factor “favors neither party” given that there was 
no evidence but where lack of evidence was explained by circumstances), and Aero-
Motive Co. v. U.S. Aeromotive, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 29, 41-42 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (holding 
that lack of confusion justified “draw[ing] the inference that this factor militates against 
finding a likelihood of confusion” in light of length of use but affording factor “little 
weight” in light of other conditions making it likely that confusion would not be 
reported), and Smithkline Beckman Corp., 591 F. Supp. at 1243-44 (“Even though there 
is no evidence of actual confusion, the Court has not given great weight to its absence 
because the [defendant’s] product has not been on the market long enough for the 
absence of actual confusion to be an indicator.”) (citation omitted). 
423  See Allen, supra note 4, at 26. 
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was using the term “Meridian” as part of its name.424  The district court had denied a 
preliminary injunction and, in doing so, found four misdirected telephone calls to be 
irrelevant because they did not involve actual or prospective purchasers.  The Seventh 
Circuit reversed and, in doing so, found that the district court committed clear error and 
concluded that the four persons who made the misdirected calls constituted the “very 
little evidence” necessary to shift to the defendant the burden of coming forward with 
“overwhelming proof” to rebut such evidence, at least for purposes of a preliminary 
injunction hearing.425  Moreover, steps that the defendant had taken to avoid confusion, 
such as discontinuing the telephone number that was the source of the misdirected calls, 
was held to be insufficient to rebut the evidence of actual confusion.426  Thus, the failure 
to give “substantial weight” to even a small number of instances of actual confusion 
among a relevant group, at least at the preliminary injunction phase, may constitute 




                                                
The problem with the burden-shifting approach is that it does not differentiate 
between different types and quantities of evidence of actual confusion produced under 
different circumstances.  Thus, in the Meridian example, misdirected calls are relatively 
weak evidence of actual confusion, and four is a relatively small number.  By contrast, 
where such factors are used to discredit such evidence and avoid burden-shifting, that 
analytic step occurs before applying the test and, hence, without any guidance from it. 
An example of how critical evaluation of evidence may precede and, thus, 
circumvent any burden-shifting test can be seen in Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in 
America.428  In that case, the plaintiff operated a chain of motels under the HOLIDAY 
INN mark, and the defendants offered campground services under marks containing the 
term “Holiday Out.”  After the district court found in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff 
argued on appeal that evidence of actual confusion shifted the burden to the defendant.429  
Although the plaintiff’s vice president testified to receiving inquiries about the defendant, 
and although the plaintiff introduced nine letters and a memorandum of a telephone call 
indicating confusion by the persons making such communications, the Fifth Circuit held 
that the burden was not shifted to the defendant.  Without offering much description of 
the substance of these communications, the court questioned them in light of the fact that 
their authors were not available for cross examination, in light of the fact that two of the 
letters were suspiciously similar and generated after the litigation commenced, and in 
light of the testimony of a manager of one of the plaintiff’s motels at the only location 
where the defendant was also based to the effect that no confusion was observed over the 
course of two years.430 
Thus, in Holiday Inns, all of the evaluation of the evidence of actual confusion 
occurred prior to, and as a way of circumventing, the burden-shifting test; yet no real 
 
424  Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 128 F.3d 1111, 1111 (7th 
Cir. 1997). 
425  Id. at 1118-19. 
426  Id. at 1119. 
427  See id. at 1118-19. 
428  Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., 481 F.2d 445, 445 (5th Cir. 1973). 
429  Id. at 447, 449 n.4. 
430  Id. at 448, 449 n.3. 
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guidance was offered as to how to evaluate such evidence short of applying the burden-
shifting test.  The lack of such guidance is particularly striking with respect to the 
absence of evidence of actual confusion at the one location where the parties were in 
competition for a significant period of time.  As previously discussed, a number of courts, 
including those in the Fifth Circuit, have held that the absence or relative lack of such 
evidence, where many instances of actual confusion would be expected, actually gives 




                                                
As with the presumption that is drawn against the defendant when the burden is 
shifted, however, merely establishing such evidentiary rules does not address the 
distinctions in different quantities of evidence and different circumstances in which the 
absence or relative lack of such evidence may arise.  Indeed, determining when a 
presumption from the lack of evidence of actual confusion would arise is particularly 
difficult, given that the lack of such evidence often will not demonstrate anything in light 
of the difficulty of obtaining such evidence.432  A presumption in either direction presents 
the additional problem of elevating one of the likelihood of confusion factors over all 
others, including ones that are recognized as more accurate predictors of likely 
confusion.433 
B. Totality of the Circumstances 
Some courts weigh the evidence of actual confusion by looking to the totality of 
circumstances surrounding the claimed confusion.434  “This examination may include 
consideration of the time period in question and how extensively the product is advertised 
or made known to the public . . . , as well as the type of confusion that exists and who 
suffers the confusion.”435  The examination should encompass “countervailing 
circumstances which lessen the impact of asserted instances of confusion.”436 
Although the total quantity of incidents in light of the opportunity for confusion to 
develop is relevant to this analysis, other factors such as price, incentive to report 
confusion, the types of persons confused, and the quality of the evidence of confusion 
may lead a court to give greater emphasis to instances of confusion that are relatively few 
 
431  See supra note 417 and accompanying text.    
432  See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 704 
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that absence of evidence of actual confusion does not 
demonstrate that confusion is not likely and noting difficulties in obtaining such 
evidence). 
433  See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
434  See Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 319 
(5th Cir. 1981); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1986).  Under 
a slightly different formulation of this approach, courts examine the number and nature of 
the reported instances of confusion in light of their context to determine the significance 
to be given such evidence.  See Commercial Sav. Bank v. Hawkeye Fed. Sav. Bank, 592 
N.W.2d 321, 331 (Iowa 1999) (citations omitted); Madison Reprographics, Inc. v. Cook’s 
Reprographics, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). 
435  Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 844 (11th Cir. 
1983). 
436  Sun Banks, 651 F.2d at 319 (citation omitted). 
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in number.  For example, in AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc.,437 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a 
finding that an ice cream bar wrapper infringed the plaintiff’s trade dress and trademark 
used to distribute its competing ice cream product and upheld a finding of actual 
confusion based upon just four reported instances of actual confusion.  Specifically, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court had properly found actual confusion based upon 
testimony of four consumers who reported being confused by letter or telephone, as well 
as a survey that was given little weight by the trial court.  Although the defendant argued 
that four instances of confusion were too few in light of the high sales volumes at issue, 
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that this argument was not persuasive in light of the 
difficulties of obtaining evidence of consumer confusion – particularly, in cases involving 
such low-priced goods.  Given that many consumers who are confused will not realize 
their confusion in order to report it and given that many consumers who come to realize 
their confusion will not bother to report that confusion to a “faceless corporation” when 
the dollar value of the purchase was so minimal, the court found that the four reported 
instances of confusion were sufficient to establish actual confusion.  The Eleventh Circuit 
characterized this evidence as “far from overwhelming” but, nonetheless, sufficient to 
support the finding.438  Although the defendant argued that the four instances of 
confusion were inconsequential because the consumers were careless, the court held that 
the argument was misguided insofar as the items in question were inexpensive impulse 
items that are not typically purchased with great care.439  Finally, albeit not emphasized 
by the court, although the number of reported instances of actual confusion were few, the 
evidence of these instances was likely highly credible insofar as the incidents involved 
mistaken purchases and the witnesses testified in person and had contemporaneously 
reported their confusion by letter or telephone.440 
¶154 
¶155 
                                                
One problem with the totality of the circumstances approach is that it often 
provides little or no guidance as to the manner in which various circumstances should 
affect how evidence of actual confusion or the lack thereof should be viewed.  One 
example is as follows: 
[A]ctual confusion or its absence is only one factor in the analysis of 
likelihood of confusion, and cases . . . have found its absence to be either 
important or insignificant, depending on the evaluation of all the other 
factors.  The significance of this factor will therefore have to be judged in 
light of the evidence with respect to the other factors.441 
The solution proposed by this Article is to establish non-exhaustive factors to be 
weighed in assessing evidence of actual confusion. 
 
437  AmBrit, Inc., 812 F.2d at 1531.  
438  Id. at 1544-45. 
439  Id. at 1544. 
440  Id.   
441  E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 393 F. Supp. at 515 (citations omitted). 
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One approach that has the potential to capture critical judgments that other 
approaches either elide or obscure is to focus on the value of the evidence of actual 
confusion.  This approach recognizes that evidence of actual confusion, including its 
type, quantity, and/or lack can be more or less valuable in different circumstances.442  
The fact that value is assigned based upon particular circumstances brings to mind the 
totality of the circumstances test.  However, focusing on the value of the evidence brings 
attention to those aspects of the case that can enhance or detract from various types of 
evidence of actual confusion.  By recognizing the different types of circumstances that 
tend to give more or less value to evidence of actual confusion, this approach has more 
potential to channel the seemingly untethered discretion of lower court judges. 
An example of judicial scrutiny of the value of evidence of actual confusion can be 
seen in the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc.443  In 
that case, the plaintiff owned trademark registrations on the term EVEREADY for use in 
connection with electric batteries, flashlights, and miniature bulbs for automobile and 
marine use.  Between October 1965 and July 1967, the plaintiff sold bulbs under its 
EVEREADY mark in blister packages designated for use in high-intensity reading lamps.  
The defendants used the mark EVER-READY in connection with importing and 
distributing electrical supplies, stationary, gift items, and accessories, including lamps, 
light bulbs, light fixtures, and flashlights.  In 1969, the defendants began importing 
miniature lamp bulbs with the EVER-READY mark stamped on the bases and distributed 
these bulbs in blister packages also bearing that mark and designated for use in high-
intensity lamps.  The defendants also imported high-intensity lamps stamped with the 
same mark.444 
In reversing the district court’s holding that there was no likelihood of confusion, 
the Seventh Circuit closely scrutinized the district court’s rejection of all evidence of 
actual confusion.  In framing this discussion, the Seventh Circuit noted the tension among 
cases holding actual confusion to be unnecessary, cases holding actual confusion to be 
the best evidence of likelihood of confusion, and cases holding isolated instances of 
actual confusion to be insufficient in establishing a likelihood of confusion.  The Union 
Carbide court resolved this tension by focusing on the value of the evidence of actual 
confusion in light of the commercial realities: 
The value of evidence of actual confusion is greater when the products involved are 
low value items because purchasers are unlikely to complain when dissatisfied, which 
would bring to light confusion; but rather they are likely simply to avoid all products 
produced by the company which they believe produced the product which caused them 
trouble. 
With this focus on the value of the particular evidence of actual confusion, the 
Seventh Circuit then evaluated three incidents of actual confusion and emphasized 
 
442  See, e.g., Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 634 (6th Cir. 
2002) (“Where evidence of actual confusion exists, the weight to which such evidence is 
entitled varies depending upon both the type and amount of confusion that occurs.”) 
(citation omitted). 
443  Union Carbide Corp. v, Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 366 (7th Cir. 1976). 
444  Id. at 370-71. 
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additional circumstances that may impact the value of the evidence such as whether the 
statements of allegedly confused persons reflect assumptions about which company those 
persons were communicating with, whether instances of confusion appear credible in 
light of evidence that transactions were instigated by interested parties and in light of 
commercial circumstances that shed light on the motives of the parties involved in such 
transactions, and whether the level of care exercised by the purportedly confused persons 
was consistent with the nature of the products at issue.445 
¶161 
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In addition to offering considerable guidance on how to value evidence of actual 
confusion, Union Carbide is also instructive in the limited control the court exerted over 
the discretion of trial judges.  Specifically, notwithstanding several areas of disagreement 
with the district court’s findings as to the value of the evidence presented on actual 
confusion, the Seventh Circuit noted that these points of disagreement, standing alone, 
would not be sufficient to hold that the trial court was clearly erroneous in holding that 
there was no likelihood of confusion.446  Nevertheless, when these areas of disagreement 
over the evidence of actual confusion were combined with the district court’s rejection of 
survey evidence that the appellate court found probative of likely confusion, as well as 
other factors weighing in favor of likely confusion, the Seventh Circuit held that the 
district court committed clear error and reversed.447  In light of the wide degree of 
discretion afforded to district courts, it is not enough for appellate courts simply to 
provide examples of how they would value particular instances of confusion in light of 
particular circumstances if they were sitting as trial courts.  Rather, explicit criteria are 
needed to guide trial courts valuing such evidence. 
Even courts purporting to follow the burden-shifting test have showed signs of 
abandoning that approach in favor of an approach that affords different value to different 
types of evidence of actual confusion.  Specifically, in Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway 
Discount Drugs, Inc.,448 the then newly-formed Eleventh Circuit purported to follow its 
predecessor, the Fifth Circuit, but noted an inconsistency between the burden-shifting 
test, which is triggered by very little evidence of actual confusion, and decisions that have 
discounted relatively few instances of actual confusion that have occurred over a 
 
445  Id. at 383-85. 
446  Id.  
447  Id. at 385-88.  See also Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 
718 F.2d 1201, 1207 (1st Cir. 1983) (discounting evidence of actual confusion in light of 
factors diminishing its value); Imperial Serv. Sys., Inc. v. ISS Int’l Serv. Sys., Inc., 701 F. 
Supp. 655, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (“The weight given to evidence of actual confusion varies 
according to the identity of those confused, the value of the services involved, and the 
context in which the confusion occurs.”) (citations omitted); Source Servs. Corp. v. 
Source Telecomputing Corp., 635 F. Supp. 600, 614 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“[T]he weight to be 
accorded that evidence [of actual confusion] remains an open issue to be evaluated in 
light of the evidence concerning the degree of competition between the parties, the 
strength of plaintiff’s marks, the circumstances surrounding the confusion, and the 
universe of contacts within which these incidents of confusion arose.”). 
448  Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1160 (11th 
Cir. 1982). 
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significant period of time.449  The court then focused on how much weight should be 
afforded to such evidence and pointed to factors influencing this determination other than 






                                                
Perhaps as important as, and helping to explain the various interpretations of the 
relevance of, the number of instances of confusion are the kinds of persons confused and 
degree of confusion.  Short-lived confusion or confusion of individuals casually 
acquainted with a business is worthy of little weight . . . while confusion of actual 
customers of a business is worthy of substantial weight.450 
The court went on to find only two instances of confusion to be highly probative.  
One instance involved a misdirected letter from a supplier whose familiarity with the 
trade would presumably make confusion difficult.  The second instance involved a 
customer—the precise class that must not be confused for a business to compete.451 
The value of the evidence approach improves upon the totality of the circumstances 
approach by recognizing that not all evidence deserves equal weight.  Some evidence of 
confusion is highly probative.  Other such evidence is less so.  In each case, the value of 
the evidence must be determined by context. 
Ultimately, however, like the totality of the circumstances approach, the value of 
the evidence approach fails to provide sufficient guidance.  Missing are any general 
methods for ranking different types of evidence and any received understanding as to 
contextual factors that affect value.  The solution proposed by this article is to articulate 
types of evidence that tend to have differing degrees of value and types of circumstances 
that tend to affect value in the form of a multi-factor test. 
V. A MULTI-FACTOR TEST FOR VALUING EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL CONFUSION 
Each of the approaches set forth above presents different difficulties.  Either such 
approaches do not provide meaningful guidance or such approaches reflect overemphasis 
on the presence or absence of evidence of actual confusion with insufficient regard for 
context or the multi-factor nature of the likelihood of confusion analysis and the proper 
place of the actual confusion factor in that test.  One solution to the difficulty in 
determining actual confusion is to take a lesson from the approach that courts have 
developed to establishing likelihood of confusion—namely, to use a multi-factor test that 
should be considered in valuing such evidence.  These factors should give explicit 
recognition to the types of circumstances set forth in this article that are relevant to 
valuing evidence of actual confusion.  In turn, each factor should be considered in light of 
sub-factors.  As with the likelihood of confusion test itself, any such list of factors should 
be nonexclusive due to the infinitely varied circumstances that may affect any particular 
case. 
 
449  See id. at 1166-67 (citations omitted). 
450  Id. at 1167.  See also Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 
931 F.2d 1100, 1110 (6th Cir. 1991) (same). 
451  See Safeway Stores, Inc., 675 F.2d at 1167. 
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The first factor to be assessed is the quality of the evidence of actual confusion.  
One component of this factor is admissibility of the evidence.  If the evidence is not in 
admissible form, it should be excluded at trial.  At a preliminary injunction hearing, the 
court must determine if there is reason to accept such evidence.  This assessment must 
take into account the apparent reliability of the evidence—including its completeness and 
context—as well as the proponent’s ability to present the evidence in a better format in 
light of the stage of the proceedings and the court’s ability to conduct a full evidentiary 
hearing at the preliminary injunction phase. 
If the court relaxes the evidentiary rules, or if the evidence satisfies an exception to 
the hearsay rule but, nonetheless, presents the very concerns that underlie the hearsay 
rule, then the court should discount such evidence, unless present in an overwhelming 
quantity or bolstered by evidence of other types of evidence of actual confusion, survey 
evidence, or a strong showing with respect to the other likelihood of confusion factors.  
Among other things, courts should determine whether the persons whose statements or 
actions at issue are identified, how many chains of declarants translate their statements or 
actions before they are offered into evidence, the opportunity of lawyers to shape the 
statements or actions that are offered into evidence, the completeness of any statements 
or actions, and context for any statements or actions, and the feasibility of gathering and 
presenting evidence with greater detail, given, among other circumstances, the nature of 
the incidents of confusion, the nature of the businesses, the ease with which such 
incidents can be documented, and the involvement of counsel during the time when 
incidents of confusion were surfacing. 
B. Types of Evidence 
Courts should recognize that different types of evidence of confusion are subject to 
differing degrees of reliability of evidence depending upon the degree to which such 
evidence consists of actual real-world reactions to the parties’ marks as used in the 
commercial world, whether the actions or statements at issue require a degree of 
investment of thought, resources, or energy such that any confusion rises above the level 
of mere musings about the parties or careless or inattentive actions or statements, and 
whether such evidence takes the form of clear and unambiguous actions or statements 
and provides sufficient context to discern the nature and context of confusion.  Thus, 
evidence of actual confusion will vary in descending order of quality roughly from 
mistaken purchases, other mistaken commercial interactions such as provision of 
financing, credit, or supplies, obtaining service or repairs from the wrong party, returning 
products to the wrong party, redeeming coupons with the wrong party, mistakes by 
advertisers, mistakes in the press that are likely to mislead others, misdirected 
communications that reflect a mistaken understanding, inquiries that reflect a mistaken 
understanding (as opposed to mere musing), and other types of misdirected 
communications, inquiries, and impressions whose import is less clear. 
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This factor has two components.  First, the court must determine where the persons 
at issue fall within the spectrum of those whose views are relevant and how credible the 
persons are.  Based on the discussion in Section III, categories of confused persons are 
relevant in roughly the following descending order: actual purchasers; potential 
purchasers with proximity to a purchasing decision; investors, suppliers, service 
providers, or others whose decisions may affect the good will of the trademark owner 
where such persons are in proximity to a relevant decision; advertisers or members of the 
media who are likely to impact the purchasing public; potential purchasers who are more 
remote from actual purchasers; potential investors, suppliers, service providers, or others 
whose decisions may affect the good will of the trademark owner where such persons are 
more remote from a relevant decision; persons charged with using a high degree of care 
to identify the parties correctly; and others whose reactions may be indicative of the 
reactions of persons in some relevant category. 
Second, courts must consider bias and credibility.  Factors indicating that the 
person might be biased include relationships with, or hostility towards, one of the parties 
or other financial or economic incentive to favor one of the parties.  Factors that may bear 
on credibility include sheer contrast between the account of confusion and the other 
likelihood of confusion factors, the inability of the witness to recall specifics, whether the 
account is consistent with the witness’s degree of sophistication, whether the plaintiff 
was involved in instigating the incidents, whether there are circumstances that bolster the 
credibility of an account, and whether the relevant persons are subject to cross 
examination (or, at least, to being deposed by the defendant). 
D. Level of Care 
Courts must consider whether the persons at issue exercised the appropriate level of 
care and attentiveness for the types of products or services at issue and for the type of 
interaction at issue in each case. The level of apparent care used by persons allegedly 
confused should be assessed in light of the market conditions relevant for determining 
likelihood of confusion.  Consumers should not be held to a higher level of care than they 
would exercise in the marketplace.  While confusion may erode a trademark owner’s 
good will in contexts other than a mistaken purchase, where carelessness or 
inattentiveness occurs in circumstances that are not indicative of potential impact on the 
trademark owner’s good will, then such confusion should be discounted.  Thus, 
misdirected communications regarding warranties, service, or product returns are likely 
to be more relevant than communications that merely report impressions about a product. 
E. Level of Sophistication and Intelligence 
Much like the level of care, the sophistication of persons purportedly confused 
should be assessed in light of marketplace conditions and in light of what such evidence 
foretells regarding persons in the marketplace.  Persons purportedly confused should be 
held to a reasonable level of ordinary intelligence—but not more than would be expected 
of the average member of the consuming public for the relevant product or service.  To 
the extent persons reporting actual confusion are more sophisticated, such confusion (if 
  121 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 4  
 
credible and if occurring in a context indicative of the reactions of others) may foretell 
broader confusion among persons more representative of the actual marketplace. 





To some extent this factor overlaps with the type of evidence at issue.  For 
example, a mistaken purchasing decision will exhibit a higher degree of confusion than a 
casual inquiry about whether two parties are related.  However, courts should also 
consider the degree to which reports of confusion continue to surface over time—as an 
indicator of the reliability of incidents at any particular time to predict of likely confusion 
and as an indicator of whether incidents are likely attributable to some factor other than 
the parties’ marks (like the temporary existence of only one party in a telephone 
directory), which may disappear over time. 
G. Duration, Extent, and Nature of Coexisting Uses 
This factor measures the degree to which evidence of actual confusion would be 
expected to surface by looking to whether there has been sufficient coexistence in the 
marketplace to produce confusion.  For that to happen, the parties must have presented 
their marks to a common audience—either through direct competition, through sales as 
complimentary or related products or services, or through advertising to a common 
audience in a common territory or in overlapping channels of trade.  In addition, the court 
must take intou account factors regarding the context of the coexisting uses that may 
make incidents of confusion more or less likely to surface—factors such as price of the 
goods or services, ease of communicating with the parties, the degree to which the parties 
communicate directly with consumers, the degree to which communications with 
intermediaries such as retailers are passed to the parties, the degree to which consumers 
are likely to realize their mistakes and report them to the parties, the degree to which 
consumers are likely to be deterred from coming forward by concerns such as 
embarrassment or the fear of becoming a witness in litigation, and the parties’ 
recordkeeping practices.  In light of the extent and nature of the particular coexisting 
uses, the court must then determine whether the coexistence has endured for a sufficient 
period that some amount of confusion should have surfaced if confusion were likely to 
occur. 
H. Ability to Gather Evidence of Confusion 
The courts should also consider the practical ability of a party to obtain evidence of 
confusion that has surfaced.  Circumstances affecting the ability of a party to obtain such 
evidence include whether consumers typically communicate with third parties regarding 
the products or services at issue instead of the parties themselves, the degree to which the 
parties’ have had the opportunity to conduct discovery, and the opposing party’s 
recordkeeping practices. 
I. Quantity of Incidents 
With the various other factors in mind, for each type of person and each type of 
incident, the quantity of incidents will be important but the degree of importance will 
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vary with the strength of the evidence and the degree to which evidence of actual 
confusion should be expected.  While courts should be wary of imposing any statistical 
significance threshold that could only be achieved properly in the context of a survey, 
courts should also be mindful of benchmarks that provide context, such as extent of sales, 
advertising, and publicity. 
In light of the many textual and policy reasons underpinning the rule that evidence 
of actual confusion is not required, no inference should automatically be drawn against a 
plaintiff where instances of actual confusion are minimal or nonexistent.  Rather, if the 
defendant seeks to use this factor to overcome other evidence of likely confusion offered 
by the plaintiff, it should be incumbent on the defendant to put the lack of evidence of 
actual confusion in context and to demonstrate its significance.  In some cases, this task 
will be easy, such as where there has been extensive side-by-side competition over many 
years.  In other cases, the task will be more difficult.  By contrast, where the plaintiff 
seeks to establish the actual confusion factor as pointing to likely confusion, it should be 
incumbent on the plaintiff to put the evidence of actual confusion in context and to 
demonstrate its significance.  Given the many problems with evidence of actual 
confusion and the many contextual nuances that affect the value of such evidence, 
presumptions in either direction from the presence or lack of such evidence are not 
appropriate.  However, the strength of the inference drawn in either direction may vary 
depending upon the showing made by the party seeking to establish such an inference. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, far from serving as a stable, objective determinant of likely confusion, the 
actual confusion factor has been a source of inconsistency, incoherence, unpredictability, 
and, indeed, confusion in trademark law.  Evaluating evidence of actual confusion 
requires highly subjective judgments.  To date, the courts have not yet articulated an 
approach to such evidence that promotes a consistent, coherent, and predictable approach 
to the evidence.  A multi-factor test will best achieve that end and, by providing uniform 
guidance, should ultimately help courts discern between evidence of actual confusion 
having more objective value and evidence of actual confusion that is more prone to 
subjective interpretation. 
